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ABSTRACT 
Tl'e Maputo Corridor is the most significant development project undertaken by 
the Souti1 African government since 1994. The Corridor is an extremely complex 
project, bringing together a variety of actors from South Africa, Mozambique, and 
beyond. The project includes the rehabilitation and upgrading of major transport 
and communications infrastructure between Witbank and Maputo, institutional reform 
to expedite border-crossing, and incentives for labour-intensive investment in the 
areas adjacent to the Corridor. The Maputo Corridor is also the first build-
operate-transfer highway in the region. 
The Maputo Corridor is a valid and fascinating subject for political inquiry 
because it provides insight into the new South African government's priorities and 
ideological stance. Research on the Corridor also contributes to our understanding 
of political power structures in the region. The primary goal of this dissertation 
was to come to an understanding of why and how the Maputo Corridor developed. 
Research was designed to test popular hypotheses from the South African media. 
These hypotheses were (1) that the Corridor was designed to isolate Gauteng from 
potential transport-based blackmail by the IFP and (2) that the Corridor was 
sponsored and directed by the leaders of Mpumalanga Province. 
This dissertation is composed of four main sections. First, the historical 
context of the Corridor starting in the 19th century is investigated. Repetitive 
historical themes with relevance for the present are identified. Second, the 
leaders and managers of the corridor project are pinpointed. Third, strategic 
motivations for the corridor in the current political environment are studied. The 
fourth part consists of an investigation of the means used to implement the 
Corridor. Several sources of information were used. These sources included in-
depth interviews with the Corridor's stakeholders, primary documentation, and 
secondary published sources. 
The conclusion of the research was that a revitalised transport corridor was 
virtually inevitable given the region's geography, history, and recent political 
developments. However, the Maputo Corridor includes much more than simple 
transport development, it is a holistic regional development strategy. The impetus 
for this strategy came from the Department of Transport. While representatives of 
Mpumalanga played prominent roles in the Corridor's development, they were far less 
influential than had originally been presumed. The initial phase of the project's 
implementation has been largely successful. This success is the result of careful 
co-ordination of a wide variety of actors. This co-operation and co-ordination was 
fostered through functional, intergovernmental teams of civil servants. The Maputo 
is a successful example of a new paradigm of development in Southern Africa - that 
of intergovernmental co-operation and private-public sector partnership. 
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Louis Trichardt treks to Delagoa Bay. 
Johann Smellekamp sails into Delagoa Bay. 
South African Republic and Portugal recognise each 
other. 
First train in South Africa -- steam train from 
Durban to the Point 1.87 miles. 
Discovery of diamonds near Kimberley. 
President Pretorius attempts to annex part of 
Mozambique. 
New Treaty signed between SAR and Portugal. 
"Matola" Road constructed to Lourenco Marques. 
Free trade pact signed between Portugal and SAR. 
French President McMahon decides in favour of 
Portugal's sovereignty over Delagoa Bay. 
President T.F. Burgers travels to Europe to raise 
capital for a railway. 
Nellmapius' new road opens to Pilgrim's Rest. 
UK annexes South African Republic. 
UK and Portugal sign Lourenco Marques Treaty. 
South African Republic regains sovereignty. 
Discovery of Witwatersrand gold fields. 
Sivewright Agreement extends Cape line to Rand. 
Cape -- Johannesburg line completed. 
Lourenco Marques connected via Ressano Garcia to 
Transvaal. 
Durban -- Johannesburg line opens to traffic. 
Secret Anglo-German Agreement. 
Mozambican labour recruitment recommences. 
Modus Vivendi signed. 
Pact government formed. 
Lourenco Marques Convention signed. 
Mozambique Convention signed. 
Limpopo line opens. 
Frelimo founded in Dar es Salaam. 
Lourenco Marques -- Goba, Swaziland line opens. 
Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence. 
Zambia closes border with Rhodesia until 1978. 
Over 200,000 South Africans travel to Mozambique 
annually. 
Portuguese sign Lusaka Protocols. 
Mozambique achieves independence. 
Richards Bay and Saldanha ports come on line. 
Mozambique closes border with Rhodesia. 
Zimbabwe achieves independence and border with 
Mozambique is re-opened. 
SADCC founded in Lusaka? 
SADCC makes its first effort to rehabilitate 
Mozambican ports (10 year project @ US$10 billion). 
Ruth First assassinated in Maputo. 
SADF Commandos destroy Beira oil storage depot. 
Nkomati Accords signed. 
Mozambique launches Economic Recovery Plan. 
General Peace Agreement for Mozambique signed in 
Rome. 
Opposition parties unbanned in South Africa; 
dissidents freed. 
The African Development Bank releases a report on 



















Africa; infrastructure development is highlighted, 
private sector participation suggested. 
NINETEEN NINETY-FOUR 
South Africa appoints John Sunde as first 
ambassador to Mozambique. 
Passenger train service between Johannesburg and 
Maputo is restored. 
Joe Madise and Matthews Phosa go to Mozambique for 
talks. 
Mandela visits Maputo to sign an agreement on 
security, trade, and the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric 
scheme. Agreement sets up bi-national commission. 
Cross-Border Committee established (drug- and arms 
smuggling, stock theft). 
Mozambican troops loot goods train 25 km west of 
Maputo -- all train service suspended. 
Passenger service to Maputo reintroduced. 
Premier Matthews Phosa declares a road from 
Middelburg to Maputo a priority. 
NINETEEN NINETY-FIVE 
CFM rejects US$25 million from USAID for severance 
packages. With 15,000 employees, CFM is 
Mozambique's largest employer. 
1 800 tons of USAID grain stolen "losses of the 
magnitude suffered in the recent deliveries of 
USAID-financed maize are clearly so large that they 
must have required a high degree of organisational 
planning." further shipments suspended. 
Phosa meets governor of Mozambique's Gaza province 
to discuss border security, agriculture and 
infrastructure. 
Ketso Gordhan (transportation D-G) officially 
announces the Maputo Corridor project. 
Manuel, Maharaj and Sigcau fly to Mozambique to 
finalise details of multimodal transportation 
agreement including corridor development. 
Maharaj introduces concept of "development 
corridor" for first time at super-cabinet meeting. 
Discussions held between Northern Province and Gaza 
Province with goal of a Kruger Park border post. A 
Road through Kruger Park is proposed. 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism Minister Dawie 
DeVilliers condemns idea of Kruger Park road, as it 
would exacerbate problems with poaching, migration, 
and crime. 
South Africa's two largest coal exporters express 
grave doubts that port of Maputo could adequately 
service their needs. 
NINETEEN NINETY-SIX 
Phosa calls on investors to join in infrastructure 
funding. 
Maputo Development Corridor launch showcase trip 
to Maputo runs into problems. (Maharaj, Gordhan, 
and Phosa present) 
Rennies, P&O and CFM invest in Maputo container 
terminal. Goal: increase 12,000 containers/year at 
present to 100,000 containers/year in four years. 
Mpumalanga's first private sector investors' 
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Government calls for tenders in road and rail 
upgrading project (expected to be awarded in first 
week of June). 
MDC "launched" with support of Mandela in Maputo. 
Mozambican businessmen seek protection from South 
Africa - demand for government guarantee of a 
portion of building contracts. 
Matthews Phosa presents plans to include Swaziland 
and Botswana in Maputo Corridor. "We are looking at 
creating a direct transport link straight through 
Swaziland from northern KwaZulu-Natal to serve as a 
second feeder for the harbour [at Maputo]." 
Police stationed every SOOm to 2 km along N4 in 
Mozambique. 
KwaZulu-Natal, Mozambique, and Swaziland agree on 
N2 expansion. 
Nzo chairs first sitting of South Africa-Mozambique 
co-operation commission. 
Maputo Corridor Investment Conference. Goal: 
Mandela) Maximise private sector participation. 
500 potential investors at conference. 
Transnet and CFM sign a declaration of intent to 
upgrade rail link between Ressano Garcia and Maputo. 
Rename accuses Frelimo of going ahead with MDC 
without consultation of other parties. 
Three day Frelimo party congress. Frelimo reverses 
its stand on privatisation. 
Mpumalanga releases its strategic plan. 
Joe Magagula holds talks with KZN Premier Mdlalose 
on Maputo Development Corridor 
Joe Magagula envisions super-corridor from the 
Atlantic to the Indian Ocean to Cape Town. 
Tenders for N4 extended until last day of June. 
SA Infrastructure Fund launched by SCMB. First of 
its kind in Africa. 
Framework accord signed by Maharaj and Muxanga 
compromising three agreements. Maputo Corridor Company 
established. 
European promotional roadshow for Maputo Corridor. 
DTI earmarks $5bn of investments in Maputo Corridor 
Mozambican and Zimbabwean foreign ministers meet 
and pledge to deepen co-operation. 
Transportation white paper released, 
revolutionising the role of government in transport 
provision. 
Two consortiums short-listed for N4 
Meeting of UK-South Africa trade association 
Maharaj says, "a cost-effective, efficient 
transport system could substantially lower the cost 
of trade." 
Final N4 bids to be submitted in early October 
(winner to be announced in late October and 
construction is set to begin in January) 
Maharaj and Muxanga meet in Maputo 
UK delegation arrives to assess investment 
potential of Maputo Corridor. 
Swazi government signs Memorandum of Co-operation 
to join in Maputo Corridor. 
Head of Grinaker Construction estimates cost of 
toll road at R3 billion, not R600 million. 
Plans to privatise port of Maputo announced. 70% 
private shareholding expected; bidding in 1997. 
Tenders for rail rehabilitation in Mozambique to be 
ready. 
















Ketso Gordhan announces that national roads agency 
to be in place by April of 1998 with responsibility 
for national roads network and all Build-Operate-
Transfer roads. 
Maharaj meets .Wolfensohn in Maputo. World Bank 
recognition called "groundbreaking" as the Bank 
usually only lends to governments and not to regions. 
Investec and Nedbank appointed as leaders for 
organising R700m local debt. 
Thabo Mbeki opens first major toll road financed by 
private sector. Nl between Warmbaths and 
Pietersburg is a "precursor of a whole 
generation of projects" -- Maharaj. 
The Industrial Development Corporation selects Maputo 
as the site of its iron reduction plant, nixing plans 
to build it in Phalaborwa. 
CFM releases a report calling for the leasing of its 
rail lines to domestic and foreign companies. 
Three companies are short-listed for the N4 "platinum" 
toll road in the Northwest Province. 
Government shelves plans for the "Wild Coast Toll 
Road," similar to the Maputo Corridor Toll Road. The 
project would not be economically viable. 
Fish River/Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative 
Investors' Conference held. 
Phosa attends SADC conference and discusses migration 
and other issues of regional cooperation. 
Pref erred bidder to be announced for Maputo Port 
management contract. 
Contract for rehabilitation of the Port of Maputo 
expected to be awarded. 
Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative (South Africa, 




The Maputo Development Corridor is a major infrastructure and 
development project that will tie Southern Mozambique to South Africa's 
Mpumalanga, Gauteng, and Northern Provinces. The Corridor is an 
intricate web of private- and public-sector investment between Witbank 
and Maputo. The Corridor's many actors include the private sector, 
international financial institutions, and the governments of South 
Africa, Mpumalanga, the Northern Province, and Mozambique. The Maputo 
Corridor comprises: new infrastructure investment in ports, rail, and 
roads; institutional reform at the border crossing; and promotion of the 
region to private sector investors through a number of investment 
incentives. The Maputo Corridor is the most prominent of a number of 
Spatial Development Initiativesi(SDis) promoted by the South African 
government. 
Economic development is one of the primary tasks of any 
government. Development policy is almost always controversial, but it 
is particularly contentious in post-Apartheid South Africa. Despite 
some policies clearly bearing .the nee-liberal stamp, ii there is no 
single accepted paradigm for development. The ANC seems to vacillate 
between nee-liberal and socialist thinking in its development policy. 
The governing coalition includes everyone from Marxists to free-
marketeers. Since the Maputo Corridor is the largest new development 
project undertaken to date, a case study of the Corridor would provide 
clues about the ANC's ideological stance. Such a study would be 
particularly enlightening in terms of understanding the ANC's economic 
policy, South Africa's unique brand of federalism, and South Africa --
Mozambique relations. 
This paper will investigate three factors that contributed to the 
implementation and development of the Maputo Corridor. First, the 
importance of the historical legacy of transport relations between South 
Africa and Mozambique will be studied.iii The precedent for the Maputo 
Corridor was set over one hundred years ago, when the Reef was linked 
via rail to Louren90 Marques. A number of recurrent themes emerge from 
the history of this route, also known as the "Oosterlijn,n which have 
important implications for current policy-formation. 
iSpatial Development Initiatives are regional development schemes that include 
both infrastructure upgrading and incentives for investment. There are a number 
of SDis across South Africa. SDis are promoted by South Africa's Departments of 
Transportation and Trade and Industry. 
iiFor example, the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution plan largely adheres 
to the principles of neo-liberalism as expressed by international financial 
institutions. 
iiiThe historical legacy is the history of South Africa -- Mozambique relations 
and how this impacts policy formation at present. 
Second, the role of leadership will be investigated. 
Understanding who is in control of policy is essential, because leaders 
have the power to influence policy in a variety of ways. It is not 
uncommon for leaders to influence policy to their own benefit. 
Identification of the leaders of the Maputo Corridor will contribute to 
our understanding of the motivations for the Corridor. 
Third, the domestic and regional strategies of Frelimo and the ANC 
and how these strategies contributed to the Corridor development will be 
discussed. Within South Africa, the Corridor may be one means of 
protecting the economic heartland of Gauteng from potential blackmail 
from KwaZulu-Natal. Regionally,iv the Corridor is one facet of a 
strategy to create a more integrated and prosperous neighbourhood. In 
addition, the Maputo Corridor fits neatly into Frelimo's economic and 
regional strategies. 
It was hypothesised that these three factors - history, 
leadership, and strategic motivations, affected the implementation of 
the Maputo Corridor. To more fully understand the impact of these 
factors, the implementation process, or the way the concept of a 
development corridor was transformed into bricks and mortar, will be 
discussed (see figure one). 
1.1 What are Development Corridors? 
Development corridors take many forms. In South Africa alone, 
there are planned corridors that never leave one city (Soweto - CBD), 
corridors that entail primarily new infrastructure (East London -
Butterworth), and corridors that entail very little new infrastructure 
but are attempts to attract private investment to a particular area. 
All development corridors are essentially composed of the area around a 
major route in which development is, or potentially could be, 
concentrated. 1 According to the Maputo Development Corridor Interim 
Coordinating Committee Technical Team, development corridors 
are almost always assigned to that linear geographic area bisected 
by an existing or potential infrastructure route 'spine.' Such 
infrastructure enables access to points at both ends of, and 
within, the corridor, and is usually the critical link spurring 
development along the corridor. Often, investments in upgrading or 
constructing new spine highways, rail lines, canals, gas/oil 
pipelines, or communications infrastructure are made to enhance 
opportunities within the corridor. 2 
In short, corridors are linear areas identified for accelerated 
infrastructure/development funding, where incentives for new investment 
are provided. 
ivRegional policy is South African or Mozambican foreign policy involving the 
SADC region. 
2 
The Interim Coordinating Committee distinguishes between three 
types of development corridors: 
First, development promotion corridors are corridors envisioned 
with the idea of attracting investment of one particular type or 
another. 3 These corridors aim to take advantage of agglomeration and 
scale economies.v For example, by linking existing or proposed 
biotechnology facilities, universities, and hospitals with a development 
promotion corridor, new investment could be attracted as an area is 
recognised as a place of research excellence. A development promotion 
corridor allows for more effective marketing of a particular region to 
potential investors. New infrastructure is not always needed for a 
development promotion corridor. Although not technically corridors, the 
research triangle area in North Carolina and Fairfax County, Virginia 
are examples of this type of initiative. 
Second, heritage corridors attempt to promote the development of 
an area's natural or historic resources, while conserving the area's 
unique attributes. In the US, heritage corridors are promoted by the 
National Park Service in order to encourage holistic development of 
scattered natural attractions or historical sites.vi Infrastructure 
improvements in these corridors must proceed with care in order to avoid 
negatively impacting the surrounding area. 4 
The third type of development corridor is the access corridor. 
Access corridors' primary objective is to facilitate access between 
production and export facilities or between production facilities and 
sources of power. However, an access corridor also creates opportunities 
along its entire length by improving transportation to existing human 
and natural resources. The Sao Paulo - Buenos Aires corridor is likely 
the largest example of this type of project. This corridor is a co-
operative venture between three countries spanning 2,100 kilometres from 
end to end. When completed, the road will cut transport costs by 50% 
and delivery time by over 90%. 5 
Southern Africa's experience with development corridors is limited 
largely to simple access corridors, all of which were built during the 
colonial era. Simple access corridors provide for the movement of goods 
between point A, usually a mineral extraction area or industrial centre 
and point B, a port. Development along the route of the corridor is not 
emphasised, and if it takes place at all, is concentrated around a 
vAgglomeration economies mean that spatial clustering firms of a similar type 
(such as in Silicon Valley) increases their efficiency, innovation, and 
competitiveness. Scale economies are efficiencies which increase as firm or 
plant size increases. A development promotion corridor would provide 
opportunity for scale economies by improving transport, effectively increasing a 
given plant's market area. By clustering similar firms spatially, a development 
promotion corridor would achieve agglomeration economies. 
3 
limited number of intermodal nodesvii (see figure two). Examples of such 
corridors are the Limpopo (Harare - Maputo), Benguela (Shaba -
Benguela), Nacala (Malawi - Nacala), and Beira (Harare - Beira). These 
transport coTridors were the focus of much attention and investment 
during the SADCC years. viii Southern African examples of other types of 
development corridors are limited. The Nl between Johannesburg and 
Pretoria has grown organically into a sort of development promotion 
corridor. 6 However, the driving force behind this high-tech corridor is 
largely the collapse of central business districts in Gauteng.ix 
In South Africa, the concept of development corridors emerged in 
the 1975 National Physical Development Plan (NPDP). The plan identified 
a number of development axes (see figure three). However, the lack of 
sufficient investment incentives and the absence of a support and 
promotion system meant that little developed along these routes. 7 
Ironically, much of South Africa's experience relevant to the Maputo 
Development Corridor comes from the Apartheid homeland system. In order 
to make the homelands more self-sufficient and to bolster the political 
and economic arguments behind separate development, the industrial 
decentralisation program was launched. The government, along with the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), provided incentives for 
investors to locate new investments in homeland areas. 8 The program had 
mixed success; similar incentives are used to attract companies to the 
Maputo Corridor area. The primary difference is that the Corridor's 
development potential is far greater than that of any of the former 
homelands. 
1.2 Definition of the Maputo Development Corridor 
The Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) is one of a number of 
spatial development initiatives (SDis) promoted by South Africa's 
Departments of Transport and Trade and Industry. SDis are multifaceted 
projects aimed at encouraging economic growth and enhancing South 
vi The Colonial Parkway, linking Jamestown, Williamsburg, and Yorktown in 
Virginia, is an example of this type of corridor. 
viiAn intermodal node is a location where an individual or goods can change from 
one mode of transport to another. Examples of intermodal nodes are ports, 
railway stations, and airports. Atlanta is an oft-cited example of how an 
intermodal node can become a major city. 
viii see Tortensen, Arne. Dependence and Collective Self-reliance in Southern 
Africa: the Case of SADCC (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 
1982). 
ixGauteng has emerged as a single metropolis covering a large area with low-
density clusters of malls, residential subdivisions, office developments and 
entertainment complexes linked by a system of highways. As such, Gauteng 
closely resembles American 'new cities.' According to Robert Fishman, "the 
basic unit of the new city is not the street measured in blocks, but the "growth 
corridor" stretching 50 to 100 miles." The Nl is Gauteng's growth corridor. 
For a comprehensive analysis of American urban trends see Fishman, Robert. 
(1990) "America's New City," The Wilson Quarterly, 14, pp. 24-48. 
4 
Africa's international competitiveness through infrastructure 
development. The Maputo Development Corridor is a hybrid corridor, 
comprising attributes of several types of development corridors. 
The Corridor is designed to facilitate access. Transport between 
the endpoints and various intermodal nodes is improved through 
infrastructure upgrading. A. new highway and improved rail links should 
speed transport and reduce costs. This aspect of the project is similar 
to Southern Africa's simple access corridors. 
Certain sections, such as Northern KwaZulu-Natal and the sub-
corridor to Xai-Xai, are to be developed as a type of heritage corridor. 
Sensitive and appropriate development should encourage tourism and 
appreciation of the natural surroundings. Prior to 1975, over 200,000 
South Africans followed to N4 to holidays in Mozambique annually. 9 A 
newly renovated N4 combined with peace in Mozambique should encourage 
the return of tourists, who will follow the heritage corridors up and 
down the coast. 
In addition, a variety of instruments are designed to facilitate 
development along the length of the corridor. Inducements are provided 
for investment and government will provide accelerated development funds 
for the areas adjacent to the corridor. In this aspect the Maputo 
Corridor is similar to development promotion corridors and to the 
industrial decentralisation schemes of the past. Investment in the 
corridor area is promoted by the central governments of South Africa and 
Mozambique, the Mpumalanga government, and a dedicated Maputo Corridor 
Company. 
The Maputo Corridor has its roots in the region's simple access 
corridors, experience garnered from separate development, and 
international development experience. Together these initiatives are 
anticipated to stimulate economic growth in the area between Gauteng, 
Maputo, and Northern Natal. Benefits from the Corridor are expected to 
accrue at the end points as well as to the areas adjacent to the 
infrastruct~re (see figure four). 
The Maputo Corridor is composed of a primary corridor and a 
secondary corridor. The primary corridor comprises rail, road, and 
telecommunications links between Witbank and Maputo. The primary 
corridor also includes the main urban centres along the route. The 
secondary corridor area consists of the administratively definable areas 
immediately adjacent to the primary corridor. In practice, this is the 
area which receives attention in terms of new investment and accelerated 
RDP funding. The secondary corridor is composed .of the bordering 
magisterial districts. This demarcation is u~~ful for statistical 
purposes. 
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The corridor also includes three tertiary resource nodes and 
feeder links.x These are: a link to Penta do Ouro to facilitate tourist 
development with Northern KwaZulu-Natal; a link from Middelburg to 
Steelport; and a link to the petrochemical cluster in Secunda. In 
addition there are two sub-corridors, one to Phalaborwa and Tzaneen in 
the Northern Province and another to Xai-Xai in Mozambique (see figure 
five) . 10 
The corridor includes five major projects: the N4 toll road 
between Witbank and Maputo; upgrading of rail service between 
Komatipoort and Maputo; improvement and dredging to the Port of Maputo; 
restructuring the border post to allow more efficient movement of people 
and goods; and new telecommunications infrastructure connecting South 
Africa and Mozambique. 
1.3 Why Study the Politics of the Maputo Development Corridor? 
The politics of development are almost always contentious. Any 
policy decision favours some• g~oups in society over others. Policy can 
favour old people over younger people, companies over workers or vice 
versa. In South Africa, business and labour fought endlessly over the 
new Labour Relations Act. Each group hoped to use its influence to 
create conditions favourable to their own interests. Every new 
development initiative will experience such a struggle as different 
groups compete for benefits. This behaviour is also known as rent-
seeking. 
The politics surrounding transportation development can be 
particularly quarrelsome as the benefits of transport networks are 
spatially concentrated.xi A new road will only affect those individuals 
and companies which it passes. For example, the choice to route the Nl 
via Bloemfontein rather than Kimberley is profitable for individuals and 
businesses in Bloemfontein. To secure such benefits, different regions 
often compete for limited infrastructure capital. This competition can 
become especially fierce in countries with limited infrastructure 
budgets like South Africa. 
The stakes in new transport infrastructure are high; by making one 
or another region more accessible to the national or world markets, this 
region becomes relatively privileged. New transport infrastructure 
changes the spatial distribution of opportunity, demand, and supply. An 
xTertiary resource nodes and feeder links are essentially improved 
infrastructure links to areas that offer existing or potential economic 
opportunity and are in proximity to, but not part of, the axis between Witbank 
and Maputo (roughly along the N4). 
xiAccess to a transportation network means that an individual or firm's market 
is larger than without such access. This allows opportunities for 
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area with access to a larger market has opportunities for specialisation 
and trade that an isolated area lacks. An area bypassed by transport 
and communications networks is virtually guaranteed to languish in 
poverty. Brittany, the Tennessee Valley, and parts of the Eastern Cape 
are excellent examples of this phenomenon. 
Not only can infrastructure make or break a region's development 
plans, the allocation of new infrastructure can be an indication of 
political power. Infrastructure provision usually follows power. 
Research on the allocation of new infrastructure can contribute to our 
understanding of political power structures in Southern Africa. For 
example, Gbadolite, the home town of ex-Zairian President Mobutu, was 
the only part of Zaire with adequate and functional infrastructure. 11 
This holds true in South Africa. The fact that rural farmers were 
electrified at great expense while urban township residents remained in 
darkness was an indication of the relative political power of these 
groups under Apartheid. 
But the Maputo Corridor is not just about opening hitherto 
isolated areas to the world market. It is about maintaining Gauteng's 
access to the sea. Gauteng's major export routes (Durban and Richards 
Bay) traverse territory under the control of the potentially 
secessionist Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). External control over an 
inland country or region's access to the sea has serious political, 
military, and economic consequences for that area. External control 
entails the loss of some sovereignty and independence. Control over 
Gauteng's two major transport routes provides the opportunity for the 
IFP to apply pressure to the central government. The Maputo Development 
Corridor may be part of a strategy to mitigate this situation. 
The politics of the Maputo Corridor are interesting primarily 
because of the insights they provide into government policy. The Maputo 
Corridor allows us to better understand ANC policy both domestically and 
regionally. The corridor provides clues as to the operation of 
federalism in the new South Africa because it is the shared 
responsibility of the central and provincial governments. The division 
of responsibilities in the project is one example of how power is 
allocated in South Africa's nascent federal system. The Corridor gives 
us an idea of where the government stands in its economic and 
development policy. Is the ANC still the socialist party of the 1960s 
or does it now more closely resemble Thatcher's Tories? The Maputo 
Corridor provides insight into the ANC's agenda for the Southern African 
region. The Corridor is the most concrete indication yet of the ANC's 
intentions towards the country's neighbours. Of all the cross-border 
specialisation, growth, and development. The greater the distance from a 
transportation network, the more difficult it is to access the market. 
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projects in Southern Africa, the Maputo Corridor is the largest and most 
progressed. 
The Maputo Corridor project also provides insight into Frelimo 
policy. Frelimo's economic policy has made an abrupt about-face; 
onetime central planners are now courting foreign investors. The 
Corridor also contributes to an understanding of Mozambique's policy 
towards its neighbours in Southern Africa. 
1.4 Methodology 
After the choice of the Maputo Development Corridor as a research 
topic, questions of research methodology loomed large. The current 
state of methodological pluralism in the discipline demanded that I 
critically assess different approaches before coming to terms with a 
particular method. xii 
First, I asked myself a number of questions about the research. 
What was my institutional and social context? What were my expectations 
and how would they influence my research? What impact did I intend the 
research to have? How would I ensure reliability? What sources would 
be the most useful? 
This exercise resulted in my adoption of a hybrid methodology, 
however largely in accordance with the neo-realist school, where I felt 
most comfortable. First, I decided to study the Johannesburg Maputo 
transport route from an historical perspective. The emphasis of the 
historical section would be to identify recurrent historical themes with 
relevance for the present. I decided to avoid a technocratic paper full 
of statistics; much writing on Southern African corridors from the 1980s 
was pursued in this manner, ignoring capabilities and motivations, and 
these studies seemed overly optimistic and generally unreliable. 
This juncture called for the formation of a research question. 
The question that would guide my research was, "What are the major 
factors contributing to the development of the Maputo Development 
Corridor?" A list of potential contributing factors was compiled. This 
was subsequently narrowed to three, which would be the focus of my 
research (see figure one). 
The historical legacy of the region was one of the factors 
hypothesised to contribute to the Corridor's development. Policy-
makers' understanding of a symbiotic relationship between South Africa 
xiiI was helped greatly in this endeavour by Richard Griggs of UCT's Department 
of Environmental and Geographical Sciences. 
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and Southern Mozambique in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s encouraged them to 
attempt to reinvigorate that relationship. 
Leadership was expected to leave its stamp on the implementation 
of the Corridor. Leaders were expected to come from areas likely t0 
benefit from the Corridor. According to newspaper articles, Mpurnalanga 
was taking the lead in the Corridor's development, as would be expected. 
African National Congress and Frelimo strategyxiiiwas expected to 
contribute to the development Corridor. For the South Africans, the 
Corridor would concurrently cement ties with neighbouring states and 
insulate Gauteng from any potential transport blockages. For the 
Mozambicans, the Corridor would underscore the Economic Recovery 
Programme and would pay to rehabilitate major infrastructure.xiv For 
both countries, long-term strategic objectives were a primary motivation 
for the Corridor. 
These hypotheses were formed based on information from written 
sources: newspaper articles, magazine articles, and journal articles 
(listed in descending order of importance). In order to check the 
accuracy of these published reports and of my hypotheses, I decided to 
interview those involved directly with the implementation of the Maputo 
Corridor. 
Interviews were requested with a number of individuals identified 
from press reports. Initially, letters requesting interviews were sent 
out to: Joe Magagula, Director of Strategic Planning, Province of 
Mpumalanga; Paul Jourdan, Director of Special Projects, Department of 
Trade and Industry, Ketso Gordhan, Director-General, Department of 
Transport; Alec Erwin, Minister of Trade and Industry; Matthews Phosa, 
Premier of Mpumalanga; and Mac Maharaj, Minister of Transport. 
After regular contact with the relevant offices, interviews were 
scheduled for the final week of May with the following individuals: 
Karin Pearce, Director of Special Projects at the Department of 
Transport; George Jamieson of the TRAC Consortium with the N4 contract; 
Benedito Nassone, Economic Affairs, Embassy of Mozambique in Pretoria; 
Dr. A. Zacarias, Professor of International Relations, Witwatersrand 
University; Joe Magagula; Coleman Nyathi, Director, Department of 
Economic Affairs and Gaming, Province of Mpurnalanga; and Francisca 
Soares, Director of Planning at Mozambique's Department of Transport.xv 
xiiistrategy is understood to mean a plan of action or policy in line with long-
term political objectives. 
xivThe Maputo Corridor is the product of both South African and Mozambican 
policy. However, an assumption was made that South Africa was the leading 
partner. In addition, I chose to focus on South Africa due to my access to 
source materials, language barriers, and other practical requirements. Frelimo 
policy will be addressed, but not to the same degree as ANC policy. 
"'All interviews were successfully concluded, except for the interviews 
with Nassone and Zacarias which were cancelled due to transportation 
problems. 
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Since the subjects of the interviews were a small number of 
important politicians and civil servants, relatively unstructured and 
in-depth interviews were envisioned. As far as possible consistency was 
maintained. I strove to arrive ten minutes prior to the interviews and 
a jacket and tie were worn. Each interview started with a brief 
introduction and an explanation of the purpose of my research. A 
question list was drawn up prior to each interview. To avoid biasing my 
interview subjects, open-ended questions were asked. 
The interviews were structured with three goals in mind. The 
first was to gain a working knowledge of how the Corridor was 
implemented. The second goal was to understand the power structures 
behind the Corridor, to ascertain who was in charge of the development, 
and to clarify the relationship between Mpumalanga and the central 
government. Interviewees were asked about their role in the Corridor 
and about their perception of the leading figures in the development. 
The third goal was to understand how the Corridor served as an indicator 
of the ANC and Frelimo's policies. The interviews were recorded and 
transcribed. 
The result of my work is this paper, which seeks to analyse and 
discuss several factors that influence the implementation of the Maputo 
Corridor. In order to check the accuracy of my research and to have an 
impact on the policy process, copies of the paper were sent to the 
research subjects. They were requested to provide criticism of and 
commentary on the research. 
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2. History of the Maputo Corridor 
A number of recurrent themes emerge from the history of South 
Africa's relations with Mozambique. (1) The strategic significancei of 
Delagoa Bay was recognised in the early 1800s, but was only realised 
with the construction of a railroad at the end of the century. Even 
during twenty years of virtual warfare between South Africa and 
Mozambique the strategic significance of Southern Mozambique remained 
undiminished. The geographic logic of the link between Africa's largest 
agglomeration of economic activity (Johannesburg) and its closest port 
(Maputo) is undeniable. The Maputo Corridor project is an attempt to 
reclaim the region's potential for peaceful purposes. 
Several of these themes are problematic. (2) Fear of foreign 
domination has driven both Portuguese and Mozambican policy for 
centuries. This concern was not unjustified. During the 19th and early 
20th centuries, South Africans tried to annex parts of Southern 
Mozambique repeatedly. More recently, South Africa was implicated in 
the devastation of Mozambique through terrorism and guerrilla warfare. 
At several points in history, constructive relations were nearly 
scuttled by Portuguese or Mozambican anxiety about the potential for 
foreign domination of Southern Mozambique. 
(3) Concerns about efficiency in Mozambique surface repeatedly in 
the history of transport relations. South African complaints about 
Portuguese management of the port and railway started soon after the 
railway's completion, and were a regular feature of the next 90 years. 
This is particularly true of the period after 1975, when the port and 
rail system's efficiency nose-dived. Simply returning to pre-
independence efficiency will be a challenge. 
(4) Finally, competition and periodic skirmishes between different 
provinces in South Africa (primarily the Transvaal, Natal, and the Cape) 
came close to spoiling relations between South Africa and Mozambique at 
a number of junctures in the early part of this century. 
Policy-makers must be aware of the restraints placed on policy-
formation by past decisions and must understand how their world-view is 
shaped by the history of the Southern African region. The following 
work is an attempt to create an accessible and useful introduction to 
iThe strategic significance of Southern Mozambique is defined as the military 
and economic importance of the region to Portugal, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
South Africa or Mozambique. 
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the history of the Maputo Corridor for policy-makers, academics, and 
interested individuals. 
2.1 Early Recognition Of The Bay's Potential And Broken Promises 
Early contact between the Afrikaner residents of the Transvaal and 
the Portuguese was the result of the proximity of Delagoa Bay to the 
Eastern Transvaal and the Afrikaners' long-standing desire to rid 
themselves of dependence on the British. An independent supply route 
would be the key to greater autonomy and independence for the 
Afrikaners. In addition, an alternative route would make good business 
sense. The cost of trading via British South African ports was high due 
to transport levies and customs duties. Competition from another route 
would cut transport costs.~ 
As early as 1837, Hendrik Potgieter recognised the strategic 
importance of Delagoa Bay. Characterised as "the most restless of 
Voortrekkers," Potgieter was the first to champion the cause of linking 
the Transvaal with Southern Mozambique. 1 The difficulty of realising 
Potgieter's dream was demonstrated one year later by Louis Trichardt 
when he travelled to Delagoa Bay during an exploratory mission. 
Although Delagoa Bay was not far from the Eastern Highveld, Trichardt 
only reached the Bay after contracting the malaria and sleeping sickness 
that were endemic to the region. His oxen and horses were plagued by 
tsetse flies. 2 Transport through the area remained impractical and most 
contact and trade between the Boers and the outside world continued to 
proceed via Natal and the Cape.ii 
Five years later Johann Smellekamp, a Dutch Trader, was refused 
landing rights at Port Natal. His ship, the Brazilia, was loaded with 
cargo destined for the estimated 15,000 Boers in the interior. 
Smellekamp decided to sail up the coast to Delagoa Bay where he might be 
able to trade with the Boers. He hoped to establish a trading post and 
was warmly welcomed by the governor of Louren90 Marques. However, 
metropolitan Portugal feared losing control over the Bay. Smellekamp's 
operation could have given the Boers a toehold in Southern Mozambique. 
Smellekamp was refused the right to settle. 3 
Despite this inauspicious beginning, there was no shortage of 
visionaries with plans for roads to Delagoa Bay. These plans were the 
result of two motivations: personal profit for the developers, and the 
Boers' recognition of their precarious position encircled by the 
ii Early maps show the area East of the Lebornbo mountains as uninhabited due to 
Tsetse fly infestation. See figure six. 
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British. The Volksraad authorised the construction of a road to Delagoa 
Bay in the 1840s. However, Portuguese authorities, fearing British 
reprisals, refused permission for the road. 4 All plans came to naught 
until August 1858, when the Portuguese government and the South African 
Republic signed several treaties. The parties recognised each other, 
established borders, outlawed the slave trade, agreed to build a road, 
and signed a mutual defence treaty. 5 
A decade passed, and no action was taken to construct the road. A 
frustrated President Pretorius attempted to secure free access to the 
ocean for the Transvaal by annexing a strip of land two miles wide on 
the banks of the Maputo River from the border to Delagoa Bay. Pressure 
from the Cape, Natal, and Portugal forced him to withdraw his claim, and 
it was recognised that the sea would have to be reached with the co-
operation of Lisbon. A new treaty was signed between the South African 
Republic and Portugal on July 19, 1869, covering roughly the same issues 
as the 1858 treaties. 6 
Finally, in January 1871 work began on a road from Delagoa Bay to 
the South African Republic via Northern Swaziland. The road was hastily 
completed and·it was nicknamed the "Matola" after a river it crossed. A 
company was formed to transport goods along the Matola, but relatively 
inefficient human porters had to be used as mules succumbed to tsetse 
flies. 7 It would not be until the arrival of rail in this part Southern 
Africa that the Delagoa Bay route would become truly workable. 
Despite these technical obstacles, another road was built to 
connect the Republic with the Bay. A.H. Nellmapius, an associate of 
Paul Kruger, opened his road to Pilgrim's Rest early in 1876. This road 
facilitated trade because it connected with a more efficient network of 
roads inland, because of lower customs duties, and because of the lower 
cost of sea transport to Louren90 Marques. 8 
The treaty of 1869 and the flurry of road construction between the 
South African Republic and Delagoa Bay represented a threat to the 
British regional policy of containing the Boers. The British attempted 
to close this outlet for the Transvaal by claiming a portion of Southern 
Mozambique based on the assertion that it had not been effectively 
occupied by the Portuguese. Following an acrimonious exchange of 
positions, Portugal and the UK submitted their claims to arbitration by 
the French President in 1872 and the issue was settled in Portugal's 
favour three years later. 9 British heavy-handedness made bedfellows out 
of Portuguese administration in Louren90 Marques and the Boers; a free 
trade pact was signed in 187 3. 10 
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By the 1870s, the pattern of relations in the region was already 
established. Britain, the regional heavyweight, was feared by both the 
Boers and the Portuguese. The Transvaalers sought closer ties with 
Delagoa Bay to safeguard their independence. The Portuguese were 
cautious about deepening their relationship with the Boer republic for 
fear that the British might seize one of their most valued colonial 
possessions. The new roads that were constructed were of limited use 
due to technical difficulties. Only rail transport would make the route 
economically viable, and neither the Transvaal nor the Portuguese had 
the capital for such a major undertaking. 
2.2 Rails to the Rand: Railroad Construction Booms 
A number of speculators, politicians, and adventurers promoted the 
idea of a rail line linking the Transvaal with Delagoa Bay. In the 
1870s several abortive attempts were even made at constructing the line. 
However, the economic rationale behind these plans was weak; commerce 
with the interior hardly justified construction of a railway. Another 
obstacle was the corruption and inefficiency of the Transvaal 
government. Successive Transvaal governments simply lacked the capacity 
to implement such a project. The situation was not helped by strong 
opposition to railways by a large number of Burgers. 11 It was only with 
the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in the 1880s that a railway 
became truly viable. The 1890s were characterised by intense 
competition between the railways of the Cape, Natal, and Mozambique to 
reach the Rand. 
The idea of a railway linking Louren90 Marques with the Transvaal 
was first and probably most actively promoted by W.O. Forsman, 
Portuguese Consul to the South African Republic during the 1870s. This 
idea caught the imagination of President T.F. Burgers who travelled to 
Europe in 1875 to raise capital for the railway. 12 Shortly before his 
trip, a number of South American governments defaulted on loans to major 
European finance houses, and the banks were hesitant to loan money to 
developing countries. In addition to this hurdle, the proposed railway 
line had never been surveyed, and there were strong doubts that there 
would ever be enough traffic to pay for the infrastructure. 
Regardless, Burgers was able to obtain a project loan in 
Amsterdam. The loan amounted to £80,000. By the time he secured the 
loan, President Burgers had already spent £117,000 on the project, 
including the purchase of a luxurious presidential carriage. The plan 
was a dismal failure. Construction materials worth £90 000 were seized 
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to repay debt, the railway construction crew was immediately sent from 
Louren~o Marques back to Holland, and the citizens of the SA Republic 
were unwilling to pay the 30s per farm railway tax. 13 Any other plans 
for a railway were postponed after this disastrous experience. 
In 1877 the UK annexed the South African Republic and the British 
administration, with their new perspective in the Transvaal, became 
ardent supporters of the Louren90 Marques railway. However, this 
initiative was temporarily halted by constituents in Natal and the Cape 
who felt that their interests were being undermined. Despite this 
opposition, negotiations between Portugal and the UK began in early 
1878, and by December an agreement had been concluded that appeared to 
pave the way for a Transvaal-Mozambique railway. 14 The Louren90 Marques 
Treaty was signed between the UK and Portugal in May 1879. Meanwhile, 
opposition to British rule mounted in the Transvaal and the Cape. By the 
end of 1880 the Transvaal was in open revolt. Unable to control the 
Boers, the British returned the Transvaal to Afrikaner control in 
1881. 15 
The newly-independent Transvaal and Portugal dusted off plans to 
construct a railway. To avoid possible British interference, the 
Lebombo route, via Swaziland, was abandoned and a new route surveyed. A 
private concession for the Mozambican section was obtained by Edward 
McMurdo, an American adventurer and swindler. There were some 
irregularities in the awarding of the concession, and the concessionaire 
was allowed to set rates on the route independently. This was contrary 
both to common practice and Portuguese law. 16 McMurdo quickly started 
construction on the line. However, the reality of his construction did 
not live up to expectations and four years and fifty-two poorly-built 
miles of railway later, the Portuguese cancelled the concession and 
nationalised the line as the CFLM (Carninhos de Ferro de Louren90 
Marques) . 17 
Construction of the "Oosterlijn"iii was a dirty and dangerous 
undertaking. A wild frontier mentality prevailed. So many workers 
succumbed to malaria, that "every sleeper on the line hid a corpse" 
became a common saying. Conditions for African workers were 
particularly bad. 18 Tsetse flies prevented the use of oxen; lions along 
the route developed a taste for the donkeys that replaced the oxen. 19 
Trains transporting pay to railway workers were held up on a number of 
occasions. 20 
iii "Oosterlijn" is the name commonly used to refer to the route between the Reef 
and Delagoa Bay in the late 19th Century. 
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A variety of rough and tumble Europeans were imported to work on 
the line. Workers formed several rival gangs; the most notorious of 
which was the "Irish Brigade." Every weekend they would return to 
Louren90 Marques to drink, whore, and wreck havoc. The locals lived in 
fear; the Irish Brigade were even responsible for the deaths of a few 
policemen. Their headquarters was a run-down hotel in the centre of 
town. The police blundered a raid on the hotel, and all of the Irishmen 
escaped. In retaliation, they destroyed a Portuguese gunship in the 
harbour before dispersing, never to be seen again. 21 
Kruger gave a concession for the Transvaal section of the line to 
the Dutch firm Maarschalk. However, financiers were unwilling to 
provide money because of the myriad of risks the project faced. Several 
years passed without any prospects for funding, and in desperation the 
Transvaal approached the Cape with a request for a customs union and a 
railway extension. This request was summarily denied. 22 Finally, in 
1887 the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft floated the Nederlands Zuid 
Afrikansche Spoorweg Maatschapij (NZASM) . The company had the right to 
build all railways in the Transvaal, and could set rates up to a maximum 
established by the Volksraad. 23 
The competition between different railways to reach the Rand was 
intense. In mid 1891 the Oosterlijn project ran into difficulties when 
it became impossible for the Transvaal to secure further loans. 
Abandoning plans to have the Oosterlijn as the first link between 
Johannesburg and the sea, the Transvaal once again asked the Cape for a 
railway extension. This time the Cape government agreed and the 
Sivewright Agreement (December 1891) between the Transvaal government 
and the Cape led to the extension of the Cape's Bloemfontein line to 
Johannesburg. 24 
Between 1891 and 1892, perceptions of the Transvaal's economic 
future were considerably improved and the government took this 
opportunity to secure a loan of £2 million for the completion of the 
Oosterlijn. Construction proceeded on both the Cape and Louren90 
Marques lines. On New Year's Day 1893 the Cape-Johannesburg railway was 
officially opened. 25 Concurrent negotiations between the Transvaal and 
Natal were progressing, albeit slowly. It took until February 1894 for 
an agreement to be reached. The agreement included a provision (Article 
XVIII) that guaranteed Durban and Delagoa Bay each no less than one-
third but no more than one-half of traffic to Johannesburg and 
Pretoria. 26 
The two sections of the line to Louren90 Marques met 56 miles from 
Pretoria on 20 October 1894. The route was opened to traffic on 1 
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January 1895, but the official opening was delayed until July when the 
Portuguese governor was avail.able. 27 Competition for traffic ensued and 
in April 1895 the Cape convened a regional railway conference to bring 
some order to the transport sector. The delegates from the Cape, 
Mozambique, and the Transvaal were unable to come to any significant 
agreements and the transport rate war continued. 28 
The original agreement between the Cape and Transvaal allowed the 
Cape to set tariffs through to Johannesburg. This allowed the Cape to 
consistently charge lower rates than those on the Oosterlijn. When the 
agreement lapsed, the NZASM raised rates on its section of the Cape 
line. The Cape Railways stopped using the NZASM section altogether and 
transferred its cargo to ox wagons when it reached the Transvaal. In 
response, Kruger closed the border at Viljoens and Zand Drifts. The 
Cape government and Colonial Off ice complained and Kruger re-opened the 
border to avoid the possibility of war. 29 
Finally, in December of 1895 the railway from Johannesburg to 
Durban was opened. The regional transport situation gradually 
normalised. By 1898 the Cape, Natal and Mozambique all carried roughly 
equal shares of the Reef's traffic. 30 
The late 1800s was a period of intense and rapid development in 
Southern Africa. The discovery of diamonds in Kimberley and gold in the 
Transvaal fundamentally changed the economy and would have a profound 
impact on the politics of the region. New-found wealth and optimism 
made the construction of rail lines feasible.iv Within one decade the 
Rand was linked with three major ports in Natal, the Cape and 
Mozambique. However, this was also an era of heightened hostilities 
between the South African Republic and the British. The transport rate 
war that followed the completion of the rail lines was just one 
indication of a troubled future for the region. 
2.3 The British, the Germans, the Boers, and De/agoa Bay 
Portugal's weak hold over her colonies provided for much 
speculation over the future of Southern Mozambique. Prior to 1869, the 
British negotiated the right of "first refusaln for Delagoa Bay. This 
meant that Britain would have the right to refuse any potential 
purchaser of the Bay. 31 With the signing of the Louren90 Marques Treaty 
ivFor example, in 1873 the Cape Colony had 64 miles of railways. In 1885 there 
were 1,498 miles of railways in the Cape, resulting primarily from the discovery 
of diamonds (The Selborne Memorandum: A Review of Mutual Relations of the 
British South African Colonies in 1907, with an introduction by Basil Williams 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1925) 48. 
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(1879), the UK was at least two steps ahead of her European adversaries 
in the race to control the potentially lucrative Bay. 32 However, the 
involvement of a German finance house in NZASM (1887) set rumours in 
motion regarding German intentions for the area. Germany did in fact 
have an interest in Northern Mozambique, adjacent to German East Africa. 
However, it seems that the only serious competitors for Delagoa Bay were 
the British and the Afrikaners. Both the UK and the Transvaal attempted 
to purchase the Bay from the Portuguese repeatedly in the final years of 
the century. 33 None of these plans came to fruition. 
Portugal's administration of her colonies seemed increasingly 
chaotic in the 1890s. It became clear that the Portuguese were unable 
to control the interior of their African possessions and financial 
weakness had forced Portugal to abandon the gold standard. The British 
feared that the precedent set by the piecemeal dismemberment of China 
might be duplicated in Portugal's overseas possessions. 34 
During this period, Britain had three main strategic objectives in 
Southern Africa.v First, Britain's control over her empire rested 
supremacy on the seas. The Cape of Good Hope was a potential choke 
point and for this reason, it was necessary to maintain naval 
superiority in the area. Portugal's control over Delagoa Bay was not 
threatening due to the weak state of Portuguese affairs. However, if 
the Bay fell into the hands of another colonial power it would be 
disastrous for British prestige and power. Control of Delagoa Bay was 
thought to have profound implications for the United Kingdom's position 
throughout Southern Africa in terms of strategy, geopolitics, economics 
and prestige. 35 Britain feared a rival power would establish a naval 
base in the "finest harbour in South Africa." 36 
Second, British policy called for containing the Boers. They were 
seen as unpredictable and they imperilled Rhodes' Cape to Cairo dreams. 
Particularly after the discovery of gold on the Rand, the British felt 
that it was in their interest to maintain leverage provided by a 
transport monopoly over the Afrikaners. Any significant foreign power's 
presence in Louren90 Marques would mean more independence for the 
Transvaal and reduced control over the Reef's gold. Specifically, the 
British feared that a closer alliance between Germany and the Transvaal 
would undermine their power in the region. 37 The Colonial Office 
believed that when Germany "thinks the time has come, she can at any 
moment pick a quarrel with Portugal and seize Delagoa Bay: and then we 
vFor the purposes of this section, British strategy is seen as the means 
(political, economic, and military) used to pursue their world-wide and regional 
objectives. 
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should then have the alternative of war with Germany or being booted out 
of South Africa. 1138 
Third, the United Kingdom needed to safeguard the interests of the 
Cape and Natal. The colonies' financial situations were precarious, and 
it was imperative that railway traffic was maintained sufficient to 
repay their debts. The British Colonial and Foreign Offices spent much 
of the 1890s foiling any attempts to develop Delagoa Bay. 39 British 
strategic and economic interests in the Cape and Natal dictated that the 
Bay remain undeveloped. "The transformation of Delagoa Bay from a being 
a sleepy backwater with inefficiently run port and communications 
facilities into a real rival to Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, and 
Cape Town would have damaged the commercial interests of Natal and the 
Cape Colony. 1140 If the majority of the Transvaal's trade passed through 
Mozambique, the lack of customs revenue and transit duties would likely 
result in financial ruin for the two colonies. British investments in 
transport infrastructure in South Africa amounted to £22-million and 
sufficient traffic was needed to make the investment pay off. 41 Rhodes 
explained in a speech at Cape House in 1886, "If the Delagoa Bay Railway 
is carried out, the real union of South Africa will be indefinitely 
deferred. 1142 
Foreign control over the Bay itself was not Britain's only fear. 
At this time it was believed that the Portuguese government would be 
forced by financial crisis to put the CFLM up for sale. The British 
understood that if the railway were to pass into Transvaal, German, or 
French hands it would have a deleterious effect on their interests in 
Southern Africa. Non-British control over the CFLM would give the 
Transvaal virtual independence from Britain and would spell the death 
knell of the plan for a united British South Africa. 43 
The British government clearly saw Louren~o Marques as the key to 
South Africa. "It is worth risking a good deal to get hold of Delagoa 
Bay, for once we hold that, South Africa must be British. 1144 For this 
reason negotiations were initiated with Portugal with the goal of 
putting the CFLM under British control. Waxing British influence in the 
region caused alarm in Berlin; Britain and Germany came to a secret 
agreement, settling their differences over Mozambique. The Anglo-German 
Agreement of 30 August 1898 stipulated that in the event of the collapse 
of the Portuguese empire, the UK would gain control over Southern 
Mozambique and Delagoa Bay. Germany in return would gain control over 
sections of Angola, Northern Mozambique, and East Timar. Until the 
envisioned disintegration of the Portuguese empire, the two powers would 
co-operate to maintain the status quo. 45 
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In the waning years of the 19th Century, Britain worked hard to 
keep Delagoa Bay and the CFLM under Portuguese or British control. 
Diplomatic efforts succeeded in keeping the port out of foreign hands, 
thus securing the whole of Southern Africa as a zone of British 
influence. The British felt this secured their control over the destiny 
of the Afrikaner republics. However, relations between the British and 
the South African Republic were coming to a head. 
2.4 The Anglo-Boer War 
A number of factors contributed to the Anglo-Boer War. Britain's 
fear of losing its dominant position in Delagoa Bay undoubtedly added to 
a preoccupation about losing control of an increasingly wealthy and 
independent Transvaal. The strategic and military potential of Delagoa 
Bay had long been recognised, but it was only during preparations for 
the war that the real military significance of the Louren90 Marques line 
was realised. British pink surrounded the Transvaal on all sides except 
the border with Mozambique (see figure seven). 
Friction between Britain and the Transvaal had reached a fever 
pitch by the late 1890s. The large purchase of weapons by the Transvaal 
appeared threatening to the British. One official from the Colonial 
Office remarked that "it is quite clear that the Boers have arms and 
ammunition enough to shoot down all the armies of Europe. " 46 Ships and 
men at the Royal Navy's Simonstown base were on call to defend Delagoa 
Bay from a Boer military onslaught. 47 
The role played by the Louren90 Marques route in bringing about 
the war is generally seen as minimal. However, recent research by Peter 
Henshaw re-evaluates British motives in the Anglo-Boer war. Henshaw's 
research shows that strategic concerns at Delagoa Bay played a more 
significant role in causing the war than has ever been recognised. The 
Anglo-German agreement of 1898 contained a loophole allowing German 
involvement in Delagoa Bay, which could have given the Transvaal an 
unacceptable degree of independence. The discovery of this loophole led 
to some alarm on the part of the British Colonial Office, and this in 
turn may have set the war in motion. 48 Henshaw's work must be viewed 
cautiously. While it is true that strategic concerns at Delagoa Bay may 
have played a much more significant role in initiating the war than 
previously recognised, they can still not be seen as a major causal 
factor. 
As in the United States during the civil war, rail proved an 
important variable in the Anglo-Boer War. Men and materiel could be 
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transported with much greater speed and ease by rail. The British used 
their trains successfully to bring soldiers and supplies into the 
interior. Boer commandos made a habit of raiding the British trains. 
As British forces neared Pretoria, the capital of the Republic was moved 
to Machadodorp in 1900. Later the capital moved to Nelspruit. 
Ultimately, President Kruger fled to Portuguese territory via the 
Oosterlijn. 49vi 
During the war, gold mining in Johannesburg came to a virtual 
standstill. The return of thousands of workers to Mozambique and the 
cessation of transport on the Louren90 Marques export route had serious, 
however short-lived implications for the Mozambican political economy. 50 
The Portuguese governor-general claimed that the virtual stoppage of 
trade was ruining Louren90 Marques and its port. 51 The Portuguese were 
eager to get the arteries of commerce back in operation. During the war 
Boer commandos had dynamited several sections of the Oosterlijn to 
prevent the British from using it. 52 The railway was left in a state 
between disrepair and devastation. 53 
The Anglo-Boer War led to a short-term postponement of any new 
development along the route between Johannesburg and Louren90 Marques. 
However, the war proved to be only a temporary setback. Traffic on the 
Louren90 Marques line grew rapidly at the turn of the century and caused 
rapid development in Southern Mozambique. Some numbers should 
illustrate the implications. In 1891 36,564 passengers were carried on 
the Louren90 Marques line. This figure rose to 81,403 at the time of 
the outbreak of the Boer war and reached nearly 126,000 in 1909. Cargo 
on the line rose from 28,192 tons in 1891 to 638,294 tons in 1909. The 
value of the port's commerce rose from 1,656 contos in 1892 to 19,247 
contos in 1900 -- accounting for virtually one-half of the domestic 
product of Mozambique in that year. 54 
2.5 A Rocky Patch: South Africa and Mozambique in the Early 2<111 Century 
The first decade of the 20th Century would witness the 
establishment of the formal legal arrangement that would govern the 
South African Mozambican relationship for the rest of the century. 
In the aftermath of the war, new agreements had to be reached on 
transportation, customs, and labour migration. Negotiation of these 
issues was time-consuming and frustrating for all involved. The 
viKruger wasn't the only one to flee using this route. Winston Churchill 
escaped prisoner of war camp by following the railway (Van Onselen, Lennox: Head 
of Steel. (Howard Timmins: Cape Town, 1962), 99). 
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greatest impediment to successful negotiations was the inability of the 
Cape, Natal, and the Transvaal to agree on anything. The South Africans 
fought endlessly among themselves. What would ultimately emerge from 
these negotiations was a barter relationship, where South Africa got 
labour in return for transport development in Mozambique. 
The new Transvaal administration, under Sir Alfred Milner, wanted 
to get the mines humming in as short a time as possible. 55 The 
prosperity of the entire region depended on the extraction of diamonds 
and gold. Milner needed to secure the necessary supply of African 
labourers for the mines. Prior to the war, large numbers of Mozambicans 
had formed the backbone of the labour force on the Reef. As early as 
1887, one-half of the able-bodied male population of Maputo province was 
working in South Africa. 56 Milner's task was to re-establish this 
relationship. Recruitment of Mozambicans for the Reef recorrunenced in 
April 1901. Milner was also able to reinstate the pre-war agreement 
that allowed customs officials from the Transvaal to verify goods bound 
for South Africa. In return for this concession, Sir Milner promised to 
encourage the revival of corrunerce at the Port of Louren90 Marques. 57 
For practical reasons the new Transvaal government continued to 
favour the route to Delagoa Bay. The route was shorter, and in most 
cases cheaper than the Cape or Natal routes. In addition, the Transvaal 
government profited more from traffic on the Louren90 Marques route than 
on the Durban or Cape routes.vii The Transvaal government received over 
£5 for one ton of normal cargo shipped via Delagoa Bay, and only £3 for 
one ton of similar goods shipped from Natal. 58 
The Portuguese were determined to maintain Mozambique's profitable 
relationship with South Africa, but in the post-war dispensation, they 
feared that Louren90 Marques would be sidelined by Cape and Natal ports. 
Ruth First explains. 
To the Transvaal Republic with no outlet to the sea, Louren90 
Marques had been an indispensable outlet, but its importance and 
value might have declined dramatically once the Transvaal had been 
defeated, for both the British colonial administration and the 
Union which was formed in 1910, controlled a unified economy and 
transport system. 59 
vii The NZASM and the Transvaal government received payment based on the type of 
goods shipped and on the length of NZASM track covered. On the Louren90 Marques 
route, trains travelled 341 miles along NZASM track. In comparison, trains 
covered only 178 miles and 49 miles of NZASM track on the Natal and Cape routes, 
respectively. The Transvaal government earned significantly more on traffic to 
Louren90 Marques than on traffic to any other port. (The Selborne Memorandum: A 
Review of Mutual Relations of the British South African Colonies in 1907, with 
an introduction by Basil Williams (London: Oxford University Press, 1925) 54). 
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The Portuguese held one trump card. Mozambique was "the only possible 
source from which labour could at that period be bought. " 60 In December 
1901, the Portuguese halted labour migration to South Africa. 61 
At the negotiations that followed, there. was a determination to 
increase involvement in· the operation and administration port by the 
British: Corruption a~ the Port was a major headache for British and 
South African firms. 62' However, the need to .reb1'lild the Transvaal (and 
thus the need for Mozambican labour) was more pressing. 
The draft modus vivendi provided for a return to the status quo 
antebelium situation of tariff-free access for Mozambican manufactured 
and agricultural prodticts to the Transvaal in return for allowing the 
Chamber of Mines to recruit labour in Southern Mozambique. The pre-war 
division of traffic between the Cape, Natal, and Mozambique was 
maintained. The agreement would remain in force .for ten years or until 
replaced by a formal ccinvehtion. 63 The modus vivendi reinforced 
perceptions that Tran~vaal mining interests had taken precedence over 
other economit and political interests dri South Africa. Despite the 
obvious interest that the Cape and Natal had in the outcome of the 
negoti~tions, they were not consulted. Natal's governor was informed of 
the provisions of agreement five days after its signing. Copies of the 
modus vivendi were forwarded to the coastal colonies only in 1902. 64 
The negotiation of the modus vivendi unleashed a storm of protest. 
Natal had labour problems of its own and wished to secure a portion of 
Mozambique's migrant labour. Natal's governor, Sir Henry Mccallum, 
asked Milner to intercede on behalf of Natal on the labour issue. As 
both colonies were competing for the same pool of labour, it should come 
as no surprise that this assistance was not forthcoming. Farmers, 
particularly sugar planters, were also unhappy. Not only were they 
unable to recruit labour in Mozambique, but they now had to compete with 
duty-free Mozambican sugar imports. 65 
Transport and customs issues were becoming major sources of 
friction between the various colonies. The British had just fought a 
war to unify So~th Africa and that very unity·was threatened by these 
disputes. In March 1903 Milner convened an inter-colonial conference in 
Bloemfontein. The four colonies, plus Southern Rhodesia and·Mozambique 
were represented. The conference dealt with two issues, rail tariffs 
and customs. Any attempt to remove Mozambique's favoured position 
resulted in threats to discontinue labour recruitment. The status quo 
prevailed. Article XXII of the resulting agreement specifically 
guaranteed Mozambique's preferential access to· the· Transvaal market .·66 
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The early years of the century saw a gradual but clear trend with 
Louren90 Marques attracting an ever increasing share of traffic to 
Johannesburg and surrounds (see figure eight). At the turn of the 
century, one-quarter to one-half of Johannesburg's traffic was shipped 
via Mozambique. That figure exceeded 50% by 1905 and Louren~o Marques 
accounted for two-thirds of Johannesburg traffic by 1910. 74 Louren90 
Marques' raison d'etre was its role as a port for the Rand. The focal 
point of the entire city was its port. The port's pivotal role can be 
clearly seen of maps of the era (see figure nine). 
2.6 Negotiations Continue: Portugal Becomes Indecisive 
In the period following 1910, the South Africans (with their new 
constitution) began to handle negotiations with other countries more 
successfully. Disputes between the four colonies slowly receded. 
During the same time frame, Portugal's government became increasingly 
less effective. Governmental instability and administrative 
incompetence caused many problems for Mozambique and South Africa. 
Portuguese weakness meant that Southern Mozambique remained an 
attractive target for South African empire builders. Complaints of 
gross maladministration on the Mozambican leg of the route to Louren90 
Marques led to calls for the port and railway to come under South 
African control. Jan Smuts, however, had more than just control of the 
railway in mind. Smuts wanted to incorporate a section of Southern 
Mozambique into the Union. His plans were foiled in 1917, when the 
British imperial war cabinet refused to pressure Portugal into 
surrendering Delagoa Bay. 75 
One year later, the Union requested some minor changes in the 
convention, particularly in cargo handling. Chaos prevailed in Lisbon 
and this prevented any effective response on the part of the Portuguese. 
The instability of the republic period in Portugal was clearly reflected 
in the politics of Mozambique. Between 1910 and 1928, Mozambique had 13 
different heads of government. 76 By 1921, the impatient Union 
government took a different tack in negotiations and began to survey 
sites in Northern Natal for a new port. It was hoped that this scare 
tactic would draw the Portuguese back to negotiations. The tactic 
worked; financiers were utterly unwilling to underwrite any new loans to 
Mozambique with its major source of revenue in question. This threat 
apparently drove the Portuguese to the negotiating table. 
In 1922 the Portuguese finally agreed to enter into negotiations 
to revise the Louren90 Marques Convention of 1909. Portuguese 
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negotiators immediately ruled out any closer political ties between 
Mozambique and South Africa. South Africa insisted on the formation of 
a new joint management, with South African control, for the Port of 
Louren90 Marques and CFLM. The board would be independent of both 
governments and would be run on a commercial basis. 77 
Despite some sympathy for binational port and rail management in 
Louren90 Marques, the administration in Lisbon would hear nothing of the 
sort. Any apparent weakening of Portuguese power in the region would be 
unacceptable, as it would "wound national sentiment." Centuries of 
imperial decline made this an extremely sensitive issue. Manuel 
Camacho, then Portuguese High Commissioner in Mozambique, took the lead 
in negotiations. 78 Camacho took a hard line, demanding for example, the 
completion of the Goba line and construction of an additional line to 
Rhodesia. 79 Neither side was willing to compromise. 
In the absence of any progress, Part I of the 1909 convention was 
extended by Camacho and the British Ambassador to Lisbon on 31 March 
1923. This allowed continued labour recruitment under the terms of the 
old agreement. In rapid succession, both the Portuguese and South 
African governments fell. Negotiations would have to wait until the 
dust cleared. 80 
In South Africa, the Pact government came into power in the wake 
of the Rand Revolt on a "civilised labour" manifesto. J.B. Herzog of 
the National Party (one-half of the Pact government formed in 1924) 
attacked what was the very raison d'etre of Mozambique-South Africa 
relations -- migrant African labour. The new government claimed that 
dependence on imported labour reduced the demand for white workers. In 
the new dispensation, employers were encouraged to employ whites rather 
than blacks whenever possible. The South African Labour Department saw 
the conclusion of migrant labour within four to six years as an 
essential part of the "civilised labour" policy. The Chamber of Mines, 
however, was thoroughly opposed to this policy. 81 
The Portuguese gave notice of the imminent cancellation of Part I 
of the 1909 Convention. Progress was surprisingly rapid and in mid-May 
1928 agreement had been reached on most matters. Louren90 Marques was 
guaranteed 50-55% of the Rand's traffic, and use of the port was to be 
encouraged by a statutory board. 82 Administration of the Port remained 
wholly in Mozambican hands. In fact, the port was nationalised in 
1929. 83 Both nations gave each other most favoured nation status, and a 
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list of products to pass between the countries without duty was 
compiled. 
The legal and institutional framework for the South Africa -
Mozambique relationship was established during first three decades of 
this century. Negotiations between the two countries were interminable, 
frustrating, and often fruitless. The chaotic situation in Louren90 
Marques and Lisbon scuttled virtually any possibility of productive 
talks in the 1920s. All in all, it took nearly 30 years to come to a 
workable agreement. 
2. 7 The Appearance of Stability and Growth 
The 1928 Convention proved to be long-lived. Only minor 
adjustments were made in the following years. The period between the 
1930s and 1970s was a time of unparalleled growth and stability in 
Mozambique. Despite periodic labour unrest centred on the Port of 
Louren90 Marques, trade increased. 
In 1932 Salazar became Prime Minister of Portugal and in the 
following years he consolidated his hold on power. He would remain head 
of government until 1968. Salazar centralised most functions of 
government; the colonies were largely administered from Lisbon. The 
world-wide depression reduced traffic through the port. In 1933 port 
officials and handling companies reduced workers' wages by 10-30%. 
Workers walked off their jobs, and the government's response was 
decisive. The police locked the workers into the port and forced them 
to unload ships. 84 
Portugal stayed out of World War Two and the era proved to be one 
of close co-operation between South Africa and Mozambique. The 
Portuguese administration was sympathetic to the allied cause. The Port 
of Louren90 Marques was an essential export route for war materiel. In 
addition, the war effort and the conscription of South African men 
dramatically increased South Africa's demand for Mozambican labour. 85 
Britain's focus on Mozambique as a provider of transport for South 
Africa and Rhodesia is clear in War Department maps of the era (see 
figure ten) . 
In the post-war era, while most European colonial powers were 
carefully disengaging themselves from their colonial possessions, 
Portugal took another route, stepping up involvement in Mozambique and 
Angola. Between 1937 and 1957 emigration from Portugal increased five-
fold. 86 Development budgets ballooned and with the assistance of US 
Marshall Plan money, roads, railways, harbours, and airports were 
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built. 87 The Limpopo line was completed in 1955, linking Louren90 
Marques with Rhodesia. By 1973, Mozambican ports handled a large 
portion of regional traffic -- 1/5 of South African, 2/3 of Rhodesian, 
1/2 of Swazi, and all of Malawian. Louren90 Marques was the largest 
port in Southern Africa. 88 
The Mozambican economy began to diversify. New facilities were 
established for manufacturing textiles, paper, pulp, matches, 
fertiliser, beer, cement, soap, tiles, sugar, and sisal. 89 Despite these 
developments, Mozambique continued to have a significant trade deficit, 
particularly with Portugal. This situation was compensated for by 
income from South Africa. Mozambique earned significant revenue from 
three sources during this period: tourism (mostly from Rhodesia and 
South Africa); migrant workers' remittances; viii and the transhipment of 
goods. 90 Traffic at the Port of Louren90 Marques increased from 4 
million tons in 1955 to 14 million tons in 1970. 91 
However, at the same time the port was a focal point of conflict 
between the government and its opponents. In 1947 a bitter strike by 
stevedores spread to neighbouring plantations. Discontent simmered just 
under the surface and resulted in an abortive uprising in Louren90 
Marques in the following year. In 1950 and 1957 major strikes closed 
down the docks at the port. During the 1950s, a nascent feeling of 
Mozambican nationhood grew. When workers felt their grievances were not 
being adequately considered in 1963, a strike hit the ports of Louren90 
Marques, Beira, and Nacala simultaneously. 92 
Frelimo was founded in 1962 in Dar es Salaam and guerrilla 
activity became a serious threat to Portuguese rule in Mozambique, 
particularly in the North. The advent of the liberation struggle 
dramatically changed the political economy of transport in the region. 
In the early 1970s the Portuguese embarked on a major road building 
project, prompted by their counterinsurgency needs. 93 To bolster its 
position, Portugal attempted to involve South Africa in its war. The 
construction of the Cahorra Bassa hydroelectric scheme in the Tete 
Province is a clear example of this strategy. The dam and power lines 
were situated strategically, and would increase South Africa's interest 
in the area. 94 
The South Africans assisted Portugal, but at the same time began 
to reduce their dependence on Mozambique in the event of a Frelimo take-
over. In 1963 the Louren90 Marques Convention was modified, reducing 
viiiin the 1960s and 1970s the majority of all foreign workers on South Africa's 
mines were Mozambicans. Between 1970 and 1974 more Mozambicans were employed on 
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Mozambique's guaranteed share of Reef traffic to 40%. In 1969 all 
guarantees of traffic to Mozambisue were dropped. 95 By the mid-1970s 
South Africa planned to be free of any dependence on Mozambican 
transportation. The South African government embarked on an ambitious 
harbour and port construction programme. Richard's Bay was envisioned 
as a large-scale port for the export of coal, one of Maputo's major 
commodities. South African traffic on the Louren90 Marques line dropped 
from 6. 2 million tons in 197 3 to 4. 4 million tonnes at independence. 96 
When proponents of the Maputo Corridor talk of a "golden age" of 
transport in Mozambique, they are generally referring to the period 
between World War Two and the early 1970s. Despite periodic labour 
unrest and a growing independence movement, the Portuguese were able to 
make significant investments in transport, communication, and industry. 
"At no time in Mozambique's colonial history was the tempo of commerce 
and industry so accelerated as the last twenty years of Portuguese 
rule." 97 This rapid growth would contrast sharply with the next twenty 
years. 
2.8 South Africa wins, Rhodesia loses: Mozambican Independence 
The cost of empire was great for Portugal, measured either in 
terms of money or lives. After many years of colonial wars the military 
had had enough of fighting and took power in Lisbon. The coup d'etat 
led to the Portugal's capitulating to all of Frelimo's demands in the 
Lusaka Protocols on 7 September 1974. 98 The Portuguese retreated from 
their colonies with unseemly haste. On June 25, 1975 Mozambique 
achieved independence and Frelimo took power. 99 
In the following years, 90% of the Portuguese population of 
Mozambique departed. Mozambique was left with a very poor endowment of 
human capital -- six economists, two agronomists, and fewer than 1,000 
high school graduates. Of 350 railroad engineers in Mozambique in 1975, 
just one was black. Presumably most of the rest left; the railways were 
severely impacted by the lack of skilled personnel. 100 Ironically, the 
accession of a revolutionary African government in Maputo resulted in 
closer co-operation in transportation between South Africa and 
Mozambique in the short-term. Political considerations aside, revenue 
from the Ressano Garcia line was essential to the Mozambican economy. 
The departure of skilled personnel necessitated the importation of South 
African port and railway personnel to fill the gap. South Africa's 
the mines than South Africans (Hanlon, Joseph. Beggar Your Neighbours (London: 
Catholic Institute for International Affairs, 1986) 133). 
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long-standing demands for more control over ?Ort management had finally 
been fulfilled. The Frelimo government even took special care to guard 
the line from Renamoix attack, so important was the revenue from 
transhipment. 101 
Salisbury was not as lucky; traffic from Rhodesia was not quite so 
important to Mozambique as South African traffic, and the Smith regime 
seemed less entrenched than Apartheid seemed in South Africa. 
Mozambique took an important political stand in March 1976 by closing 
its border to traffic with Rhodesia, forgoing a significant source of 
income. The border closure had great implications for Rhodesia as well. 
Wholly reliant on South Africa for imports and exports, Rhodesia's 
dependence on its Southern neighbour increased. New rail links had to 
be constructed to accommodate the increased traffic. Political 
subservience was guaranteed by geography and infrastructure. 102 
In response to Mozambican independence, the Rhodesians 
established, trained, and armed Renamo, which included a mix of 
Rhodesians, disenfranchised Portuguese settlers, and a small number of 
domestic African opponents of the Frelimo government. 103 The Rhodesians 
feared that independence would lead to the use of Mozambican territory 
for ZANU and ZAPU bases. Their fears were warranted, and Frelimo 
welcomed the Zimbabweans. Initially, Renamo's activities were confined 
to areas adjacent to Rhodesia. This served Rhodesian interests by 
keeping ZANU/ZAPU bases out of the area. In retaliation for the border 
closure, Rhodesia sent Renamo into Mozambique to repeatedly burn 
villages, disrupt railroad and highway traffic and raid re-education 
camps. 104 
The new South African ports of Richard's Bay and Saldanha came on 
line in 1976. 105 While these new ports were built from scratch, older 
ports were upgraded, making South Africa self-sufficient and increasing 
capacity to handle exports from other Southern African states. 106 Port 
development, in conjunction with destabilisation in Angola and 
Mozambique could fundamentally reorient the structure of trade in the 
region. All imports and exports to land-locked countries would have to 
be transhipped via South Africa's ports and roads. South Africa would 
wield immense power over its neighbours. 
ix Resistencia Nacional Moc;:arnbicana. 
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2.9 Mozambique Loses: Renamo and South Africa on the Offensive 
As if offering a foretaste of independence, Frelimo sabotaged 
railway lines in the Tete Province, and severed the Beira line 
repeatedly in 1974. 107 Mozambique was so dependent on transport revenue 
and the routes to the coast were so vulnerable to attack, that the 
railways proved near irresistible targets. Attacks on communications 
infrastructure were a very effective means of sending messages both to 
Lisbon and to the outsitje world. Protecting these routes proved to be 
arduous and expensive. The tactic pioneered by Frelimo would become a 
hallmark of the next 20 years of conflict. 
In the 1980s, the South African government implemented the "total 
strategy" in defence of Apartheid. The relationship between Pretoria 
and Maputo, which had been strained since independence, took a decided 
turn for the worse. South Africa began to use its military muscle and 
that of its surrogates to attack Mozambique, and in particular its 
transport and communications infrastructure, with great fury. 
The independence of Zimbabwe and the founding of SADCC in 1980 was 
threatening to the white-minority government in Pretoria. South Africa 
responded with its military force and economic power. In January 1981, 
South Africa sent a commando raid on Maputo. For two weeks in March, 
South Africa maintained a railway embargo on Mozambique. A similar 
embargo on Botswana and Zimbabwe lasted for three months. Over the next 
year, South African cargo destined for Maputo was drastically reduced. 
Particularly hard hit were high value goods that were profitable for the 
port. Maputo was left exporting low value and low-profit coal. 108 
Direct South African aggression became a regular feature of 
regional affairs. In 1981 South African troops crossed the border at 
Ponta do Ouro. The SADF also attacked Beira directly three times that 
year. 109 The following year Ruth First was assassinated by letter bomb 
in her office at Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. Beira's oil 
storage depot, which supplied much of Zimbabwe's petroleum needs, was 
destroyed by South African commandos in December 1982. 110 In another 
major attack, South African jets bombed Maputo's suburbs of Matola and 
Liberdade with fragmentation grenades. A number of civilians were 
killed in the attacks . 111 
Direct aggression was only part of South Africa's campaign to 
destabilise Mozambique. After Zimbabwean independence, Pretoria took 
over as Renamo's primary backer. Renamo's pirate radio station moved to 
Pietersburg and training camps were established in the Eastern 
Transvaal. 112 Rename was able to increase the scope and scale of its 
operations until it was active throughout Mozambique. The Beira 
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Corridor was closed from 21 September until 3 October 1980. Soon, 
Renamo was regularly attacking and sabotaging rail, road, and pipeline 
links between Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. Renamo's publicity 
office claimed that 123 acts of railway sabotage were committed in 1982; 
a total of 57 trains were destroyed. 113 By 1984 the lines connecting 
Beira and Malawi, Nacala and Malawi, and Maputo and Zimbabwe were 
severed. 114 
South African military pressure and the dire economic situation 
brought Frelimo to the negotiating table. A series of discussions 
resulted in the signing of the Nkomati Accords on 16 March 1984. South 
Africa was concerned about the use of Mozambican territory as a staging 
ground for ANC operations. The accords compelled the signatories not to 
support armed insurrection in each other's countries. The ANC was 
unceremoniously ejected from Mozambique. Both parties also pledged 
mutual co-operation on a number of fields, including the re-
establishment of Maputo as a significant port for the Transvaal's 
exports. 115 
At the time of the Nkomati Accords, Frelimo was making a change 
from an ideologically-driven liberation movement to a pragmatic 
governing party. South African aggression and central planning had 
taken their toll on the economy and the government was desperate. In 
1984 Mozambique joined the IMF and World Bank, and adopted a Private 
Investment Code to attract foreign investment. In May 1985 the 
government abandoned wage and price controls and appealed to Portuguese 
businessmen to return. ln 1987 Mozambique imposed the IMF approved 
Economic Recovery Programme. 116 Despite these and other changes, the war 
raged on and actually intensified, particularly in the South. 
Both South Africa and Zimbabwe became involved in protecting 
corridors in Mozambique. By 1985, 7,000 Zimbabwean soldiers, fully 17% 
of Zimbabwe's armed forces were stationed in Mozambique. The Beira 
Corridor had been turned into a virtual Zimbabwean province. South 
Africa's involvement in the Maputo Corridor was similar, although much 
less elaborate than Zimbabwe's activity to the North. South Africa and 
Mozambique established a joint operations centre at the border in April 
1985; this strategy was ineffective. 117 
The security situation throughout Mozambique continued to 
deteriorate. In 1985 a Western diplomat explained that, "the MNR 
(Renamo) operate at will. A year ago you could drive to South Africa 
and back in a day. Now you cannot go at all. " 118 The Economist reported 
that, "Beira is working at less than 1/2 its capacity. The bigger port 
at Maputo, the capital, is handling no more than 1/5 of its former 
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traffic. There is fighting almost every day on the outskirts of 
Maputo."119 The Director of the Port of Maputo explained that the 
railway to South Africa was only operational 33% of the time and to 
Swaziland the route was only open 38% of the time. 120 
A diplomatic row erupted in October 1986 when evidence came to 
light that the South Africans were continuing their support of Renamo. 
In turn, South Africa accused Mozambique of contravening the Nkomati 
Accord by supporting the ANC. South Africa ceased labour recruitment in 
Mozambique; Frelimo signed an agreement with the German Democratic 
Republic sending thousands of Mozambican mine workers to toil in this 
"socialist brother country. 11121 
By the late 1980s, a once proud railway was in shambles. The 
Maputo rail line was full of inefficiencies. Train control at CFM was 
archaic and prone to sabotage. CFM operated shorter trains than the 
South African standard, cutting shipments in two, causing delays in port 
while the first half of a shipment awaited the rest. Customs and 
immigration facilities were bureaucratic and slow. In addition, each 
return trip was delayed for approximately one hour when CFM crews 
purchased food at the nearby cafe for profitable resale in Maputo. 122 
Despite such problems, the pace of the war was slowing. CFM and 
the Port of Maputo were paralysed by a number of strikes in 1990-1991 
over pay demands and wage arrears going back three years. Strikes were 
one sign of returning normalcy in Mozambique. International mediation 
efforts eventually paid off and negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo 
resulted in the signing of the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique in 
Rome on 4 October 1992. 123 The demobilisation process proved to be slow-
going and difficult at times, although ultimately successful. Groups of 
bandits, ex-government soldiers, government soldiers, and Renamo forces 
were intermittently destructive. 124 
Despite these problems, travel within Mozambique gradually became 
safer. On 25 March 1993 the Limpopo Corridor opened to traffic for the 
first time in nine years. Rehabilitation continued and traffic volumes 
improved throughout Mozambique. South Africa and Mozambique extended 
full recognition to one another, and respective trade missions became 
embassies. 125 
Meanwhile, negotiations on a new dispensation in South Africa were 
under progress. The ANC, PAC and Communist Party were unbanned and 
political prisoners were released. The movements in exile returned to 
negotiate a new constitution. April 1994 was set aside as for South 
Africa's first democratic election. 
33 
The 1980s were a decade of active underdevelopment in Mozambique. 
The destruction of Mozambique's infrastructure facilitated the regional 
aims of South Africa and the impoverishment of Mozambique. The final 
decade of minority rule proved costly to South Africa's neighbours. 
Fortunately, the 1990s brought an end to civil war in both countries. 
With democracy just around the corner, the countries were poised to re-
establish a closer and more constructive relationship. 
2. 10 Conclusion 
The 1990s provides the opportunity to return to the boom days of 
the 1960s. A number of South African and Mozambican politicians and 
civil servants pursued this goal. Their conception of the Corridor and 
its potential is based on a particular understanding of the past. The 
past provides reason for hope. After all, Louren~o Marques was once 
Southern Africa's busiest port. For many years, South Africa --
Mozambique co-operation was very successful. 
However, there are also a variety of caveats and concerns that 
emerge from the region's history. (1) Southern Mozambique's economic 
and military significance has long been recognised. For this reason, 
the Portuguese and Mozambicans have been understandably fearful of their 
powerful neighbour's intentions. Mozambique's capital and its most 
important city is only an hour's drive from the border with South 
Africa. Mozambique's fear of South Africa kept the two countries at 
arm's length for many years. (2) Disputes between South Africa's 
provinces also emerge as one of the Oosterlijn's greatest obstacles 
during the first decades of the century. With opposition parties 
governing the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, such problems might recur 
if the benefits of infrastructure development are not spread widely. 
(3) Finally, South Africans have been concerned with efficiency at 
Mozambique's ports and railways for over one century. It would be naive 
to expect this situation to change overnight. 
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3. Leaders of the Maputo Development Corridor 
Strong leadership is one of the three hypothesised factors that 
impacted the Maputo Development Corridor. It is clear that those in 
leadership positions have the power to affect the outcome of an 
initiative. Leaders can direct the benefits of a project to whomever 
they choose. It is particularly important to determine if a particular 
initiative fulfils national or parochial or subnational priorities. A 
project's motivations can only be reliably understood in light of its 
leadership. Thus, the identification of leaders is an essential first 
step to understanding why the Maputo Corridor is a policy priority. 
Based on the distribution of benefits, it was assumed that the 
beneficiaries, primarily the Province of Mpumalanga, would be the 
driving force behind the project within South Africa. Press coverage 
reinforced this perception. According to several newspaper accounts, 
the Corridor appeared to be directed from Nelspruit. However project 
stakeholders downplayed the role of Mpumalanga in interviews. Press 
reports and the impressions of stakeholders were strikingly different. 
3.1 Assumptions: Mpuma/anga Gets Great Press 
If everything proceeds according to plan, the Maputo Corridor will 
be a boon for Mpumalanga. New industries should spring up taking 
advantage of investment incentives, cheap transportation, natural 
resources, and plenty of electric power. The province should secure a 
large percentage of economic spin-offs worth Rl6-billion, and the 
Corridor is projected to boost the province's gross geographic product 
by 13% by the year 2010. 1 Assuming self-interest on the part of 
government officials, it was hypothesised that the representatives of 
Mpumalanga would play a leading role in the development. 
The impression that Mpumalanga was the leading force behind the 
Corridor was reinforced by reports in the press, which highlighted the 
role of Mpumalanga officials in the development. Press accounts of the 
Maputo Corridor made it appear as if a fleet-footed provincial 
administration in Nelspruit had recognised the potential of a corridor 
between Maputo and Gauteng, convinced the national government to give 
approval, and then began to implement the project. 
An April 1996 interview in African Business gives an indication of 
press coverage. In the interview, Phosa takes full credit for the 
Maputo Corridor. "It's my baby. I recognised the potential, did some 
35 
homework on it and took it to Madiba [Nelson Mandela] . He said to me 
'don't just talk. Get it moving, speak to Chissano.'" Soon afterwards, 
Phosa was putting a plan together with the governors of Mozambique's 
Gaza and Maputo provinces. "In a short time the dream was a billion rand 
project." At the end of the article, the interviewer concludes, "Phosa 
had the foresight to see that the corridor is the best way to build up 
Mpumalanga' s economic muscle ... " 2 In August 1996, Finance Week added to 
Phosa's reputation as the Corridor's leader -- "Mpumalanga is its [the 
Maputo Corridor's] birthplace. Its architect in chief is Matthews 
Phosa. " 3 
Matthews Phosa was clearly involved in the development of the 
Maputo Corridor. Phosa recognised the importance of improved 
neighbourly relations early on. He understood the need to work in 
conjunction with bordering Mozambican provinces. He promoted cross-
border projects shortly after his swearing-in. Phosa's initial 
development plans for Mpumalanga (dating from mid-1994) included a new 
road directly linking Middelburg with Maputo harbour. 4 Early in 1995 
Phosa met with Mr. E. Numaio, Governor of Mozambique's Gaza Province. 
Tourism and joint infrastructure projects were discussed. 5 Some time 
later, the Eastern Transvaal signed "sister agreements" with 
Mozambique's Gaza and Maputo provinces. After the Investors' Conference 
in May 1996, both Botswana and Swaziland expressed an interest in 
greater involvement in the Maputo Corridor. Initially, it was Matthews 
Phosa who went to both countries to consolidate support for a greater 
corridor including Botswana, Swaziland, and Namibia. 
Phosa also took part in cross-border negotiations on a national 
level far more than any other premier. He was a regular member of 
national delegations to Mozambique when matters pertaining to his 
province were discussed. In July 1994, Phosa became the first Premier 
to travel abroad with an official delegation. He and Defence Minister 
Joe Modise travelled to Maputo for talks on cross-border crime with the 
Mozambican government. 6 In July 1995, when the Ministers of Trade and 
Industry, Public Enterprises, and Transport made a pilgrimage to Maputo 
to iron out final details of a multimodal transport agreement, Matthews 
Phosa was present. The agreement had serious implications for 
Mpumalanga. It included an understanding that the N4 between Gauteng 
and Maputo would be upgraded. Provisions were included for: dredging 
Maputo harbour; promoting shipping, aviation, and rail transport; and 
co-ordinating tourist development. The participants also discussed a 
second road from Phalaborwa to Maputo and security on the Maputo --
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Komatipoort road. 7 While his influence at these negotiations is 
unknown, his very presence has some significance. 
Extensive media attention seemed to corroborate the initial 
assumption of a Mpumalanga- and Phosa-led corridor. It is evident that 
Phosa played a role and had some influence in facilitating the Maputo 
Corridor. But was he at the helm or was he simply the Corridor's most 
boisterous cheerleader? 
3.2 Origin of the Corridor Concept 
Sorting out paternity of the Corridor is extremely difficult. The 
Maputo Corridor is a prominent and popular project, and it is often 
hailed as a success. Any number of people involved in the Corridor 
claim that they originated the concept. The press gave the most 
attention to Phosa's claims of originating the idea. But if you go to 
the Department of Transport, you'll hear an entirely different story. 
What really got it going was from the Department of Transport, our 
Director-General, Ketso, went to inspect roads or something in the 
Kruger Park. For some reason or another, he was in that area and 
getting to the border realised how close the sea was and how close 
Maputo was. He came back and said 'this is ridiculous, we've got 
to do something about this'. so, discussions began between our 
ministry and the Ministry of Transport in Mozambique. So, that's 
really how it started. 8 
Everyone puts himself or herself at the centre of their own 
conception of history. The identity of the individual who came up with 
the idea of a corridor is impossible to pinpoint, but it is actually 
inconsequential. Given the geography and history of the area, a 
revitalised transport corridor, at very least, was inevitable. After 
all, the Maputo Corridor is the shortest route to the sea. Even at the 
height of tensions between South Africa and Mozambique, South Africa was 
involved to some degree in the maintenance of the Ressano Garcia line. 9 
Some cargo continued to travel along the route even at the most 
difficult of times. 
It is likely that several people came up with the idea of a 
renewed corridor concurrently. Many prominent members of the new 
government were well acquainted with Mozambique from years of exile 
there. Mac Maharaj, Paul Jourdan, and Matthews Phosa spent a 
significant amount of time in Mozambique during the armed struggle. 
What is of greater import is the source of the relatively novel concept 
of the hybrid development corridor. Apparently this concept originated 
in the Department of Transport and was readied in time to be presented 
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to the cabinet in August 1995. 10 The proposal for a hybrid development 
corridor was accepted by the cabinet and thereafter the Maputo Corridor 
took shape. 
3.3 Political Leadership 
Political leadershipi played an important role in the development 
of the Corridor. According to Karin Pearce, "You have to have high 
level and consistent political support for these initiatives [corridors] 
otherwise they don't succeed."11 High-ranking politicians from the 
national government, the Mpumalanga provincial government, and the 
Mozambican government gave the project their blessing from the earliest 
stages. Both Mandela and Chissano attended the Investors' Conference in 
May 1996. When the final agreement on the N4 was signed in Maputo, 
Thabo Mbeki and his Mozambican counterpart were both present. 12 
The priority that politicians accorded the Maputo Corridor 
provided a sense of mission and discouraged petty bickering and turf 
battles. In interviews, many of the Corridor's key players referred to 
the role of political leadership. According to Karin Pearce, " ... if you 
have good 'A' political leadership and 'B' managerial people at the top 
of your structure, then the quality of what gets done lower down is much 
better."13 In contrast, lack of full political support was clearly a 
problem for the Beira Corridor. 14 Bitter infighting has characterised 
the Beira Corridor Group from its inception. The project's stakeholders 
had difficulty reaching necessary compromises. Karin Pearce adds that 
one of the problems inherent in the Beira Corridor was that the Corridor 
was run entirely by a private company -- "there was no government buy 
in. " 15 A commitment from government could have served as a strong 
incentive to compromise. 
All the politicians involved -- Mandela, Mbeki, Phosa, Manuel, 
Maharaj, Erwin, Chissano, Sicgau, and others used their positions to 
publicise and promote the Corridor to international investors. "If the 
President or Deputy President or any minister goes anywhere to address 
investment in South Africa, they must talk about corridors. That is a 
major part."16 High-level political support reassures potential 
investors. A commitment from political leaders ensures that 
bureaucratic and administrative obstacles to investment will be 
iPolitical leadership is defined as the role played by elected officials. This 
includes everything above the level of Director-General. Director-General and 
down is considered civil service. 
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overcome. International exposure should result in a net gain of 
investment, ensuring that the Corridor is not simply a zero-sum game, 
attracting investments to the Corridor region that would have otherwise 
been made in other parts of South Africa. 
In addition to their aforementioned roles, politicians made one 
more important contribution to the Corridor. Political leaders had the 
restraint not to intervene in the process once it had been initiated and 
responsibility had been delegated to civil servants in various 
government departments. Throughout the world, many development projects 
with great potential are ruined by political interference. According to 
World Bank research on rapidly growing economies, technocratic isolation 
- the ability of leading civil servants "to formulate and implement 
policies in keeping with politically formulated national goals with a 
minimum of lobbying for special favours from politicians and interest 
groups" is the foremost institutional trait that allows successful 
policy implementation. 17 In interviews, relevant civil servants gave 
the impression that they were fully in control of the process. 
The only political leaders who involved themselves in the 
specifics of the project were the Ministers of Transport, Maharaj and 
Muxanga. George Jamieson, of the TRAC Consortium, observed the 
ministers at work. "From what I saw and listened and heard ... the 
Minister of Transport for South Africa and Mozambique and the Director-
Generals really pushed the project."18 However, Maharaj and Muxanga's 
role was that of departmental manager, rather than representing any 
particular constituency. By avoiding political interference, the 
project was expedited and potential conflict regarding the distribution 
of benefits of the Corridor were avoided. 
3.4 Movers, Shakers, and Workhorses: Management of the Corridor 
One of the primary goals of research was to identify the leaders 
of the Maputo Corridor -- essentially finding out who was in charge. It 
is essential to know who is in control of implementation, as this is the 
first step towards understanding the motivations for the project. To 
ascertain this, the number of press references to individuals involved 
in the Corridor were compiled. The most commonly cited individuals in 
South African newspaper and magazine articles on the Maputo Corridor 
from the beginning of 1995 until the end of 1996 were Mac Maharaj, 
Minister of Transport, and Matthews Phosa, Premier of Mpumalanga 
Province. In addition to being quoted in articles about the Corridor, 
both were the subject of a number of interviews and profiles. Also 
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appearing frequently were: Ketso Gordhan, Department of Transport 
Director-General; Paulo Mu~'.anga, Mozambican Minister of Transport; Nazir 
Alli, Department of Transport Director of Roads; Joe Magagula, 
Mpumalanga Director of Strategic Planning; Karin Pearce, Department of 
Transport Director of Special Projects; Paul Jourdan, Department of 
Trade and Industry Director of Special Projects; and Francisca Soares, 
Mozambique's Director of Planning for the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. ii 
The interview process was used to check the accuracy of press 
reports on the Corridor. Interview subjects were asked to name the 
"visionaries and workhorses" behind the Maputo Development Corridor. 
Contrary to expectations, only Mpumalanga officials mentioned Matthews 
Phosa or other provincial officials. According to interviews, it 
appears that the Mpumalanga government played a less prominent role than 
was portrayed in the press. This is understandable. As the primary 
beneficiaries of the Corridor, Mpumalanga had the most to gain from 
publicising the project. The Mpumalanga government was the Maputo 
Corridor's loudest cheerleader, but they were not actually in charge. 
In addition, Mpumalanga gets more press coverage overall than most 
other provinces. South African media organisations dedicate a 
disproportionate amount of time and space to politics in Mpumalanga. 
Extensive coverage of events in Mpumalanga may be due to the Province's 
successful media and publicity machine. Joe Magagula explains, "We are 
fortunate that most of the things have been said very loudly in the 
media. We have good publicity."19 
Transport Minister Maharaj and Ketso Gordhan, Department of 
Transport Director-General, received the most recognition from their 
peers in interviews. Gordhan is one of the two project co-ordinators for 
South Africa. Both Maharaj and Gordhan are enthusiastic about the 
project. "The South Africans want to charge ahead with the project, not 
least because Transport Minister Mac Maharaj and Director General 
Gordhan have made it [the Corridor] a crusade."20 
iiA number of other individuals were mentioned in the press in association with 
the Corridor with less frequency. These include: President Mandela of South 
Africa; President Chissano of Mozambique; Rusty Evans, Director-General, 
Department of Foreign Affairs; Pascal Mocumbi, Prime Minister of Mozambique; 
Trevor Manuel, Minister of Finance; Stella Sicgau, Minister of Public 
Enterprises; Dawie De Villiers, ex-Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism; Mario Dimande, President of Caminhos de Ferro de Mo~ambique; Roberto 
White, Mozambican Minister of Public Works; Paulo Auade, Director of the Port of 
Maputo; Alec Erwin, Minister of Trade and Industry; Katherine Marshall, World 
Bank Southern Africa Director; Roberto Chaves, the World Bank's representative 
in Mozambique; Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Minister of Home Affairs; Winton Cobbs, 
Spoornet International Rail Manager; and James Wolfensohn, World Bank President. 
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Nazir Alli, Department of Transport director of roads, was also 
mentioned frequently. Jamieson, by the nature of his position 
negotiating for the N4 contract, had close contact with Alli. "As far as 
the personalities are concerned, Nazir actually ran it, he drove it, 
negotiated ... even more than his counterpart in Mozambique, Nazir really 
led the way ... Nazir chaired most of the meetings, negotiated directly 
with us, stuck with us through all hours of the night putting the whole 
thing together. " 21 However, one important caveat needs to be made. 
Alli was in charge of road construction at the Department of Transport, 
and the N4 was the first part of the Corridor project to be implemented. 
Alli will not be as prominently involved in other Corridor projects. 
The name of Paul Jourdan, Director of Special Projects for the 
Department of Trade and Industry, came up repeatedly in interviews. 
Jourdan is one of two project co-ordinators on the South African side. 
"The joint interim team directing the project includes people such as 
Paul Jourdan, an ANC member who lived in exile in Mozambique for nine 
years. Jourdan, who has a PhD in political economy and is special 
adviser on the Corridor project for the Department of Trade and 
Industry, has the determination of a missionary. One recent day started 
with a 6.30 am meeting in Johannesburg, then back to his office in 
Pretoria in time for a 9am session."22 
Karin Pearce, Director of Special Projects at the Department of 
Transport; Roberto White, Mozambican Minister of Public Works and 
Housing; Paulo Muxanga, Mozambican Minister of Transport; and Antonio 
Pinto, from Mozambique's Ministry of Foreign Affairs were all recognised 
by their peers. 
The difference between newspaper reports and the impressions of 
participants in the implementation process is striking. Newspaper 
reports tended to focus on the role of Matthews Phosa and Mac Maharaj. 
The role of civil servants in Nelspruit, such as Coleman Nyathi and Joe 
Magagula, was also highlighted. These people were the project's most 
vociferous publicists, but were not necessarily in charge of the 
Corridor. Publicity is essential for the success of a development 
project dependent on attracting investment. However, during the 
interview process it became clear that the Maputo Corridor was actually 
directed from the offices of civil servants in Pretoria, and to a lesser 
extent, Maputo. The real movers and shakers in the Maputo Corridor were 
undoubtedly Mac Maharaj, Ketso Gordhan, Paul Jourdan, and Karin Pearce. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
Identifying the leaders of the Maputo Corridor was an important 
step to understanding the motivations for the project. Individuals who 
control policy formation and implementation have the opportunity to 
shape the world. It is important to identify these individuals and to 
understand their motives. A number of individuals left their stamp on 
the Corridor. Respected politicians gave the project their full support 
from the outset. Mandela, Mbeki, Chissano, and Phosa have actively 
promoted the project both in Southern Africa and overseas. But 
political leaders kept their hands off the project itself and left 
implementation to civil servants. 
Research started with assumptions of the Corridor's leadership 
that were based on press reports and the distribution of the benefits of 
the project. These assumptions proved to be spurious. Mpumalanga, 
believed to be leading the project, clearly played a secondary, albeit 
important role. The Mpumalanga government carried the torch in terms of 
publicising the Corridor both inside and outside of South Africa. The 
central government's Departments of Transport and Trade and Industry are 
clearly the driving force behind the Corridor. Civil servants in 
Pretoria, particularly in the Departments of Transport and Trade and 
Industry are the managers and implementers of the project. 
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4. Strategic Motivations for the Corridor 
Every major development project has a variety of motivations --
economic, social, political, or strategic. Brazil's new capital city of 
Brasilia, for example, was constructed for a number of reasons. The 
location would spur transport and economic development in the interior; 
it would help to integrate the native American community into wider 
Brazilian society; and it would represent a break with the colonial past 
and a belief in Brazil's future. The most successful development 
projects are economically viable while concurrently fulfilling strategic 
objectives.i The Maputo Development Corridor is undoubtedly a viable 
infrastructure project with sufficient economic rationale. The 
willingness of the private sector to take the risk of financing the N4 
is a clear indication of the Corridor's viability. 
However, the Corridor also fits neatly into the ANC's long term 
vision for the South and Southern Africa. In the region,ii the Corridor 
is part of the ANC's strategy to reconstruct Southern Africa. Closer to 
home, the Maputo Corridor could help to fulfil the ANC's implicit and 
explicit long-term domestic objectives. Implicitly, the central 
government could limit the Inkatha Freedom Party's leverage by providing 
Gauteng with additional transport alternatives. But the Maputo Corridor 
also fits in with the ANC's stated economic strategy -- the Growth, 
Employment, and Redistribution plan. In addition, the Corridor fits 
neatly into Frelimo strategy to rebuild Mozambique and to reintegrate 
Mozambique into the region's transport network. 
4.1 Regional Implications of the Corridor 
After decades of conflict, peace came to much of Southern Africa 
in the 1990s. Mozambique moved slowly, but successfully from the Rome 
General Peace Agreement to democratic elections. South Africa's 
transition from minority rule to democracy began with Nelson Mandela's 
release from prison in 1990 and reached its fruition in the April 1994 
elections. 1 Peace provided the opportunity to refashion regional 
1An economically viable infrastructure project is one that could theoretically 
pay for itself by user fees, whether or not they are actually collected. 
Strategic objectives are long-term goals of great import. These would include 
the preservation of the state, borders, or the achievement of a certain level of 
economic development. 
11"Region" refers to Southern Africa, including South Africa, the BNLS states, 
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, and the Shaba region of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. 
43 
relations. Democracy demanded a re-evaluation of South Africa's 
regional priorities. South Africa now had the occasion and the will to 
transform itself from regional bully to amiable big brother. The ANC 
prioritised improved and constructive relations with other Southern 
African states. The ANC has two primary regional priorities: repaying 
its debt to allies and the creation of a conducive environment for 
shared economic growth. 
4.1.1 Repayment Time: South Africa Atones for its Past 
The African National Congress needs to repay the neighbouring 
countries that gave it refuge during its years in exile. Old allies 
from the liberation struggle are accorded a special relationship by the 
ANC government. This policy has been contentious, particularly in the 
cases of Cuba and Iran. Many of the ANC's most ardent supporters were 
other African countries, particularly the members of the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) . Mozambique was one 
of the ANC's foremost regional backers. Prior to the Nkomati Accords, 
the ANC was allowed to operate freely in Mozambique. Even after the 
Accords, the Mozambican government gave the liberation movement their 
full moral support. For this reason, the ANC recognises Mozambique's 
contribution to its success. 
The new government has inherited South Africa's moral obligation 
to help reconstruct the states where it wrecked havoc in years past. 
Joe Magagula, Mpumalanga's Director of Strategic Planning, explained 
this responsibility. "South Africa has been partly responsible for the 
destruction in Mozambique and the political responsibility lies here, 
whether it was the ANC or the National Party, somehow or another 
somebody was involved in destroying Mozambique, by either hiding in 
Mozambique or by attacking Mozambique."2 
Of all the front line states,iiionly Angola and Mozambique were 
invaded by South African troops. South Africa also bankrolled 
destructive revolutionary movements in both countries.iv But Mozambique 
arguably bore the brunt of South African aggression. Maputo's proximity 
to South Africa and the presence of ANC leaders made it an irresistible 
target. White-ruled South Africa's policy of destabilising its 
neighbours dovetailed neatly with the government's pursuit of the ANC in 
neighbouring countries. 3 For example Ruth First, an anti-Apartheid 
iiiThe Front Line States were the majority-ruled states of Southern Africa that 
opposed Apartheid. 
ivUnita in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique 
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activist and head of the African Studies Centre at Eduardo Mondlane 
University in Maputo was assassinated by a letter bomb in the winter of 
1982. 4 This destructive cat-and-mouse game was played out in several 
regional countries, but nowhere with more intensity than in Mozambique. 
As such, South Africa's obligation to reconstruct its neighbours is set 
to begin in Mozambique. 
4.1.2 Growing the Neighbourhood. 
In order to realise its post-Apartheid potential, South Africa 
needs a prosperous and peaceful neighbourhood. There are a number of 
problems caused by the asymmetrical economic development of Southern 
Africa. 
Low incomes in most of Southern Africa mean that the region cannot 
be viewed as a large-scale potential export market for South Africa. 
Exports form a central part of the ANC's economic strategy. A primary 
tenet of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy is to boost 
manufactured exports, creating jobs for the unemployed. There are 
economic opportunities on the subcontinent, but widespread poverty means 
that Southern Africa is limited in terms market potential. The SADC 
countries, aside from South Africa, have a market smaller than that of 
Belgium. 5 
More alarming is the fact that the current level of trade between 
South Africa and its neighbours is unsustainable in the long term. The 
trade balance is tilted dramatically in South Africa's favour; South 
Africa's exports to Southern Africa far exceed its imports. Unless 
regional countries start producing and exporting goods and services, 
they will not be able to continue to afford South Africa's products. 
For example, Mozambique pays for its consumption of South African goods 
largely with money from foreign donors. A more affluent Southern Africa 
would be a ready market for South Africa's manufactured exports and 
would be able to pay for them. 
In addition, the regional disparity of wealth means that migration 
from neighbouring states is virtually uncontrollable. South Africa is 
experiencing a major influx of refugees from other parts of the 
subcontinent. Coleman Nyathi, Head of Mpumalanga's Department of 
Economic Affairs and Gaming explained that "-Me have a lot of pressure 
from these people crossing the border in masses and masses trying to 
enter South Africa. They are prepared to be eaten by crocodiles, 
crossing the river to come here ... They have to brave that because the 
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situation is so serious and desperate that it is really a choice of that 
or death." 6 Illegal immigration is straining social services and is 
restricting the ANC's ability to provide a better life for the majority 
of the population. Growth in neighbouring countries would clearly 
relieve some of the pressure on South Africa from illegal immigration. 
Furthermore, an economically stagnant region would be prone to 
instability and unrest. Peace in the region has resulted in rising 
expectations on the part of Southern Africans. Citizens now expect 
their governments to deliver. If these expectations remain unfulfilled, 
discontent could translate into renewed political instability. 7 
Instability in the region would clearly spell the end of Mbeki's 
"African Renaissance." In addition, it would entail further costs to 
South Africa in terms of migration, peace-keeping, and investor 
perceptions. 
The Maputo Corridor is one facet of a strategy to create an 
environment conducive to.economic growth and political stability in the 
region. "Expanding Maputo forms part of an overall regional industrial 
and development policy. If we do not develop regionally and create jobs 
elsewhere at the same time as in South Africa, controlling illegal 
immigration becomes difficult."8 South Africa's belief in balanced and 
co-operative regional development is thus a result of various selfish 
and altruistic motives. South Africa's regional policy resembles that 
of the United States with NAFTA or the European Union with its Euro-
Mediterranean project. The ANC's objectives of repaying past debts and 
revitalising the region's economies come together in South African 
policy towards Mozambique, which includes the Maputo Corridor. 
4.1.3 Mozambique's Regional Strategy 
Mozambique is truly a country that is blessed by geography. "Of 
all Africa's 'outlet' countries, she [Mozambique] is the most 
strategically placed: because of the length of her coastline, the 
quality and size of her harbours, and the number of countries whose 
outlets to the sea she controls."9 Mozambique's 1,560 mile Indian Ocean 
coastline offers a variety of economic opportunities. 10 Not least of 
which is control over the export routes of Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and 
to a lesser extent, Botswana and Swaziland. Reconstruction of 
Mozambique is essential to the well-being of Southern Africa as a whole. 
The Maputo Corridor fits clearly into Frelimo's strategy for the 
region. Mozambique has always had a service- and transport- oriented 
economy. Frelimo's policy since independence has been to maintain or 
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improve its links with the landlocked states to the West (with the 
exception of the blockade of Ian Smith's Rhodesia). Mozambique played a 
key role in SADCC and one of SADCC's major goals was to decrease 
reliance on South Africa's transportation infrastructure by revitalising 
and making use of Mozambique's transport capacity via Maputo, Beira, and 
Nacala. It is no coincidence that Maputo was chosen as the headquarters 
for the Southern African Transport & Communications Commission 
(SATCC) . 11 
However for the first 20 years of independence, Mozambique's 
ambitions of serving as the heart of an integrated regional 
transportation network were frustrated by civil war. The end of the war 
provides opportunity for Mozambique to realise its potential as a 
transport provider. The Maputo Corridor is the largest and most rapidly 
developing of Mozambique's Corridor projects, which also include the 
Nacala and Beira Corridors. 
4.2 Domestic South African Strategy and the Maputo Corridor 
The Maputo Development Corridor helps to concurrently fulfil a 
number of objectives. It is clearly part of a strategy to stimulate the 
economy and to provide jobs. However, the spatial distribution of 
benefits has led to some speculation that other motives are involved. 
Most of the benefits of the Maputo Corridor will accrue to Mpumalanga. 
Mpumalanga is widely seen as a loyal and responsible ANC-led province 
and, as such, deserves to be rewarded. In addition, there have been a 
number of reports in the press attributing the Maputo Corridor to the 
ANC's fears of a restive and possibly secessionist KwaZulu-Natal. 
Observers prone to conspiracy theories purport that the Maputo Corridor 
is the result of a strategy to isolate the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
and to secure South Africa's industrial heartland. 
Gauteng is Southern Africa's largest economic agglomeration and 
Gauteng's most important ports, Richards Bay and Durban, are both 
located in KwaZulu-Natal. KwaZulu-Natal is run by the sometime-
bellicose IFP. "With his support base centred on KwaZulu-Natal, he 
[Mangosuthu Buthelezi] has a potential stranglehold over the country's 
economic heartland. For the industrial and commercial conurbation of 
Gauteng, the N3 highway between Van Reenen's Pass and the harbours of 
Durban and Richards Bay is the main supply line, the jugular."12 
Of the leading figures involved in the Corridor, only Joe Magagula 
would discuss this aspect of the development. 
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... the basis of my argument is that if KwaZulu-Natal and Durban and 
Richards Bay are the key points for export and import and we have 
this kind of violence going on in KwaZulu-Natal, the South African 
economy as a whole is going to be affected nationally, 
internationally. To allow South Africa to participate 
competitively in global markets you definitely need to position 
yourself strategically in terms of those outlets. One of the key 
things is for us to look for an alternative harbour. Particularly 
for the provinces up here, you cannot rely on East London, Port 
Elizabeth, or Cape Town ... 13 
While it is true that a successfully implemented Maputo Corridor 
will cause Durban to lose its virtual monopoly on Gauteng's exports, it 
is impossible for Maputo to replace the Natal ports in the event of a 
blockade or other emergency. In 1996, Maputo only handled 3.5 million 
tons of goods, compared with Durban's 27 million and Richards Bay's 80 
million tons. 14 Even at its current theoretical capacity of 14 million 
tons, Maputo's transit volumes pale in comparison with those of the 
Natal ports. 
Other problems with conspiracy arguments abound. Maputo's harbour 
is currently only 7.4 metres deep, and after dredging will only reach a 
depth of 9.4 metres. This compares poorly with Durban, which is 12.9 
metres deep and Richards Bay, which is 12.8 metres deep. 15 Even after 
rehabilitation and dredging, Maputo's coal terminal will only be able to 
accommodate 80,000 ton ships. 150,000 ton ships are the preferred means 
for shipping bulk coal and they are currently served by the Richards 
Bay Coal Terminal. 16 Maputo is, in all aspects, an inadequate 
replacement for Durban and, or Richards Bay. However, in conjunction 
with other South African and regional ports, it could possibly act as an 
"emergency lifeline" for the industrial heartland. 17 While securing the 
heartland may have been a marginal motivation for the Corridor, it 
cannot realistically be seen as a primary motivation for the project. 
In stark contrast to the brouhaha that surrounded the Oosterlijn 
in the early 20th century, protests against the Maputo Development 
Corridor from other provinces are virtually absent. The Maputo Corridor 
is essentially a concentration of infrastructure and RDP funding. One 
would expect some dissent based on the fact that the capital expended on 
transport infrastructure in Mpumalanga and Mozambique could easily be 
spent in other provinces. 
Quiet domestic consensus on the Maputo Corridor can be explained 
by the broad geographic spread of development funds. The MDC is only 
one of a number of Spatial Development Initiatives (SDI). In fact, 
every province has at least part of an SDI envisioned for it. 18 The 
Western Cape has the West Coast Corridor, the Eastern Cape has several 
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corridors in the former homeland areas, and KwaZulu-Natal is part of the 
Maputo Corridor and has other projects running from Pietermartizburg to 
Richards Bay. Even the Northern Cape, the Northwest and the Free State 
are due to benefit from development corridors. 19 
Another consideration is that there is very little excess capacity 
in the South African port system. Exports are growing strongly and all 
the ports are taxed. Mike Schussler, an economist at Transnet, 
predicted total exports would increase by over 20% in 1996 and 17% in 
1997. 20 Durban, Gauteng's primary port, is at capacity. 
In order to handle current and expected traffic growth, port 
expansion is taking place at all of South Africa's seven commercial 
ports. Durban and Richards Bay, likely the most prone to dissent, are 
both expanding. The Port of Durban is getting a new R500-million 
container terminal and is likely to expand onto the existing airport 
site once the city's airport moves to La Mercy. 21 Richards Bay is 
getting a new dry-dock, a new coal export terminal, and a liquid bulk 
storage facility. 22 The Eastern Cape is getting a major new port at 
Coega, near Port Elizabeth, and the Western Cape's Saldanha Port is also 
being expanded. 23 In fact, in 1997 Transnet approved a record capital 
budget of Rl.5 billion for 1997/98. 24 This situation contrasts with the 
situation at the beginning of the century, when excess capacity 
predominated and the need to repay debt obligations was pressing. 
4.2.1 Other More Plausible Motivations for the Corridor? 
The Maputo Development Corridor clearly is aimed at fulfilling a 
number of objectives. It should cement ties with the rest of the 
subcontinent. The addition of another port to the South African system 
should give the South Africa flexibility to deal with any number of 
eventualities, including potential secession or unrest in KwaZulu-Natal. 
However, other motivations for the Corridor are clearly present. 
Pragmatic and less divisive motivations are more plausible than any 
conspiracy theory. The Maputo Corridor dovetails with the government's 
goals as expounded in the GEAR strategy and the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme. Karin Pearce stresses that " ... the overall goal, 
not only of the Maputo Corridor, but of all the SDis, is to deliver 
sustainable jobs."25 It should be emphasised that the Maputo Corridor 
is only one of several regional "spatial development initiatives" across 
the country. Each SDI has, at its core, the goal of creating the 
conditions necessary for sustained and equitable economic growth, based 
on regional comparative advantage. 
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Different regions have different potential for future economic 
growth. This potential can be seen as the difference between the 
opportunities on offer and the extent to which these are currently 
exploited. It must be understood that this is a relatively short-term 
view; in the long term, human ingenuity is the only limit on economic 
opportunity. The larger the extent of unexploited opportunity, the 
bigger a "bang for a buck" the government will get for its investment in 
infrastructure. In KwaZulu-Natal, for example, there is a great deal of 
opportunity provided by climate, the population, and geomorphology. 
However, much of this opportunity is currently exploited, KwaZulu-Natal 
has an excellent network of roads, railways, airports, and two major sea 
ports. 
By contrast, the Maputo Corridor region is full of unexploited 
economic opportunity. Not only is the region the closest link between 
Gauteng and the sea, but it boasts a variety of opportunities that would 
remain unexploited without cheaper and more efficient transport. As 
Karin Pearce explains, "The corridor concept works quite well in the 
case of the Maputo Corridor because you have an existing wealth of 
industry and economic activity on one end and you have a port with 
enormous potential at the other. And in between the two you have a 
range of economic potential which is really quite diverse and quite 
phenomenal. " 26 
The geographic and economic logic of the Maputo Corridor is highly 
convincing; there is a great deal of potential along the Corridor route. 
There are opportunities in mining, electricity production, forestry, 
heavy and light industry, and agriculture. The region covered by the 
Maputo Corridor has the greatest potential of any of South Africa's 
regions. This is largely because political considerations prevented the 
development of the Eastern Transvaal starting in the mid 1970s. It 
should come as no surprise that the government should concentrate its 
attention first on the Maputo Corridor. 
4.2.2 Domestic Strategy and the Maputo Corridor: Mozambique 
Similar pragmatic motivations drive policy in Mozambique. 
Starting in the mid-1980s, the exigencies of a war-ravaged economy and 
the collapse of the Soviet Union have forced Frelimo to moderate its 
economic policy. Despite periodic bouts of hesitation, Frelimo has 
moved steadily from ideological central planning to a pragmatic mindset 
encouraging foreign investment and market mechanisms. 27 According to 
Coleman Nyathi, the Mozambican government has " ... turned around very fast. 
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They realised they have been successful in stopping the war, but it will 
all depend now on whether they can create jobs for those people."28 
Francisca Soares underscored the government's new perspective by 
explaining that the primary goals of the Maputo Corridor are "to 
maintain and create new jobs" and "to minimise the negative impacts on 
investment. " 29 The Mozambican government unabashedly courted investors 
at the May 1996 Maputo Corridor conference held in Maputo. 
But consensus on economic policy is far from complete. Less than 
a month after the conference, the Frelimo Party Conference called for a 
reversal in policy, safeguarding the government's monopoly in banking, 
insurance, air transport, ports, railways, energy, water and 
communications. 30 The decision caused major jitters among investors, 
but the threat was never carried out. Francisca Soares explained the 
difficulty inherent in a major policy reorientation. "I think it is a 
complete change which in fact is not easy because this is a change of 
the people also. And we are talking of the same people who have been 
working and living in colonial times. We have been living with central 
planning -- we are the same people! And we are in a new situation and 
it's a very short time." 31 If successful, the positive experience of the 
Maputo Corridor is likely to encourage Frelimo to continue with 
investor- and market-friendly policies. 
A long-standing domestic concern is that the Maputo Corridor may 
exacerbate the wealth differential between Southern and Northern 
Mozambique. Historically, most development was undertaken in the far 
South, with minor, primarily agricultural investments made in the 
central and Northern areas. Assertions that Frelimo favours the South 
have been raised regularly since 1975. The Maputo Corridor may generate 
dissent, particularly in the North. 
4.3 Conclusion 
The Maputo Corridor is part of the ANC's strategy to achieve its 
long-term goals. These goals include: a prosperous, peaceful, and 
growing Southern Africa; and a politically stable and unified South 
Africa with outward-oriented economic growth providing opportunity for 
all citizens. In the region, the Corridor is one facet of an attempt to 
improve relations, repay past debts, and reinvigorate the economies 
Southern Africa. Domestically, some observers see the Corridor as part 
of a strategy to disempower the IFP and to isolate Gauteng from any 
transport-related economic shocks. While the Corridor may achieve these 
ends, it also fits into a more pragmatic and less conflictual strategy -
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- job creation and economic growth. The Maputo Corridor also converges 
with Frelimo's long-term objectives. Frelimo's desire to re-establish 
Mozambique as a regional transport provider is clearly served by the 
Corridor. The Maputo Corridor also serves domestic Mozambican interests 
by attracting foreign investment and creating conditions favourable to 
further economic growth. 
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5. The Implementation of the Maputo Corridor 
The first stages of the implementationi of the Maputo Corridor 
have been characterised by speed, a high degree of consensus, and 
efficiency. This is primarily the result of two characteristics of the 
implementation process. The first is that the implementing structure 
has been kept relatively lean, with a clear and orderly chain of 
command, but with ample delegation of responsibility. The second 
characteristic is that there has been a great deal of co-operation and 
co-ordination, facilitated by regular meetings of functional teams. 
There is close co-operation between different departments within the 
same government, close co-operation between different governments, and 
close co-operation between government and the private sector. A balance 
was struck successfully between these two characteristics. It must be 
noted that the implementation of the Maputo Corridor will be a long-term 
process, and this analysis is based solely on this early information. 
5.1 An Efficient Chain of Command 
The Maputo Corridor project was remarkably free of open rivalries, 
turf battles and discord during its development. To a large degree this 
is due to the clear demarcation of roles and the delegation of 
responsibilities between different groups and levels of government (see 
figure eleven) . Each country has a ministerial committee or sub-
cabinet, composed of relevant ministers. In South Africa, this includes 
the ministers of Transport, Trade and Industry, Home and Foreign 
Affairs, and other ministers when their portfolio is pertinent to the 
issue under discussion. The parallel structure in Mozambique includes 
ministers of Public Works and Housing, Transport, Foreign Affairs and 
Co-operation, and others when called for. 1 
Answerable to the sub-cabinets is the Interim Coordinating 
Committee (ICC). The ICC is where the management and implementation of 
the Corridor takes place. The ICC is composed of the national co-
ordinators (Ketso Gordhan and Paul Jourdan in South Africa, Francisca 
Soares and Antonio Pinto in Mozambique) and representatives from a 
variety of other departments. The ICC is responsible for the 
development of major transport and communications infrastructure between 
Witbank and Maputo (including the N4, rail, the Port of Maputo, 
iThe implementation process is the means by which the concept of a Maputo 
Corridor is turned into the reality of a development and infrastructure project. 
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telecommunications, and the border post). Its mandate includes 
"assessing socio-economic conditions, appraising development potentials, 
and ident.ifying key actions required to facilitate development" along 
the Corridor. 2 The ICC appears to receive adequate resources to fulfil 
its mandate. To June 1997, approximately R4-million was spent on the 
project by the South African government alone. 3 The ICC has a dedicated 
technical team, composed of specialists from a number of fields. The 
technical team undertook detailed economic, geographic, demographic, and 
engineering studies of the region and drew up the specifications for the 
Corridor that were presented to the investment community in May 1996. 
Mpumalanga Province plays an important support role. " ... al though 
the provinces are not technically part of this structure, the provinces 
are a really critical part, particularly on the South African side of 
this initiative."4 This support role is facilitated by a corridor sub-
cabinet, similar to the structure in the central government. 
Mpumalanga's focus is on the provision of services and smaller-scale 
infrastructure (drinking water, sewage, secondary and tertiary roads, 
etc.), particularly in the secondary corridor area. The secondary 
corridor is composed of the administratively definable area adjacent to 
the primary corridor. " ... we therefore concentrate on the periphery, the 
areas that are more far away from the Corridor and that cannot benefit 
directly." 5 So there is a spatial differentiation between the role of 
the central government, with provincial responsibilities more pronounced 
as distance increases from the Corridor route itself. 
The province is responsible for a number of programmes that 
support the central government's role in the primary corridor. The 
provincial administration identified a number of secondary issues in the 
province for which it has responsibility. Coleman Nyathi explained that 
there are " ... primary issues, which involve liasing with the national 
government. And there are secondary issues which are those of a 
developmental nature that the province has to fulfil and we've got 
project managers for that. Within that we have sub-programmes: SMMEs, 
environment, local government, agriculture." 6 When Nyathi was asked if 
the Corridor was "organised along federal lines; [with] certain things 
designated as central government responsibilities and other things as ... ," 
he responded with a determined "Exactly." 7 There is a differentiation 
of responsibilities between different levels of government. Where 
overlap occurs, consultation takes place regularly. 
The province's most important responsibility is to attract 
investment. This responsibility is shared between the central and 
provincial governments, but local areas have a clear incentive to court 
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investors. Mpumalanga is in the process of establishing a "one-stop 
investment centre."8 This should direct potential investors towards 
ideal industrial locations and is aimed at facilitating all aspects of 
the investment process. "Mpumalanga province is remarkable in that they 
have really ... taken ownership of the initiative. They have established 
all sorts of mechanisms and things that enable investors to feel very 
comfortable and to have access to the information they need ... " 9 
As the focus of the Maputo Corridor moves from establishing the 
necessary infrastructure to attracting the investment that will create 
the jobs that will bring social benefits, the role of the province is 
set to increase. Coleman Nyathi explained this role. "We see that it 
is our role to promote investment via the Maputo Development Corridor, 
to co-ordinate any effort to build a database for this region in terms 
of introducing availability of data for those wanting to invest. 1110 The 
fact that the province's responsibility is to attract investment largely 
accounts for its high profile in the press. The more publicity the 
Corridor gets, the larger the benefit likely for Mpumalanga. Other 
provinces, specifically the Northern Province, are involved and share 
the same responsibilities as Mpumalanga. However, the Northern Province 
has not expended as much effort on the Corridor as Mpumalanga has. 
Extraneous parties were deliberately left out. For example, 
Zimbabwe and Swaziland were initially not involved, even though they 
would be impacted by the Corridor. This simple design helped expedite 
the Corridor, but it didn't make any friends in neighbouring countries. 
Despite a long history of multilateral action on issues such as regional 
transportation development, Mozambique and South Africa initially set 
out on their own. This was deliberate; the Southern African Transport 
Coordinating Conference's past success was very limited and there was a 
desire to avoid past mistakes. 
An orderly chain of command was essential to efficiently 
implementing the Maputo Corridor. Conflict between different levels of 
government was avoided by delegating different responsibilities to the 
different levels of government. Major transport infrastructure is the 
responsibility of the central government. The provincial government is 
responsible for smaller infrastructure and for attracting investment to 
the secondary corridor area. 
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5.2 Co-operation and Co-ordinat•on 
However, the implementati.)n process is not entirely a top-down. 
The other primary reason for the successful implementation of the 
Corridor is extensive co-operation between different stakeholders. 
It is through face-to-face meetings that co-operation and co-ordination 
are fostered. When asked what the most important aspect of the 
development is, leading figures consistently referred to co-operative, 
team-oriented interaction. Francisca Soares explained the working 
environment of the Corridor project, "I think it was really people 
committed and involved, working day and night ... we found there's good 
co-operation between both countries."11 There are four types of co-
operation that characterise the Maputo Corridor. 
First, interdepartmental, functional co-operation within the same 
government is instrumental in getting all the relevant experts involved 
in the project. 
Second, there is a significant amount of co-ordination of 
activities between the different governments involved (primarily 
Mpumalanga and the South African and Mozambican central governments). 
Third, the Corridor's implementation is characterised by a high 
level of co-operation between government and the private sector; it was 
envisioned essentially as a partnership between the two parties. 
Finally, the project could not have come to fruition without a new 
understanding between Mozambique, South Africa, and international 
financial institutions. 
5.2.1 Functional Co-operation 
When working on the same project, it is often the case that 
individuals from different departments perceive themselves as in 
competition. This results in an inefficient and uneasy relationship. 
Interdepartmental communication languishes on individuals' desks and 
misunderstandings are prone to arise. Bringing relevant individuals 
from different departments and putting them on a functional team helps 
to avoid these sorts of problems. All three governments (South Africa, 
Mpumalanga, and Mozambique) have functional structures which bring 
relevant ministers and civil servants from a variety of departments 
together on a regular basis. This ensures that they are all focused on 
the same goal and that problems can be resolved expeditiously whenever 
they arise. 
In Mpumalanga, interdepartmental work is facilitated through the 
provincial sub-cabinet responsible for the Corridor which meets at least 
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monthly. 12 Joe Magagula described the situation; "I would say to you 
that the fact that we don't have a lot of turf battles, and the fact 
that people seem to be co-operating in terns of learning and there is 
nobody who is claiming to be knowing more than others ... everybody relies 
on others to succeed."13 This type of atmosphere is fostered by 
functional teams. 
Functional co-operation in the South African and the Mozambican 
governments is facilitated by both ministerial committees and the 
Interim Coordinating Committee. Decisions in these structures are 
reached by consultation and consensus, obviating the need for lengthy 
interdepartmental communications. The logic of this approach was 
explained by Francisca Soares, " ... this is a multi sectoral project, it's 
not only transport. We've got a committee which involves technicians 
from agriculture, industry, public works, planning, and finance." 14 
Having all interested and relevant parties around one table is a 
clear factor accounting for the initial success of the Corridor. 
Decisions can be expedited and implementation of these decisions is more 
certain than if the decisions were made in isolation. Lack of co-
operation and consultation was one reason for the failure of the 
Oosterlijn in the early 20th Century. Groups likely to dissent were 
excluded from negotiations in order to achieve consensus, but the 
resulting agreements could never be implemented because of the earlier 
exclusion of these groups. 
5.2.2 Intergovernmental Co-operation 
Functional co-operation within governments would have not been 
sufficient to implement the Corridor. The project would never have come 
to fruition without close co-operation between the South Africa, 
Mpumalangan, and Mozambican governments. It was imperative that the 
relationship between the various governments involved in the Corridor 
developed along co-operative and not competitive lines. Communication 
and regular contact are the primary tools used to facilitate this 
relationship. There are monthly meetings between the South African 
central government and the government of Mpumalanga. South African and 
Mozambican civil servants also meet at least once a month and as often 
as several times a week. Regular consultation is necessary to avoid any 
unnecessary misunderstandings. 
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5.2.2.1 The Central Government and Mpumalanga 
Karin Pearce explained the priority that the cel'tral government 
accorded to establishing a good working relationship with the provinces. 
It's " ... very important for us to consolidate a good working relationship 
and ensure that the capacity of the provinces is capable of handling the 
opportunity that is there ... " 15 The provinces (with the exception of the 
Free State) are new structures and (with the exception of the Western 
Cape) are governed by parties with little or no government experience. 
The central government has made provincial capacity-building one of the 
priorities of the Maputo Corridor. 
Communication between the different levels of government is 
essential to maintaining a productive relationship. "The way we 
structured this was that no matter what level of government you talk to 
about this, the same message is given. We established our co-ordinating 
structures with the provinces to ensure precisely that. So even if a 
person who wants to know about the road is in Nelspruit and decides to 
go and see Coleman Nyathi, he can tell them the very same story that I 
can tell and Nazir can tell." 16 Representatives of provincial and 
central governments meet on a monthly basis to remedy any problems. 17 
Despite these efforts, co-ordination between the provincial and 
central governments did not go off without any hitches. According to 
George Jamieson, when he met the Mpumalangans, " ... they were really very 
badly informed about what was going on and they were, I believe a little 
bit upset because they'd been left out ... " 18 Joe Magagula also referred 
to this problem, "In the main there's good co-operation between the 
department and ourselves ... [but] what seems to be happening is that as 
this project becomes more practical and implemented, the Department of 
Transport tends to distance themselves. In fact, they tend not to 
consult more and they tend to do a lot of things above our heads."19 
Despite an emphasis on shared understandings of the development, there 
are intermittent misunderstandings. But the relationship between the 
central government and Mpumalanga seems on the whole to have been 
amicable and co-operative. 
5.2.2.2 Mpumalanga and its Neighbours 
Mpumalanga has also maintained a co-operative relationship with 
its neighbours. Initial plans called for two roughly parallel corridors 
running through Mpumalanga and the Northern Province. This road would 
have had to traverse the Kruger Park; the plans caused a great uproar 
particularly among environmentalists and in the tourist industry. 
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Ultimately, the plan for the Northern Province's road to Maputo was 
scrapped. The Northern Province was integrated into the Maputo Corridor 
via a sub-corridor to Phalaborwa and Tzaneen (see figure five). Spurned 
ambitions for a separate corridor could be a major ingredient in an 
antagonistic relationship. Despite this potential for conflict, the 
Northern Province -~ Mpumalanga relationship seems to be productive. "It 
[the relationship) is co-operative. It is a very close one because our 
corridor technical committees meet once a month. In a number of areas 
we have joint studies, for example for the environmental impact 
assessment ... There is great co-operation. " 20 ·Mpumalanga and the Northern 
Province work together, sharing many of the same responsibilities. 
Gauteng, despite its position as a likely beneficiary of the Corridor, 
remains entirely outside of consultation. Coleman Nyathi explained, "At 
this stage, I must say that they [Gauteng) are a silent partner." 
Reports of Mpumalanga's contact with Mozambique are mixed. Once 
again, press accounts and personal accounts differ markedly. A Cape 
Times article from August 1996 gave the impression of intimate co-
operation. "We never expected that we would work so closely and so well 
together," said Magagula. "We even sit in on each other's planning and 
strategy meetings, so it is working very well." The two governments are 
reported to refer investors to each other on a daily basis. 21 However, 
contrary to the Cape Times' assertions, Francisca Soares explained that 
her contact with the Mpumalanga government was very limited. They were 
present at a number of bilateral meetings, but they were very much in 
the background. She suggested that officials from Gaza and Maputo 
Provinces might have had more contact with them. 22 
5.2.2.3 South Africa Gets a Taste of Regional Sensitivities 
South Africa is slowly re-establishing commercial, diplomatic, and 
cultural ties with other countries on the continent and subcontinent. 
The Maputo Development Corridor is one aspect of a strategy to stitch 
Southern Africa back together. However, while reasserting its leading 
role in the region, South Africa managed to upset its neighbours. Some 
Southern African states felt that South Africa was pursuing its own 
interests with little regard for their well-being. Others feared that 
they would be left behind in the rush to establish the Maputo 
Development Corridor. 
In terms of infrastructure there are a number of projects that are 
aimed at reconnecting South Africa with the subcontinent. In late 1995 
Mac Maharaj suggested that a number of roads leading into other sub-
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Saharan African countries be upgraded in order to facilitate trade, 
tourism and other interaction. The Maputo Corridor and the upgrading of 
the N4 emerged as the fastest developing and most prominent of these 
initiatives. 23 Henceforth, the N4 was the Department of Transport's 
number one regional priority. 
Speed was a priority in the Corridor's development, and the 
implementing structure was kept as simple as possible in order to 
facilitate efficient decision-making. Unnecessary consultation would be 
avoided whenever possible. This meant that the Corridor would be 
developed as a bilateral project. This approach was successful in 
expediting development. However, the bilateral nature of the project 
caused problems with other states in the region who felt they were being 
left out . 
... Swaziland and Zimbabwe and Namibia complained bi tterly ... both 
Mozambique and ourselves took the position that we are focusing on 
something which has economic rationale ... For Swaziland, Maputo port 
is an important alternate route to Richards Bay, but economically 
there is no rationale for having a trilateral or quadrilateral 
Maputo Corridor ... So they [neighbouring countries] have been ... brought 
in on specific structures. But we didn't need to get an agreement 
with Swaziland about the N4. We didn't need an agreement with 
Swaziland about the port. 24 
In the process of developing the Maputo Corridor, South Africa was 
accused of reverting to its old hegemonic, self-interested ways. In 
this regard, the means employed in implementing the Corridor were a 
failure. The impression of a hegemonic South Africa was the result of 
the fact that the Corridor was an expedited project with limited 
consultation, the fact that most planning took place in Pretoria, and 
because of the fact that the road upgrade was initiated before the rail 
upgrade. The rail network in Southern Mozambique is more comprehensive 
than the road network. As the body responsible for rail and port 
upgrading, the Maputo Corridor Company (MCC) will be a more 
representative body. It is expected to have shareholding from interests 
in Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. 25 Nonetheless, 
the port and rail rehabilitation could not have proceeded first because 
it entailed many more contentious issues, and as such, required 
consultation with a variety of stakeholders (IFis, trade unions, CFM, 
etc). 
Regional sensitivities were perhaps more pronounced than expected. 
Throughout the project's existence there has been a growing recognition 
that South Africa needs the support of other countries in the region. 
The government has worked hard to dispel notions that the Maputo 
Corridor would benefit South Africa with little consideration for its 
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neighbours. "We are working on it under the auspices that it is a 
regional project. It goes beyond our province because, for instance, 
without these regional countries supporting it, it would not be a 
success. " 26 
Corridor proponents, like Matthews Phosa, stress its regional 
benefits. Phosa took the time to fly to Botswana and Swaziland after 
the Investors' Conference in 1996 to placate their fears of being left 
behind. The road linking Botswana with the N4 to Maputo was highlighted 
as the next priority project. 27 In addition, Namibia's plans for 
promoting Walvis Bay were integrated into the Maputo Corridor. The 
resulting vision was of a greater Walvis Bay - Maputo Corridor bisecting 
the subcontinent with an axis running through its economic heart --
Gauteng. 
The Maputo Corridor is clearly a significant part of South 
Africa's strategy to promote co-operative regional development. 
Apartheid is gone, but South Africa is still the giant of the region. 
The South African economy is more than four times the size of its SADC 
neighbours combined. 28 As such, South Africa still has a dominant role 
to play in the region. Implementation of the Maputo Corridor brought 
South African officials face to face with national sensitivities in 
neighbouring countries. These sensitivities were, at times, offended in 
neighbouring states. The Maputo Corridor was South Africa's first 
serious experience with regional co-operation on any significant scale 
and it proved to be a learning experience. 
5.2.2.4 Mozambique Fears South Africa 
South Africa also upset the Mozambicans from time to time. Old 
fears of South African domination always lurked in the shadows. 
Mozambique's "fear of economic and political domination sits deep, 
rooted in a century of migrant labour dependent on the Witwatersrand 
mines, ingrained by Botha's imposition of the Nkomati Accord, and 
drenched in blood by years of covert South African Defence Force 
action."29 This anxiety was highlighted by the fact that many of South 
Africa's current demands are the same demands that were made from the 
1920s onwards. 
Like the Portuguese once were, Mozambicans are highly sensitive 
about foreign domination. An executive from a Mozambican consulting 
firm explained that when the South Africans began negotiations for the 
Maputo Corridor "they were very paternalistic and domineering." 30 In an 
interview, a Mozambican official betrayed her sensitivity about being 
61 
"forced" to reform by South Africa and the World Bank. "I don't think I 
was forced to do anything!! I couldn't do anything by force, I'm sure. 
Myself, I was not forced to do anything!" 31 South Africans and 
Mozambicans had to learn how to work together after 20 years of 
conflict. 
Aspects of the Maputo Corridor perceived to impinge on national 
sovereignty are clearly most difficult to negotiate with Maputo. The 
border is a case in point. For a country that receives 60% of its GDP 
in foreign aid, the border is one of the few places that the government 
can clearly demonstrate sovereignty. 32 The emotional impact of 
relinquishing any control over the border, particularly for a country 
with a long history of submission, cannot be quantified. Negotiations 
on re-engineering the border post proceeded at a snail's pace. The one-
stop border post is probably the most contentious and the most important 
part of the Maputo Development Corridor. 
Aside from emotional issues, the countries' work cultures are very 
different. " ... the countries are quite different. The organisations, 
from the government side, are also different. The means, and this is 
very important, the means are very different also." 33 These profound 
differences mean there was always a great potential for conflict. 
Despite these problems, the South African and Mozambican governments 
have been able to come to an understanding; progress is being made. 
It must have been trying at times for the South Africans working 
with the Mozambicans. According to a high-ranking South African 
official, " .. ~here are serious inefficiencies, there are serious capacity 
problems, there's no question about that." 34 Even the Mozambicans will, 
at times, admit their weaknesses. Francisca Soares, one of two project 
directors for the Mozambican government explains, "It was interesting. 
I think it was a different experience from my side to work with South 
Africa. I think for them to work with Mozambique was another 
experience."35 
Thanks to regular consultation, small disagreements between South 
Africa and Mozambique never seem to have escalated. The joint South 
African -- Mozambican composition of the interministerial committee and 
the Interim Coordinating Committee help to defuse any conflict. Regular 
intergovernmental contact ensures that the project is tackled in a co-
operative manner and that misunderstandings are kept to a minimum. 
From the earliest stages of the Corridor, the two countries strove 
to create and maintain a single perspective on the development. Regular 
contact bred trust, allowing a single perspective to emerge, and a good 
working relationship flourished. George Jamieson described the 
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relationship he observed between South African and Mozambican officials. 
"His [Alli's] counterpart in Mozambique supported him, especially on the 
Mozambican aspects he advised him on what would be acceptable, the right 
ways of doing it ... a very good team atmosphere." 36 Karin Pearce also 
referred to the contribution of close bi-national co-operation to the 
development. For Pearce, the single greatest achievement of the 
Corridor has been the ability of the two governments to "pull together 
and pull it off. 1137 
One only needs to look North to understand how misunderstandings 
can mushroom and frustrate development. The Beira Corridor Group (BCG), 
which aims to follow the Maputo Corridor's lead in promoting corridor 
development, is composed of interested parties from Malawi, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), Zambia, Zimbabwe, and 
Mozambique. When planning an investors' conference for 1996, the BCG 
spent five very unproductive months squabbling over the question of 
whether the venue should be in Mozambique or Zimbabwe. They ultimately 
decided on Harare. 38 Despite great potential for the Beira route, the 
development's pace is slothful. In contrast, the Mozambican government 
first discussed the Maputo Corridor in a ministerial meeting in August 
1995. By May 1996, the Investors' Conference was held and plans for the 
Corridor were well underway. 39 
5.2.2.5 Government and the Private Sector 
The Maputo Corridor represents a new era of co-operation and 
partnership between the governments of the region and the private 
sector. The whole project is based on a new understanding of the 
respective roles of the private and public sectors. In Mozambique, the 
collapse of the economy due to war and central planning resulted in a 
re-evaluation of the role of private enterprise. Frelimo changed from a 
dogmatic Communist party to a party willing to work with the private 
sector if it would benefit the people. The ANC also made a dramatic 
turn around between 1990 and 1996. An abrupt about-face was made from 
Charterist policies to the nee-liberal Growth, Employment, and 
Redistribution strategy. At a 1993 conference on transport, Carl 
Niehaus explained the ANC's perspective. "A future democratic 
government should define transport as an essential service rather than 
as a profit generating business ... we therefore feel that the running and 
continuation of the industry should be with the state ... 1140 The ANC now 
sees the government's role as creating an enabling environment in which 
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free enterprise can thrive. However, the fruits of new growth must go 
to the previously disadvantaged. 
In terms of actual infrastructure, co-operation between the 
government and private enterprise is unprecedented in the region. The 
N4 is Southern Africa's first Build-Operate-Transfer project. The 
railway and port are set to be privately managed in what was until 
recently a one-party Marxist state. The TRAC Consortium's George 
Jamieson explained how the government gave their full support to TRAC's 
work. "They [the government] have given us all of their support and 
through the negotiation stage we have had very good co-operation from 
the Department of Transport." 41 From an international perspective, this 
public-private infrastructure partnership is in line with current 
trends. ii 
But what is truly ground-breaking is the precedent that the Maputo 
Corridor sets for government's relationship with the private sector as a 
whole. The Corridor started with a recognition that the government 
could not provide South Africans with an improved standard of living 
without the co-operation of the private sector. Given the size of the 
domestic South African market, exports were seen as the best means to 
achieve economic growth. The entire corridor was planned in 
consultation with the private sector with the goal of increasing South 
African exports and industrial competitiveness. In order to create 
jobs, the road would have to attract investment, and to do this it would 
have to respond to the needs of potential investors. 
The government's objective was economic growth, and infrastructure 
was seen as a means to achieve that growth. Simply building a road 
between two points does not mean that growth will occur between the two. 
Infrastructure will only facilitate growth and investment if it is 
approached in a holistic manner. All of the concerns of investors need 
to be taken into account. For this reason, the business community was 
approached during the initial planning stages. Karin Pearce described 
how this process progressed. "What we did, very early on in this 
project, is go and speak to all the private sector people in this area, 
particularly the bigger companies and to say to them, 'look, if Maputo 
Port was able to handle 14 million tons a year, and if it had good 
management, and everything was working, would you use the port? And the 
answer was unanimous, 'Of course we would'. " 42 
ii For an in-depth study of contemporary trends in infrastructure development, 
see World Bank. World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for 
Development, (New York: Oxford University Press: 1994). 
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The Departments of Transport and Trade and Industry have held 
discussions with companies like Sappi, Alusaf, and Gencor to encourage 
investment in the Corridor region in fields such as mining, 
manufacturing, tourism, conservation, construction, trade, transport, 
and finance. 43 The programmes that make up the Maputo corridor -- the 
road, rail, and port upgrades, and the new border post specifically 
respond to the concerns expressed by potential investors. 
5.2.2.6 Government and International Financial Institutions 
The Maputo Corridor resulted in closer co-operation between the 
governments of the region and international financial institutions, such 
as the World Bank. Mozambique is highly indebted and has a long history 
of clashes with the World Bank. Transportation has been a particular 
bone of contention. CFM is one of Mozambique's largest employers and 
restructuring it could result in a severe political backlash. In the 
early 1990s, the World Bank insisted on privatisation of some transport 
services which Maputo wholeheartedly opposed. Karin Pearce explains how 
the two sides moderated their platforms and pragmatism prevailed. 
-~he rehabilitation is one of the conditions for further tranches 
of loans. So, I think the starting point for Mozambique on this 
was very negative in the sense that it was placed as a precondition 
for further tranches of funding to be released. When we began the 
Maputo Corridor, we brought it in under the umbrella of the Maputo 
Corridor because it's so important for the success of the corridor 
and we've managed between the World Bank, Mozambique and South 
Africa to develop a working relationship and understanding around 
how to deal with the very difficult issue of restructuring of CFM. 
I think we've reached a point where there's far less antagonism and 
a lot greater understanding in this respect, but it hasn't been 
easy. 44 
South Africa worked as a moderating influence on both parties. 
Nonetheless, the alacrity with which the Mozambicans changed from a 
combative mindset to a pragmatic and largely free-market outlook is 
astounding. The government's co-operative approach is described by 
Francisca Soares, "We are trying to find the best way to deal with each 
financier, according to their interest and our interest."45 Contact and 
co-operation between the World Bank, South Africa and Mozambique is 
essential to the long-run viability of the project. At present, future 
funding from the World Bank seems likely. 
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economists, engineers, and geologists to complete. In addition, the 
Corridor is still in its earliest stages; it would be premature to 
declare success or failure until the project is up and running in the 
next century. The research contained in this paper is simply an 
examination of the history of, and the motivations for the Maputo 
Corridor and a study of the means chosen to turn the dream into a 
reality. 
Three factors were identified that were likely to impact the 
Maputo Corridor and how it was implemented. These were: the history of 
the transport route; the leadership of the Corridor; and the strategic 
motivations for the project. Each factor was investigated thoroughly 
and its impact on the Corridor's implementation was discussed. 
History of the Transport Route 
The history of the Johannesburg -- Louren90 Marques route is 
perhaps one of the most convincing arguments bolstering the Maputo 
Development Corridor. For decades, the Louren90 Marques route was a 
virtual case study of how two countries could benefit symbiotically from 
transport co-operation. From the end of World War Two until 
independence in 1975, the relationship between Portugal and South Africa 
was one of growing technical and political co-operation. South Africa 
got an outlet for exports, cheap labour for the mines, and sandy, 
tropical beaches for holidays. In return, Mozambique got money from 
transhipment and tourism. This is the period most often referred to by 
proponents of the Maputo Corridor. 
But history also provides a cautionary tale. Maputo's strategic 
location near Johannesburg, just across the border with the region's 
best natural port, made the city a virtually irresistible target for 
South Africans as early as the late 1800s. Repeated attempts at 
annexation or control have left Mozambicans.with an understandable 
degree of suspicion towards South African intentions. Twenty years of 
South African support for violent insurrection in Mozambique have done 
nothing to improve the situation. This leaves a very weak foundation on 
which to build a new understanding. 
In addition, the relationship between South Africa and Portugal in 
the first part of this century provides a clear counter-example to the 
period between 1945 and 1975. Internal problems in Portugal and South 
Africa prevented further development of the Maputo route. Disputes 
between the Cape, Natal, and the Transvaal over transport issues caused 
several decades worth of delays in bilateral negotiations and threatened 




become subsumed to a greater national identity over the last ninety 
years in South Africa. However, there is still great potential for 
conflict particularly since different parties control the Western Cape, 
KwaZulu-Natal, and Gauteng. 
-
It is also important to recognise that inefficiency preceded CFM's 
statist and socialist management techniques by many decades. South 
Africans have been troubled by inefficiency in Mozambique's ports and 
railways since the earliest days of co-operation. Today, privatisation 
is promoted as a panacea for inefficiency and corruption. Privatisation 
should help the situation, but it will be a long time before 
Mozambique's ports and railway can be viewed as efficient. 
Leaders 
The second factor which would likely impact the Maputo Development 
Corridor was the project's leadership. Leaders of any initiative have 
the power to leave their stamp on it. The vast majority of benefits 
from the Corridor should go to businesses and residents in Mpumalanga. 
Assuming that government officials will work in the interest of their 
own constituents, it was believed that the government of Mpumalanga was 
at the project's helm, or at least very influential. It was assumed 
that they had used their popularity within the ANC to extract a 
disproportionate share of funding for economic development. This 
assumption was reinforced by the glowing portrayal of Mpumalanga's 
leaders in a number of press reports on the Corridor. Mpumalanga 
officials were often referred to as the Corridor's "architects" or 
"leaders." ,. . ~ 
~ 
Interviews with Corridor stakeholders were envisioned as 
additional evidence that would corroborate or falsify the assumed 
leadership of Mpumalanga officials. A completely different perspective 
on the project's leadership emerged from these interviews. Politicians 
at the highest levels played a significant role by giving the project 
their blessing, leading to a sense of mission and dedication on the part 
of individuals implementing the Corridor. High-level political 
commitment discouraged bickering. Prominent politicians also expended a 
f 
significant amount of effort publicising the Corridor and reassuring 
international investors. But politicians, having defined broad 
objectives, left the actual implementation of the Corridor to 
"technocrats" -- civil servants in relevant departments in Pretoria and 
Maputo. It was these civil servants who actually managed and 
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Provincial governments were involved in support roles -- secondary 
infrastructure, local issues, and attracting investors to their 
jurisdictions. Mpumalanga's success in promoting investment along its 
stretch of the Corridor accounts for the province's high profile in the 
press. 
Strategic Motivations 
There are a variety of strategic motivations for the Maputo 
Development Corridor. These motivations are compelling enough to make 
the Maputo Corridor a high priority in both Mozambique and South Africa. 
For South Africa, the Maputo Corridor is one facet of a strategy to 
stabilise and unify Southern Africa. The Maputo Corridor will create 
economic opportunity in Mozambique and discourage unrestrained cross-
border migration. 
Domestically, some observers have seen the Corridor as part of a 
strategy to disempower the IFP and give Gauteng transport independence. 
This may have been a marginal motivation, but there are many more 
plausible motives, primarily the fact that the Corridor encourages 
export-oriented growth. Ports across South Africa, from Saldanha to 
Richards Bay, are undergoing unprecedented upgrading and development. 
The Port of Maputo is just one of many ports that are undergoing 
modernisation and renovation. 
Frelimo's strategic objectives similarly provide fertile ground 
for the Corridor. Mozambique would like to re-establish itself as a 
regional provider of transport services and tourism. The Maputo, Beira, 
and Nacala corridors provide a means to achieve this goal. The 
corridors also fit neatly into Mozambique's Economic Recovery Programme, 
a liberal economic strategy to attract foreign investment and create 
opportunity for Mozambicans. 
Implementation of the Corridor 
Each of the three aforementioned factors affected the Maputo Corridor 
and how it was implemented. Initial accounts of the Corridor have 
largely emphasised the speed and success with which the first parts of 
the project were assembled. One important aspect of the research was an 
attempt to iden~ify the institutional characteristics that accounted for 
this early success. 
The first characteristic was the project's clear and efficient 
chain of command. In South Africa, the project's responsibilities were 
divided along the lines of that nation's system of devolved federalism. 
The most important tasks were reserved for the central government 
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departments of Transport and Trade and Industry. Secondary, but still 
important tasks were reserved for the provinces through which the 
Corridor passed. Thus, all parties could simultaneously work on 
different aspects of the Corridor and point with pride to their 
contribution. 
The second characteristic was the high level of functional co-
operation that the Corridor entailed. Although the Departments of Trade 
and Industry and Transport took the lead, other departments were always 
involved and present when decisions were made. This obviated the need 
for lengthy inter-departmental communiques, or the need to renegotiate 
aspects of the Corridor at a later date. Functional, inter-departmental 
teams also predominated in the Mpumalanga and Mozambican governments. 
The third characteristic contributing to an efficient 
implementation was a high level of co-operation between different 
stakeholders. Different governments met regularly to iron out any 
misunderstandings. The potential for such misunderstandings is not to 
be underestimated; they nearly caused the collapse of a parallel effort 
in Beira. But perhaps most important was the fact that the Maputo 
Corridor represented a new era of government-private sector co-operation 
in Southern Africa. The project was predicated on in-depth and regular 
consultations with potential investors. This ensured that the project 
holistically tackled investors' concerns, thus virtually guaranteeing 
that the Corridor would achieve its goals of turning infrastructure 






Figure Two: A Hypothetical Simple Access Corridor 
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Figure Four: A Hypothetical Hybrid Development Corridor 
Mineral Extraction 
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Figure Six: Tsetse Fly Infestation in the Low Veld 
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Source: New and Revised Map of South Africa (J.C . Juta: Cape Town, 1882) 
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Figure Seven: The Boer War 
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Figure Eight: Rail Traffic in Southern Africa in the Early 20th Century 
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Source: "Railroads of Moz.ambique" (Board of Economic Warfare: London, 1942) 
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Figure 11: Maputo Corridor Implementation Structure 
ICC Techincal Team 
Gaza and Maputo Provinces: 
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8. Interview Transcriptions 
8. 1 Interview with George Jamieson - 27 May 1997 
LPM: I'll tell you a bit about me and what I'm doing. 
GJ : Yes. 
LPM : Right now I'm at UCT and I ' m in the second year of a masters 
program in African politics . I ' m doing a case study of the Maputo 
Corridor for my dissertation. I'm studying a number of different 
factors in the Maputo Corridor, some of the are strategic and deal with 
the ANC ' s objectives in South Africa and in Southern Africa, some of 
them are more practical and deal with how things are actually 
functioning ... (unclear) ... I ' d be interested to see the people you actually 
worked with through the tendering process and people you had contact 
with in government and what they have to say . To begin with, could you 
tell me a little about the TRAC Consortium - what are they, what you are 
and what you do? 
GJ : The TRAC ... it started at the beginning ... before, at the tender stage 
we put together a consortium of three companies which is Basil Read , 
Bouyges ... 
LPM: The French company ... 
GJ : The French company, and Stocks and Stocks. With a shareholding of 
30 % Basil Read , 30 % Bouyges , which effectively because Bouyges owns a 
majority share of Basil Read ... you know, a 60 % block , and 40 % to Stocks & 
Stocks. That effectively was what is called our sponsors - the people 
who had to put the project together and make it work and fund the whole 
thing. I mean it 's hugely expensive funding the tender process to the 
point where institutions - banks, etc. commit money. 
LPM: Now, so there were delays in the tendering process. How did that 
affect you? 
GJ: I think there might have been delays up to the point of issuing the 
document. But from the point of issuing the document to now we 
certainly haven't experienced any delays. It's been running at what 
normall~ .. in fact what we've experienced, and they've done projects BOT 
world-wide, the programme is way ahead of what is normally experienced 
world-wide. Where we are now is at least six months ahead of a typical 
pro ject. 
LPM : And that comparison, is that with other projects in the third world 
or in general all over? 
GJ : Yes, from that side the political support and commitment have been 
excellent. In other words, the government has been really keen to push 
this project. And really, they've given us all of their support and 
through the negotiation stage we have had very good co-operation from 
the Department of Transport. 
LPM: What sort of goals is the government pursuing, ultimately , in this 
project? Are they interested in benefiting Mpurnalanga, Gauteng, or ... ? 
GJ: It's difficult . Officially I don't know . I can tell you what my 
thinking is ... 
LPM : It ' s nice to speak with somebody who is not from the government. 
GJ : The Maputo Corridor is ... they're obviously trying to stimulate social 
and economic growth in Mpurnalanga. That's the immediate objective, but 
I think there ' s a broader objective of trying to bring in all the 
Southern African states. Because I know that the next toll road that 
seems to be on the list, that's gaining a lot of popularity with the 
government, is the extension of the N4 to Botswana. So, effectively 
you'll be tying Botswana ... connected to Maputo .. . there ' s a kind of bringing 
together of all these Southern African states. But the corridor is one 
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thing- the road that were building is just a part of that. And the 
Department [of Transport] is looking at toll roads all over the country 
because they believe in the user pays principle . 
LPM: Build , operate, transfer is relatively new in South Africa, has it 
gone off pretty much without a hitch so far , or? 
GJ: Yes. Up to now there hasn ' t been a true BOT . They ' re obviously toll 
roads in this country and there ' s toll roads on the Nl that's called a 
BOT , but in fact the r evenue stream is gua ranteed by the government . 
The N4 project is the first project that is totally privately financed, 
without any guarant e es from the government . 
LPM: Now is the government providing any p ortion of the construction 
costs? 
GJ : They supplied the road ... which we will take over and improve , build 
new sections and give it back to them in thirty years time. But 
obviously we control it during that time .. . 
LPM : Now part of the construction is in Mozambique. How were the 
Mozambican officials actually involved in ... ? 
GJ: The government, well , our client, TRAC ' s client is what ' s called the 
Implementing Authority , which is 50 % Department of Transport and 50 % 
DNEP , which is the equivalent of DOT in Mozambique. So, it ' s a joint 
venture between the two . Their requirements and the DOT ' s requirements 
were put together to form a contract specification and a Mozambican 
specification that applies throughout the length of the road. 
LPM : And do they seem to be getting along and co- operating? 
GJ : Very well , extremely well. I ' ve spent a lot of time in 
Mozambique ... there are three or four of our guys driving the route today 
and last week we had two or three people driving. So it ' s ... we spend a 
lot of time talking to officials and getting information and stuff 
because we ' re still in the preliminary stages and need a lot of 
information. 
LPM : Now you ' re in contact with Mozambican officials , how's that been so 
far in comparison with South African officials? Have you had any 
problems with language , etc? 
GJ : We ' re dealing with the director and the assistant dire c tor. 
Generally very good . They ' re record's obviously not as good as in South 
Africa. (interview interrupted by telephone call) Whatever they have 
they ' ve certainly given to us and they ' re very co-operative, working 
extremely well with us. 
LPM : So they ' re satisfactory ... 
GJ : Yes , you go there and talk to people that are directly related to 
the pro j ect. There ' s a lot of interest and people are keen to get 
involved with the project just from grass roots to senior ministers. 
LPM : So it ' s a popular project? 
GJ: Extremely . 
LPM : In fact , I ' m heading out to Maputo later this week , I'm very 
excited. I haven ' t been to Mozambique yet. It ' s supposed to be really 
beautiful. 
GJ : I never went there 20 years ago before the war - it must have been 
spectacular then . But even now , although it 's extremely run down , it ' s 
s till got a s pecial atmosphere which you can ' t quite put your finger on . 
I think it 's got a huge potent ial, Maput o i tself . 
LPM: In te r ms of tourism? 
GJ: Tourism, yes, it 's coming off s uch a low base . Even the year or 
eighteen months that I ' ve been going down there it ' s really improved 
100%, 200 percent d u ring that time period . 
LPM : That ' s very good to hear. I ' ve got a tour guide for Louren90 
Marques from 1973 and I ' m taking that along with my current tour guide 
and comparing them. It ' s good to hear that progress is being made. 
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GJ: The government's also, the people making decisions, I think have go t 
out of that socialist type of thinking and they're really thinking of 
attracting money and trying to develop the country from, I wouldn't call 
it a wholly capitalist type of attitude but it's certainly trying to 
bring a lot of industry. 
LPM: Within the constraints of the world system, if you want to call it 
that. 
GJ: But trying to distribute everything they have ... trying to get the 
economy stimulated and from that people hopefully get work and trying to 
lift the whole population that way. But if you look at the country, 
it's amazing. Maputo itself is a small little part of the country, but 
I suppose they have to start somewhere. 
LPM: Apparently the North is totally different ... 
GJ: Totally different. 
LPM: Now, the Port of Maputo has a mixed reputation and I was wondering 
if you had any impressions on that. 
GJ: From my information the Maputo Corridor, or the Maputo Port is 
coming out to tender in the next coming months. I believe in that 
there's a provision for a private operation of the port. So, although 
it's extremely unclear at the moment. Maybe in the last two or three 
weeks it has started to get clearer, but certainly two months ago it was 
difficult to get answers, but the guys are slowly getting their act 
together. So, maybe even by this stage there's some clearer thinking 
(unclear). 
LPM: I guess Paolo Auade, who is head of the port, I'm looking to speak 
with him. In fact, I'd be interested in any contacts that you could 
provide of people in Maputo who might be co-operative and knowledgeable. 
Now, to get back to personalities and things ... Who were the people that 
drove the idea and who were the people that started it - the politicians 
as well as the visionaries? 
GJ: It's difficult, our direct contact is with Nazir, Chief Director of 
Roads and he drove it, he literally led the whole way. His boss, Ketso 
Gordhan, the DG, he did exactly the same. I mean I went to see him 
and ... I never actually physically spoke to him apart from that we went 
through adjudication at meetings with Ketso Gordhan and Mac Maharaj on 
the South African side and on the Mozambican side their equivalents. 
From what I saw and listened and heard that level, in other words the 
Minister of Transport for South Africa and Mozambique and the Directors 
General really pushed the project. As far as the personalities are 
concerned, Nazir actually ran it, he drove it, negotiated ... even more so 
than his counterpart in Mozambique, Nazir really led the way. His 
counterpart in Mozambique supported him, especially on the Mozambican 
aspects he advised him on what would be acceptable, the right ways of 
doing it. But Nazir chaired most of the meetings, negotiated directly 
with us, stuck through all hours of the night putting the whole thing 
together. So, it was real ... 
LPM: So he was dedicated? 
GJ: Extremely dedicated to the project. But he's got a team of local 
directors, two directors who were involved in supporting him throughout 
and the assistant director in Mozambique also attended all the meetings 
- a very good team atmosphere. 
LPM: Now, all of these meetings, were they held in Pretoria? 
GJ: We had some here and some in Maputo ... we tried to share it. It 
tended, towards the end it was mostly held here in Pretoria because 
there were banks and lawyers and financial guys. There were meetings of 
15-20 people on a daily basis so it would have been very expensive to 
sit in Maputo to do that. But every second week, there was a co-
ordination progress meeting and that was held alternately here and in 
Mozambique. That summarised the last few weeks' activities certainly 
the major decisions were made in those meetings. 
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LPM : Those biweekly or progress meetings, were generally chaired by 
Nazir? 
GJ : They alternated, the Pretoria one was Nazir and the Maputo one was 
(unclear). 
LPM : Have you had any contact with the people from Mpumalanga, either 
from their department of Strategic Planning or politicians from 
Mpumalanga? Were they involved? 
GJ : The only people that I ' ve spoken to is Coleman Nyathi, who is the 
MEC for economic affairs and tourism and the other one is a guy called 
Joe Magagula . He ' s the president's planner for strategic pla nning, I 
think. 
LPM : Yes, he ' s the Director of the Mpumal a nga Department of Strategic 
Planning. 
GJ : So those are the two I presently have contact with. What has 
happened is (and that ' s why I said that Karin's shot down to Nelspruit) 
up to now we haven't had any specific contact with Mpumalanga, and the 
main reason was that we were in the tender process. We were negotiating 
with effectively the national government through the Department of 
Transport. The Department of Transport a ctually requested that they 
deal with Mpumalanga up to this stage . Now we're getting to a stage 
where we ' ll have to and deal directly with them . But it will be on a 
level of a technical side, there's a question of what they want and 
everything. We ' ll be going through a full environmental impact study, 
public participation of interested and affected parties ... then we' 11 
start talking to all the local people . But 
My personal involvement was with Coleman Nyathi and Joe Magagula . 
LPM : What sort of impressions did you get from them? 
GJ : Their biggest problem was , and I was s urprised the first time I met 
them that they were really very badly informed about what was going on , 
and they were I believe a little bit upset because they'd been left out 
of the ... and they wanted meetings with ourselves and we had a couple of 
meetings. From our side we didn ' t want to get involved in the politics. 
The central government has got to sort it out at that sort of level . We 
don ' t mind from a technical side going and talking to ... the politics of it 
is not our business. 
LPM : I know for example, with the Beira Corridor users group , they were 
going to have a big conference and they fought for about six months 
whether or not the conference would be in Beira or Zimbabwe . And it 
went on and off for about six months between the governments, a sort of 
cold war. 
GJ : Driving it from the Mozambican side you ' ve got Roberto White, The 
Minister of Interior I think or Public Works. I ' ve met him a couple of 
times and I think he ' s a very hands on sort of guy , a very practical and 
pragmatic sort of guy ... really positive. 
LPM : Now , there has been some concern expressed on the Mozambican side 
that the benefits of this project a re going disproportionately , in terms 
of construction and things like that, to foreign companies, have you 
found any resentment toward South African business? 
GJ : What we have done is we have committed them, in the document, to 
supplying or offering 30 % of the construction work to local Mozambican 
companies . 
LPM : And you ' ve got this all lined up? 
GJ : We have them effectively lined up. There ' s a huge capacity problem , 
which has still got to be tested . They ' re all small scale and they ... i t' s 
the last 20 years of history that has made them that way . It ' s not 
their fault . It ' s no fault of theirs. It's just the way things 
happened and they ' re not emerging busines s es. I mean they ' re not like 
in South Africa where there's obviously been certain groups that could 
not do business becaus e of the way politics were. In Mozambique there 
are companies that have been in operation for 20 years or longer but 
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because of the history of the war and things like that they just haven't 
managed to grow. They have a very good core capacity and expertise , but 
they ca only perform small work . What we're looking at is trying to 
let them grow, give them capital to buy equipment and stuff like that so 
they can tackle bigger work . But it ' s a ... and they admit it themselves , 
that they ' ll struggle to meet their commitments . But we ' re working on 
that . 
LPM: You were talking about funding coming from Stocks & Stocks and 
Basil Read during the tendering process, where ' s your funding coming 
from curr ently? 
GJ : We ' re funding it i nternally, yes. 
LPM: And the a ctual construction budget? 
GJ : The process, sticking to the timetable , the tender documents were 
out this time last year. The initial tender went in at the end of May , 
till the end of June . There were three tenders submitted. Then there 
were two left and there was a sort of negotiation with the two in 
p a rallel through a question and answer ses sion in writing and questions 
were asked base on our original submission . We had to answer it and 
then gradually ... 
LPM: Was the session open, was it transparent? 
GJ : Extremely transparent , obviously we didn ' t know what questions were 
being asked of our competitors - we would have loved to have known, but 
we didn ' t. They obviously didn ' t know what questions we were being 
asked and the process was fair, we believe . Where Nazir picked this 
process up from , I ' m not sure but it worked extremely well . For those 
four months of committing us to a certain level. At that point the 
decision was made to chose a preferred tender. From that point they ' d 
only be negotiating with one pe r son. And that happened at the beginning 
of December. We then went into a six month , sorry a four months tender 
process where we were the preferred ... i t was a very direct negotiation, 
around a table putting proposals on the table - it was real direct 
negotiation to a point where we actually signed a concession contract 
and all the annexes . That ' s the point where we are now. We now have 
six months to do preliminary design and then give a fixed price, turnkey 
design and construct - let me go back one step. What we're doing now is 
we ' re splitting TRAC, well not TRAC, but we're splitting the consortium 
we had during the tender process into a tender company , TRAC, a 
registered company , and a registered concessionaire , and a construction 
joint venture called SBB, which is Stocks , Basil, Bouyges . The 
construction joint venture will do a design and price it and the supply 
TRAC with the turnkey ... in other words, in one figure we need X amount of 
rands to do the first three year phase. 
LPM: Costs changed drastically in terms of estimates by the government. 
I know we're talking about six hundred million approximately , is that in 
the same area that you're expecting? 
GJ : I don't know the basis of where that six hundred came from, it ' s 
unknown to us. We asked them and they said they weren ' t sure where it 
came from either - certainly the Department of Transport because we have 
been through that . They have tested a lot of our costing through their 
databanks and previous projects , so our price has been tested . I don't 
know where that original six hundred came from. 
LPM: Is the TRAC consortium interested in other projects affiliated with 
the Maputo Corridor , or is it simply the N4 road and that's it? 
GJ : Just the N4 , at this stage. Just the s ix month development stage is 
a huge task , and we c a n achieve it in November , which is our target 
date. That will be financial close. Effectively the bank signs the 
cheque . If we can meet that date , we will have broken all BOT records 
world-wide. 
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LPM: What sort of regulation, once the road is in operation in terms of 
tolls, etc, is going to be in operation? How are they going to regulate 
your income and everything? 
GJ: The tolls are >et; it was obviously one of the factors they used to 
choose the tenderer. Those tolls are effectively fixed, based on a 
tender price and a package of finance and from that we produce our 
revenues, produced through tolls. Those tolls are set. The way they 
get escalated is set out in the document and is based on CPI and various 
things. There is a provision to increase or decrease above or below 
CPI. 
LPM : The news coming out of America on the Dulles extension toll 
road ... i t fell apart - the traffic projections were way off the mark. 
GJ : Traffic , the concession company , what it does and it ' s standard 
practice for all BOTs is it has to lay off its risk. So , TRAC is 
isolated , except for traffic. Traffic is the one single biggest risk . 
We employed our own traffic consultants , local traffic consultants . And 
the lenders employed a UK traffic consultant that audited and is busy 
doing additional investigations to look at the tra ffic. Out financial 
model is based on their calculations, but Dulles is a typical example. 
T think there ' s an alternate route that people prefer to u s e. Certain 
assumptions were made and it hasn ' t happened . 
LPM: The government is looking at getting rid of the law that says you 
have to have alternate non - tolled routes. 
GJ: Gone . 
LPM : It ' s already gone , well that ' s good to hear. 
GJ : Although the N4 is a difficult road because there are many entrances 
to the road and many exits off the road. And we can only toll certain 
places. People can still use a portion of the road and not pay toll. 
We ' ve got to live with t hat. 
LPM : There are going to be three toll plazas , are there? 
GJ: There are probably ... it hasn ' t been finalised yet ... five along the whole 
route. Three are in South Africa and two in Mozambique . 
LPM : That sounds very good . In fact , I think I have what I need . 
You ' ve been most helpful . Thank you very much. 
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8.2 Interview with Joe Magagula -- 28May1997 
LPM: I'm going to start by explaining a bit of what I am doing here. I'm 
a master's student at UCT, finishing off my second year and doing my 
dissertation on the Maputo Corridor, which I'm moving back to 
Washington, DC in a think tank in African politics at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. What I'm interested in is 
interviewing a lot of the individuals involved with the Maputo Corridor . 
I'm speaking with Coleman Nyathi tomorrow and I'm heading down to Maputo 
tomorrow, and I've just come from Pretoria. I'm going to start with 
some more general questions and move to more specific things. In terms 
of your position, what do you see as the goals of the Maputo Corridor? 
JM : You see I've been very busy . . . ok. One was, firstly the 
understanding was that Mpumalanga has a very good potential for 
development and that before the war in Mozambique 40% of the exports 
from South Africa used to go through the Mozambican channel, this 
corridor. The other thing is that South Africa has been partly 
responsible for the destruction in Mozambique and the political 
responsibility lies here, whether it was the ANC or the National Party, 
somehow or another somebody was involved in destroying Mozambique, by 
either hiding in Mozambique or by attacking Mozambique. The other thing 
is that Mpumalanga at the moment is experiencing a lot of influx by 
people coming from either Mozambique or Swaziland, and Mpumalanga cannot 
sustain it under these circumstances. We also looked at the economic 
analysis and activities of the province and said the best way to promote 
development, would be to promote and encourage the implementation of 
this corridor . The aim of the corridor is to alleviate poverty in 
Mozambique and Mpumalanga and to create stability and sustainability in 
terms of investment and economic development. And therefore to promote 
exports, making South African companies more competitive. That was the 
aim, but underlining that is to develop the broad transport 
infrastructure for the country . 
LPM : You mentioned that part of the reason for the Maputo Corridor is to 
make up for many years of involvement and destruction in Mozambique. How 
does this corridor fit into the ANC's or South Africa's or Mpumalanga's 
you can chose one perspective ... the view of Southern Africa and the role 
that Nelspruit, for example, plays in Southern Africa? 
JM : You see, the Nelspruit as it stands now , in particular, in this 
corridor. Let me tell you that we have people that are exporting their 
products through Cape Town. There are people in Botswana who are 
exporting through Cape Town and there are people in Middleburg here, who 
are exporting through Richards Bay, which is about 100 kilometres 
(unclear). Now, Botswana, for instance, Mozambique is nearer even than 
Walvis Bay in Namibia. So, this will be a f ocal point in attracting 
exports and through-transport from Southern Zimbabwe , Botswana, and this 
area. Basically it links the regional sphere . Also, is to promote one 
of the biggest industries, tourism, with the centre of tourist 
attraction being the Kruger National Park. You have a situation where 
you can make this a centre for attraction , where the park can be made a 
destination and from this you can go on and on. You can go to Zimbabwe 
and Victoria Falls , you can go to Botswana gaming , whatever. 
LPM : The new airport is part of that? 
JM: The new airport is part of that . Mpumalanga , Nelspruit for example 
is the capital of Mpumalanga. More than half of the population of 
Mpumalanga stays in this .. . and in terms of infrastructure development , 
the areas mostly affected are around Nelspruit , the former (unclear) 
area, the former homeland . So , to us this is in terms of job creation, 
in terms of human resource development, this makes a lot of sense. It 
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fits into our growth and development strategy in terms of promotion of 
the economic activities of Mpumalanga. 
LPM: RDP projects seem to play a role in the Maputo Corridor, as well as 
simply transport infrastructure . What i_ the relationship between the 
two and what is the role of .. 
JM : The government used the corridor as a catalyst for social projects. 
We are saying, 'government will facilitate and create a better 
environment for investors to invest'. Take for example, if an investor 
wants to put an investment in a particular area, and it happens not to 
be supported by certain infrastructure like roads , water, so on. 
Government will put in money to fast track that. It will ensure that 
the infrastructure is provided so that the investment is sustainable . 
If you have a company that says ' Look, we ' re going to have an industry 
here and we're going to build houses for our employees there and all 
that, but there's no provision of bulk water infrastructure, electricity 
or' . . . government would then ens ure that . 
LPM : Not just to the factory , but to people working in the factory. 
JM: Yeah, at the end of the day , the government must provide those 
services. The other important factor is that at the end of the day, the 
government does not have money . The basis of investment in economic 
development and activities taking place in the corridor, we are hoping 
to discuss with stakeholders, those who are going to invest to donate or 
maybe to contribute to a development type fund for the province. Your 
compensation , what business have you done, can you please assist. So, 
we are going all out to ensure that. But also, it assists government in 
terms of prioritisation of its scarce resources because what we are 
going to do is we are not putting in money in the corridor, that money, 
because we expect the private sector will . . . we therefore concentrate 
the periphery, the areas that are more far away from the corridor that 
cannot benefit directly . 
LPM : Physically more far away? 
JM: Exactly, you then give them . . . economic development for our people , 
it's a lot because you expect that once you have the road, you will then 
have people who want to invest. And therefore you will get employment . 
And it will be competitive for people to engage in export business. In 
that process you have got social upliftment of people in terms of skills 
in terms of .. 
LPM : Human capital development . 
JM : Exactly. So . . 
LPM : Because the road could, just bypass an area, the area in that area 
is not particularly attractive for investment , there could be a lot of 
people there who don't earn a lot of money but they might not have any 
skills, are all of these programmes oriented towards providing a 
whole ... 
JM : For instance, we are saying to the people that are going to 
construct the road now , that they don't employ people in Witbank and let 
these people work throughout into Mozambique. Where they pass , they 
employ people around that area. They will be trained. Again , you have 
subcontracting, contracting from small industries and enterprises to do 
the same thing. That is a spin- off that people will benefit from. 
LPM : There are a lot of reports from a lot of people who were involved 
in the corridor. I was wondering who the leading figures are, the 
visionaries , as well a s the workhorses. 
JM: This idea , of the corridor , generated from this office, the premier 
made an announcement that we need to develop the corridor, and export. 
LPM : That was in, what, late 1994? 
JM : '94, yeah . On the basis of that, we made a start by looking at two 
investor studies and from there we put in this vision. We therefore work 
together, we brought in the Department of Transport, and finally came 
along with this concept of (unclear). That talks about the corridor 
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development. Let me just show you the ... This is, you know, it gave us 
the overview, the strategy, the vision, the objective. This was 
produced for the May '96 conference. From here, we have done a lot of 
planning. You see at the time, this corridor from the 
province ... was ... managed ... from my office. But we have seen .. it is 
now more of implementation of industrial development, it has gone to 
economic affairs. Because you set up the structure and you set up the 
vision but we're participating in the national structure. So, the 
project has left mainly nationally by the Department of Transport, which 
certain structures linking up with Mozambican counterparts on transport. 
Then you have the provinces, and that's what I'm talking about, you have 
Maputo Province in Mozambique, and also Swaziland is involved. So, in 
this province we also have monthly meetings to monitor and evaluate the 
implementation and development along the corridor. 
LPM: The people involved in those meetings are ... 
JM: Different departments, and from different departments in the 
province. 
LPM: What is your experience with the central government and the 
Department of Transportation? and stresses? 
JM: Yeah, it should be expected in any project of this magnitude, that 
you can't have harmony all the time 100 %. In the main, there's good co-
operation between the department and ourselves, particularly in the 
first stages of this project. What seems to be happening is that as 
this project becomes more practical and is implemented, the Department 
of Transportation tends to distance themselves. In fact, they tend not 
to consult more and they tend to do a lot of things above our heads. 
But we have expressed this concern to them. There are the sort of 
tensions ... maybe now that it means money, then people don't need you. 
But, this is the only problem, we are still in control and I think we 
have made the point to them that the implementation takes place in the 
province and ... 
LPM: From here on, when actual investments are being made along the 
corridor, they will be corning through offices in the province. 
JM: Yeah. 
LPM: Now you're role, as an individual, are you a catalyst, or a 
manager ... 
JM: I'm managing the secondary development on the corridor. I'm 
responsible for everything the province needs to initiate, to the 
projects to co-ordinate. Right now, I'm reporting to Coleman Nyathi but 
I'm responsible to monitor the implementation of this project and to co-
ordinate all the departments. 
LPM: So, you co-ordinate all of the people from different offices as 
well. 
JM: Yes. 
LPM: So far you've had contact with people in the Maputo Province, what 
are your impressions of the Mozambicans and how do they work? 
JM: Very undemocratic, don't involve people. People are complaining. I 
have a meeting with other NGOs from Mozambique, professional people who 
once worked with government who are complaining they don't know anything 
about this project. They are hearing things are going to happen, but 
they don't know anything. You've got this -- (points at document) 
LPM: Yeah, but I don't have this .. 
JM: These are talking about investments and overview, these are the kind 
of things that are happening. 
LPM: But what I should do is take this to donate to UCT's government 
publications Department. I know for a fact that they do not have this. 
OK, so there's a problem in Mozambique in terms of transparency and ... 
JM: And involvement of stakeholders outside government, even from within 
government departments themselves. And there have been complaints 
(unclear) 
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LPM: Do you think that's a legacy of the central planning of the past. 
JM: Yeah, Mozambican structures from national departments are ~ot so 
strong ... Their provinces also. 
LPM: Now, what's interesting for me in South Africa, given the history 
of the ANC and the UDF, that everything goes through a lot of 
consultation ... sometimes too much consultation. Your relationship with 
the Northern Province, for a time there was a plan for a road to go 
through the Kruger Park from the Northern Province ... 
JM: That has fizzled out with the understanding that you cannot destroy 
the Kruger Park, that you cannot allow big traffic to pass through 
there, it's not on. They have accepted to move through this way. We 
are building a sub-corridor through to the Northern Province. 
LPM: The contact through Botswana, is that expected to go through the 
Northern Province? 
JM: No, through the Northwest coming via Pretoria to the N4, yes via 
Rustenburg. 
LPM: There's been the briefest mention in the press about people from 
KwaZulu-Natal being concerned about this development. 
JM: I was also asked on television. At the time I was asked, there was 
a lot of violence in KwaZulu-Natal, and I think the basis of my argument 
is that if KwaZulu-Natal and Durban and Richards Bay are the key points 
for export and import and we have this kind of violence going on in 
KwaZulu-Natal, the South African economy as a whole is going to be 
affected nationally, internationally and to allow South Africa to 
participate competitively in global markets you definitely need to 
position yourself strategically in terms of those outlets. One of the 
key things is for us to look for an alternative harbour. Particularly 
for the provinces up here, you cannot rely on East London, Port 
Elizabeth, or Cape Town. Now you can't leave a place that is 250 
kilometres from Nelspruit, Maputo and ... ridiculous. We have said that 
and in KwaZulu-Natal, in Durban the harbour is not that much fully 
developed, in terms of congestion. There are a lot of delays and 
storage capacity ... it actually calls on us to find an alternative. Now, 
to generate an alternative harbour instead being viewed as negative to 
Durban and Richards Bay is actually positive in the sense that it adds 
value. It is not taking anything away from them. It is actually 
(unclear) for the economy of the country . It was actually this 
understanding that ... in fact we have proposed to Natal that they can 
extend the N2 through Swaziland and come through to Maputo and the 
Kruger National Park for tourism purposes. KwaZulu-Natal is mainly a 
tourist province and they would argue that tourists would like to drive 
through ... we are saying that's a better way to tour. On the basis of 
that we called them in, they accepted, they agreed finally, we work with 
them. Initially it was problematic. 
LPM: In your opinion, what so far, has been the greatest success of this 
project and what is your greatest concern? 
JM: The greatest success is co-operation between three governments, 
which has never happened before. South Africa, Swaziland, Mozambique. 
In implementing a project of this magnitude and the experience that has 
been accumulated by the officials from this major project. Today, for 
the first time you have a situation where the government initiates and 
the private sector follows. That has been very significant. 
LPM: It's interesting that Mpumalanga, like many of the provinces, is 
entirely new. There is obviously a lot of learning going on. A lot of 
things seem to go right in Mpumalanga in terms of housing and delivery 
and things is the administration particularly lucky or particularly 
dedicated? 
JM: I would say to you that the fact that we don't have a lot of turf 
battles, and the fact that people seem to be co-operating in terms of 
learning and there is nobody who is claiming to be knowing more than 
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others , therefore there seems to be (unclear) at doing things. Because 
everybody relies on the other to succeed . That has been the good aspect 
of the transition . 
LPM : So, if you had something like the Free State with Lekota , that 
could have been a terrible thing. 
JM: Yes , the quite . . . it has been giving us ... although, we are no longer 
that good , t here's no administration . .. We are fortunate that most of the 
things have been said very loudly in the media. We have good publicity . 
LPM : There 's some bad publicity now ... 
JM : Exactly . . .. I think that was a very good success , especially now that 
the construction finally is going to be awarded for the toll road. 
LPM : Any concerns? 
JM : My major concern i s that you s till have the old approach by big 
business to still roll things and to do things as they were and not 
bring in economic development for previously disadvantaged communities . 
There are a lot of under carpet dealings that are still taking place, 
it ' s unfortunate. And there ' s no employment really created , 
sustainable, so far. People in the rural areas really don ' t see any 
significant development. 
LPM : It ' s important for them and important for the ANC . .. 
JM : I'm saying that it ' s too early . . . 
LPM : Although, I hear that the tender went out as the world's fastest 
build, operate , and transfer project. Thank you for your time . .. 
93 
8.3 Interview with Coleman Nyathi -- 29 May 1997 
CN: So you are from? 
LPM: I'm originally from New York and I came in 1994 to Durban and I 
worked in the elections. I decided eventually to come back and I'm 
studying at UCT, doing my masters in African politics and I'm writing my 
dissertation, it should be finished by September, on the Maputo-
Mpumalanga Development Corridor. So, I'm on a research trip. I'm going 
to spend a week here and I started in Pretoria and Johannesburg and 
spoke to parties there and I'm slowly moving towards Maputo. Tomorrow 
I'll have a couple of interviews there. 
CN: So, you are a student in Cape Town. My secretary is making some 
copies of documents for you. 
LPM: That's always very helpful; I need everything I can get. The way 
the interview is going to run is that I'm going to move from more 
general to more specific questions . In general, from your perspective, 
what do you see as the goals of the Maputo Corridor? 
CN: The goals are mainly to promote regional economic development 
because the Maputo Corridor is not only for Mpumalanga province, it's 
also for Mozambique. It's also for the benefit of the economies of 
Southern Zimbabwe, Botswana. The provinces which can benefit through 
here are Gauteng, the North West, and the Northern Province. So, 
KwaZulu Natal and Swaziland will all benefit from the corridor. So, it 
is really a corridor which is going to improve infrastructure 
development in this region as well as already what is happening is 
bringing in major turnkey projects as investment. 
LPM: The infrastructure is the key to attracting the investment. And 
the investment is that primarily coming from abroad or from within South 
Africa? 
CN: Well, wherever it is coming from, our job is to say, 'look here is a 
potential opportunity.' 
LPM: And as this has developed, how has the relationship developed 
between the Northern Province and Mpumalanga? is it co-operative? 
CN: It is co-operative. It is a very close one because our corridor 
technical committees meet once a month. And in a number of areas we 
have joint studies, for example for the environmental impact assessment 
we are doing a joint study between the Northern Province and ourselves 
which means we are doing a study along the main corridor and along the 
sub-corridor in the Northern Province. There is great co-operation. 
LPM: Now, Gauteng is one of the provinces most likely to benefit from 
this project, what is their involvement or are they a silent partner? 
CN: At this stage I must say that they are a silent partner, but their 
private sector is very active, because you must understand that TRAC is 
based in Gauteng, the ones that won the tender for the road. So, there 
is an interest. We foresee a situation where some companies, for 
strategic reasons are going to locate, probably re-locate in Mpumalanga 
in order to be close to the port, especially export oriented companies, 
industries. But at the same time if you remember in the 70s, Maputo 
Port served 40 % of imports and exports from South Africa (mostly from 
Gauteng) but now it's only around 5 %. And it makes a lot of sense that 
this is the shortest route to the sea and every company wants to 
maximise profits ... they will use this corridor. 
LPM: What is the greatest stumbling block between your position right 
now and the successful implementation of this programme? 
CN: There are a number of blockages. One of these, which is the 
greatest challenge is that the whole Maputo Development Corridor is 
based on the successful development of the port and harbour. And up to 
now, the concession for the project has not been done. The road 
concession has been completed. And to us those things are 
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complementary, you can have a road but this road will be running to 
nowhere. To me that is a critical success factor, the highest one of 
all the factors we have at the moment. Because the people that come 
say, 'fine you've got the concession for the road, the port, is it 
working? Can we start rolling now? ' And the disadvantage is at the 
moment that the port depth cannot get any bigger , it can only take about 
39000 tons, which is quite little, very small. We expect that we can 
one day have ships that can carry 6000 containers coming to offload i n 
Maputo so they can come one time and offload once for the whole region. 
So , that is the critical factor. 
LPM : Now P&O has started a joint venture where they're going to renovate 
and upgrade the container terminal at the Port of Maputo. Now is that 
part of this? 
CN : That is part of the exercise, but officially the Mozambican 
government is still to appoint a concessionaire who is going to do that. 
But what is happening is that the most critical factor is that the port 
will have to be privately managed , privately run and managed . Because 
from past experience, you know .. . when some of the countries in the 
region tried to isolate South Africa to send goods through Maputo some 
of it disappeared and was not traced, because there is a lot of 
pilferage there . There ' s no technology . .. system that you use. If you 
talk telecommunications, there ' s no telecommunications, there's no 
cellphones, you have difficulty . 
LPM : It's interesting to hear , as South Africa has difficulties of its 
own with privatisation or the restructuring of state assets, and do you 
foresee this whole process as being , are they dedicated as they are 
coming from a much more centrally planned background? 
CN : That is a very good question . What is happening apparently is that 
the Mozambicans, you can sympathise with them , they are coming from 17 
years of war, 17 years they've had no development. No development . 
LPM : Has it gone backwards? 
CN : Yeah , in fact you've gone backwards. Now they own 100% of the land 
and almost 100 % of every building that is in Mozambique. And suddenly 
you come and say 'you need to revert to private enterprise, you need to 
change your laws and facilitate title deed '. They are going through the 
process. They haven't got legislation yet , but they are working on it. 
LPM : You get a long term lease . . . 
CN : Yes, it's a lease system . They are working on it and by July they 
will have actual legislation . And for more than economic development , 
it's there to attract investment, they need that. We think that they 
have gone a very long way in that they have managed come to that sense 
to say they accept that principle , they will do it . So, there are some 
good aspects that are taking place. I think they have turned around 
very fast. They realised they have been successful in stopping the war, 
but it will all depend now on whether they can create jobs for those 
people . That ' s why we have a l ot of pressure from these people crossing 
the border in masses and masses trying to enter South Africa. They are 
prepared to be eaten by crocodiles, crossing the river to come here, by 
the lions in the Kruger Park. They have to brave that , because the 
situation is so serious and desperate that it is really a choice of that 
or death. 
LPM: I ' ve heard from people who've gone to Mozambique , and travelled 
extensively, that if you're on the coast it ' s ok . because people can eat 
fish. But some people who live inland are so incredibly poor , more so 
than the people on the coast because they can ' t farm with the mines . To 
get to another thing, What is your role , individually, in the whole 
process? Are you managing the corridor or? 
CN : Yes, I am actually the project manager for the Mpumalanga 
government . We have a provincial corridor technical team, of which I am 
the chairperson. To put it shortly I am the project manager (unclear). 
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My role is more extensive. We see that it is our role to promote 
investment, via the Maputo Development corridor, to co-ordinate any 
effort to build a database for this region in terms of introducing 
availability of data for those wanting to invest. We need to be able to 
say to people wanting to invest, 'Yes you can locate your plant there 
but this place, you can't locate there. That area, environmentally, is 
unsafe for that plant. We need those studies. We need also those 
studies that say in our province here where are our industrial areas 
that have been designated so that when people come we tell them, 'look 
if you want to do textiles maybe its better for you to locate in Ermelo 
because there is wool there, or if you want to do furniture the Lowveld 
is better because the forestry is there. So, my role really is quite 
(unclear) because I have to have to speak about the corridor, I also 
have to disseminate as much information about the corridor as possible 
to wherever. In fact, the corridor is the single most important project 
in Africa ... 
LPM: The biggest infrastructure development of its kind ... 
CN: Exactly. So it is not a small thing. What we are doing at the 
moment is we, I am also through my committee facilitating a number of 
studies on environmental assessment and capacity building with local 
authorities along the corridor and taking the SMMEs on board into this 
project so that they can also meaningfully gain and also looking at 
agricultural projects that are going to benefit and impact on the 
corridor. So, all the stakeholders who we have to take on board and 
show that they also ... 
LPM: It's a consultative process ... 
CN: Yes, yes, yes. 
LPM: You opened relatively recently a 'one stop investment centre'. 
How's that working? 
CN: In fact, we are still setting up that. We have just invited 
nominations for board members. 
LPM: Who are the other individuals, the other workhorses and visionaries 
involved in the project? Both on the provincial side and in the central 
government. 
CN: On a monthly basis we meet with, see we have our own meeting here as 
a provincial cabinet. We have identified sub-programmes in the 
province. Sub-programme one primary issues, which involve liasing with 
national government, and there are secondary issues which are those of 
development nature that the province has to fulfil and we've got pro j ect 
managers for that . Within that we have sub-programmes: SMMEs, 
environment, local government, agriculture ... 
LPM: So this is organised along federal lines; certain things are 
designated as central government responsibilities and other things as 
CN: Exactly. 
LPM: Who is the actual person who came up with the idea and how did it 
evolve from there? 
CN: It becomes a bit of problem because (unclear) I'm told that there 
are some people talking about this around 1890s. Some people were 
already talking about this development to take gold out of the 
country ... 
LPM: 1894, President Kruger 
CN: That's right, but obviously now you cannot credit them because it's 
whose done the job that we credit. This idea came apparently came from 
my premier. My premier said, .... you know we were based in Mozambique 
during the struggle and we saw how that country was actually devastated, 
mainly by the former South Africa regime. 
LPM: So, Matthews Phosa was in Mozambique? 
CN: Yes, yes. So, he took the idea to the president and said, 
'president ,what can you do?' And then the president delegated it to 
Mac Maharaj. To be quite honest with you if you go and talk to Mac, Mac 
96 
will tell you that it was his idea. He will not tell you where it came 
from because it is confidential, you know .... how the project evolved. 
In fact, if you go to the president he will tell you ... but in any case 
the president always likes to say it's not important who it came from. 
LPM : It was a logical idea and someone would have come up with it ... 
CN : In any case that is why we take a lot of pride, why the premier 
takes a lot of pride in it. We moved right through from the conception 
of this idea and now it turned out in fact that in the whole world there 
has never been a project of this magnitude except . Only two that cross 
borders , this one and the one that links Malaysia and Singapore. Only , 
but the rest of them , corridors, are in one country. 
LPM : How has the working relationship developed between the central 
government departments and the provincial administration here? 
CN : We have a ve r y good relations hip ; every month we meet with the 
Department of Transport . Some of the departments at national level, 
they have come on board this project at a later stage because .... now , 
at national level they have a sub-cabinet that deals with the corridor , 
with what they call spatial development. They have a subcabinet 
committee now. In our own province , we have similarly , a structure like 
that. The relationship is very good , because one this is an SDI of 
great magnitude, of all the SDis that are in South Africa at the moment. 
You can see already there are billions and billions of potential 
investments in the pipeline because of the nature of this project . 
There is a lot of interest , world-wide . If the President or Deputy 
President or any minister goes anywhere to address investment in South 
Africa they must talk about corridors . That is a major part. 
LPM : So, when Trevor Manuel goes abroad ... 
CN : Yeah! 
LPM: The corridor seems to be going along very well, is that because 
of ... . or how can you assess the efficiency or efficacy of the Mpumalanga 
provincial government? In terms of the fact that it is a new , entirely 
new administration since 1994. Have there been teething problems or has 
it gone smoothly? 
Is better than other provinces , or worse than other provinces? 
CN : It ' s not been easy because there has been the situation where the 
province has had to amalgamate three former administrations. There was 
the TPA, there was the (unclear) Homeland government , there is the 
KwaNdebele Homeland government. So , they ' ve had to put them all 
together. That has been the greatest challenge I think to get the 
administration together. 
LPM : That of course has led to things like the driver ' s licence . .. 
CN : That is the issue; to a large extent the homeland thrived on 
corruption. That ' s how they thrived . There was no way that you could 
justify the existence of those structures at that particular time. Some 
of them you'll find that in the homelands there was nothing ever 
developed, not a single thing . Just for Pretoria to be able to control 
the situation through a certain structure ... . to say you ' ve got your own 
traditional leaders , but economically nothing would happen . So , that 
has been the greatest challenge , to marry the former administrations 
together. Some of these things that are happening is whilst marrying 
these administrations we inherited the people from the same. We did not 
look for new people . They automatically t hey b ecame employees of 
Mpumalanga Province . So, whatever they had been doing before . . . 
LPM : You can ' t fire them, can you? 
CN: Well, under the constitution ... the constitution says they become 
employees of the government . So , their service, emanating from 
wherever , still continues. So , in other ways they still continued doing 
what they were doing for the reason that nobody could uncover them and 
say 'look you are not supposed to do this ' because they are still there. 
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LPM : That's a terrible situation in terms of managing an administration. 
I was a c tually very impressed with the Transport Department in Pretoria, 
-- hat they were very dynamic yet they still suffer the same constraints. 
How does the Maputo Corridor fit into the ANC ' s vision for South Africa 
and Southern Africa as a whole? 
CN : Well, it fits in very well because the ANC government actually makes 
this project possible and is very strongly advocating regional 
development context . We , in the province are not working in this 
project , this Mpumalanga-Maputo Project. We are working on it under the 
auspices tha t it is a regional project. It goes beyond our province 
because for instance, without these regional countries supporting it, it 
would not be a success . Without other provinces s upporting it, outside 
of Mpumalanga , it would not be a success. That is the reality. it fits 
in very well with the government ' s goal that we must try to ensure that 
the economies around South Africa develop to the same level ... Our 
economy he r e is bigger than the economy of Zimbabwe, it's bigger than 
the Mozambican economy. 
LPM : It's four times larger than all of the rest of SADC . 
CN : So what we are trying to do for instance , our exports to Mozambique 
right now. We ' re exporting to the tune of more than 20 billion Rand, 
you know and Mozambique is only exporting less than 100 million Rand . 
We need to assist them and companies like Alusaf are going to locate 
there trying to ensure that they set up factories there and that these 
factories are going to benefit Mozambique ' s economy . Some of them are 
going to export or re-export .. . Now their hydroelectric project is going 
to start exporting electricity to us. They ' re going to start exporting 
gas this way. That is what we want because it is going to improve the 
trading situation between our countries . 
LPM : It's part of the whole move from a hegemonic relationship to one 
more among equals and more co- operative . 
CN : Exactly, that is the point. If you look at what's happening with 
our negotiations with Zimbabwe . .. trading partners in the region . It's 
fair to open up to their products, though in reality it will also affect 
us in the domestic market. 
LPM : In textiles, for example . 
CN : Yes, textiles is a typical example . Our unions , they say, ' who took 
the jobs? Somebody outside South Africa or a South African?' that kind 
of . We've got to get beyond that and think regionally . Mozambique's 
economy is not the fault of the Mozambicans , it ' s the fault of the 
Portuguese . When the Portuguese were there , everything came out of 
Portugal. The reality is that they never developed any industry there . 
You see, I've got a document for you here. This document is a very good 
document; it gives you a perspective of the Maputo Development Corridor . 
It gives you the concept of corridors and the key development elements 
of this corridor: the geographical definition of the corridor . . . . (reads 
index) .. . so it's a very good document. 
LPM : That's very good to have. 
CN : This has got sectoral overviews a nd projects, per sector . . . We 
believe that we are part of the corridor . We are 50/50 with Mozambique , 
we are partners. Right now we have just set up the company, the Maputo 
Corridor Company . The Managing Director is going to come f rom 
Mozambique a nd the Deputy Managing Director f rom South Africa. 
LPM : How's your contact so far with Mozambique? 
CN : Very good . Very good. It 's just that there are certain elements 
which are a ffected by the fact that we are at differ ent levels of 
development and other aspects . Even the decision- making process is 
different. (unclear) or else, I have got certain responsibilities where 
I can make a decision. And if I make a mistake , I make a mistake for 
the province . Whereas in Mozambique , even one mini s ter cannot make a 
decision. He's got to go to a council of ministers where everything has 
98 
to be approved. (unclear) He might propose at that meeting that ' No , 
we ' re not going to discuss that today and the thing stays there for six 
months . So , that is where the differences lie . 
LPM: Great , that just about . . . 
CN : My time is going really. 
LPM : Thank you for all of your help 
CN : Yeah, s ure . . . 
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8.4 Interview with Karir,· Pearce -- 27May1997 
LPM : How was Nelspruit yesterday, was it nice? 
KP : Oh, it was fine . Terrible weather but it was ok. 
LPM : It was awful here, but I'm sure that you heard. 
KP : I hit the storm on my way back. 
LPM : I did too , both ways on the Nl. This trip is wonderful because I'm 
getting to experience all sorts of things first-hand . I have been in 
South Africa since 1994 but I took the train up to Johannesburg, which 
was wonderful ... 
KP : That ' s brave. 
LPM: Yeah, but at UCT I know lots of students who actually take the 
train and I always thought it was a bit iffy , especially in second 
class, but actually it was brilliant. I didn ' t take anything of value 
with me and it was a really interesting mix of people . We had one Cape 
Town, what I, for lack of a better word would call a ' bergie ' with his 
bottle of Virginia wine and two construction workers and it was very 
nice. And one British tourist . It was fun. Let ' s get down to 
business. I'll start out with some more general questions and we'll move 
to more specific things . I'd be interested in what the goals, the 
ultimate goals of the Maputo Corridor Project are. If you could list 
some of the things . . . 
KP : I think the overall goal, not only of the Maputo Corridor, but of 
all the SDis, is to deliver sustainable jobs . That is the ultimate 
objective it's really quite simple. And the strategy is investment, new 
investment . Now in the case of the Maputo Corridor , new investment 
requires that the infrastructure be rehabilitated to become far more 
efficient. The corridor concept works quite well in the case of the 
Maputo Corridor because you have an existing wealth of industry and 
economic activity on one end and you have a port with enormous potential 
on the other . And in between the two you have a range of economic 
potential which is really quite diverse and quite phenomenal. So, the 
first phase of the Maputo Corridor is about rehabilitation of 
infrastructure . And in terms of that there are four major 
infrastructure projects that have been identified by Mozambique and 
South Africa at the outset. The first is obviously the toll road and 
that's quite an interesting project, but I'll come back to why that's 
interesting later. 
LPM: I was speaking with George Jamieson this morning. It was very 
interesting and instructive. 
KP : The next is obviously the rehabilitation of the port ... the 
rehabilitation of the rail essentially for the corridor's purposes 
initially we were only talking about Ressano Garcia to Maputo. On the 
Mozambican side, the whole Southern Mozambique railway is intricately 
bound up with the Port of Maputo . So , rail rehabilitation is including 
not only the Ressano Garcia line, but also the line to Zimbabwe and the 
line to Swaziland. The fourth is the border post at 
Komatipoort/Ressano Garcia , which is a major blockage at the moment. 
Just to go back to cover a little bit of the approach to 
infrastructure ... the approach by government on all of the SDis , not just 
Maputo is to maximise the kind of leverage you can get on limited state 
resources from the private sector . And because of the economic 
viability of thi s corridor , it ' s obvious that the private sector should 
become involved in planning the infrastructure. The toll road is a 
single project across the two countries and entirely financed by the 
TRAC Consortium. What is quite interesting about it is normally on a 
BOT project you would ... there 's a (unclear) of capital expenditure at 
the beginning when construction takes place and then it sort of tails 
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off during the period of the concession . But in this one the capital 
expenditure is phased throughout the period of the concession. 
LPM : So , is the initial road goin~ to be, wait , I know that , it ' s going 
to be a two lane road , but does it provide for the expansion of the road 
over the period of the concession. Is that what you ... 
KP : It provides for expansion and it also provides for re - routing of 
the road in areas like Nelspruit where there ' s excessive congestion and 
once a cert a in level of traffic is reached going through Nelspruit they 
would have to take the road around Nelspruit. So it ' s quite innovative 
in that sens e . The s tructuring of the project is a joint implementing 
authority b etween the two countries. Also quite new .. . so that ' s the 
road . Most people know a great deal about the road. I don ' t really 
want to talk too much about it. On the port and rail, the Mozambican 
government also decided to approach those as joint ventures and on each 
of those they are going to put out 51% of the joint venture to the 
private sector. Now those adverts for port and rail should be going out 
this week if they a r e not already out . On the port they are looking 
essentially for a partner in a joint venture that would deal with 
rehabilitation of infrastructure in the port. The joint venture company 
would also handle management and operation of the port. Now some of the 
terminals of the port have already been privatised and those are 
privatised under a concession . Those concessions would eventually fall 
under this new holding company -- the joint venture. But there ' s 
substantially more that the terminals that needs to be rehabilitated, 
particularly intermodal facilities , the whole sort of structure and of 
quality the quayside which has been quite badly affected . And then, of 
course , dredging. The dredging cannot be included in the advert of the 
port concession the d r edging has been trea ted separately . But I think 
there is a growing realisation in Mozambique that without getting the 
dredging sorted out you can do what you like at the port , nothing ' s 
going to happen. So I think there ' s a bit of a move to possible include 
the dredging in the concession. 
LPM : So is this concession likely to satisfy donors, like USAID that 
have had quite a poor working relationship with the port of Maputo. 
KP : In fact the whole plan to rehabilitate the port and the rail was 
started through the World Bank programme in Mozambique. In fact, the 
rehabilitation is one of the conditions for further tranches of loans. 
So , I think the starting point for Mozambique on this was very negative 
in the sense that it was placed a s a precondition for further tranches 
of funding to be released . When we began the Maputo Corridor, we 
brought it in under the umbrella of the Maputo Corridor because it ' s so 
important for the success of the corridor and we ' ve managed between the 
World Bank, Mozambique, and South Africa to develop a working 
relationship and understanding around how to deal with the very 
difficult issue of restructuring of CFM . and I think we've reached a 
point where there ' s far less ant a gonism and a lot greater understanding 
in this respect, but it hasn ' t been easy. So, that ' s the port. I think 
the conservative estimate of what ' s required in the rehabilitation is 
around 60 million US dollars. 
LPM: So, is Portnet likely to be involved in bidding or this process? 
KP: There is a provision in the structure of the joint venture that the 
remaining .. . CFM would retain 33% of the sha res and instead of 
contributing equity they would contribute their assets. There's a 
remaining 16% which has been left open for neighbouring operators. 
Portnet has, until now , not expressed an interest in being involved in 
the port . I think they have their hands full in South Africa right now. 
But Spoornet has been very active with Mozambique on the rail and they 
may well have an interest in the port . I ' m not sure. They entered into 
an interim agreement with Mozambique on interim upgrading of the rail 
facilities on the Ressano Garcia line and really that would be to 
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improve the condition of the assets that would be put up on offer to a 
concessionaire. 
LPM: To make them more attractive. 
KP: Ja, on the rail we're really talking about fixing up the line. 
LPM: The roadway will actually be shortened, is that correct? 
KP: The road will be shortened because there will be a new alignment, a 
new road that will be built, essentially the road will follow the rail. 
But it's going to be rehabilitating the line, rolling stock, and things 
like signalling equipment and the marshalling yard. At the moment there 
are fairly serious intermodal problems. 
LPM: Ja, I've read some stories about that. When the Maputo Corridor 
came up, what sort of models are you following or are you blazing 
entirely new ground with it? 
KP: Not really. I think there are many examples of corridors around the 
world but what seems to be most evident from those is that you can't 
created corridors where there's no inherent economic opportunity. 
Because there the corridor concept really doesn't work. If you take the 
corridor concept to its fullest possibility there must be some economic 
rationale. Building a road between A and B doesn't mean that there will 
be investment or that there will be growth. In the case of the Maputo 
Corridor there is an enormous depth not only scope of economic 
opportunity that really hasn't been expanded on. And a lot of that 
economic opportunity, particularly on the South African side, has been 
constrained by high transportation costs to export markets. The 
prospects of having access to Maputo Port opens up a lot of 
opportunities. For Mozambique the war is the obvious reason for the 
absence of economic opportunity. But because the focus is around the 
Port of Maputo, the possibilities for the beneficiation of raw materials 
and manufacturing for export are much better in Mozambique than anywhere 
else because of proximity to the port. 
LPM: Marginal opportunities for the extraction of minerals would be 
taken advantage of ... 
KP: Absolutely. 
LPM: One of my concerns about the corridor is where the emphasis is 
really on the endpoints or is it on the middle because ... it is 
interesting in that it's commonly referred to as a development corridor 
and it is an RDP project and it does include some social investment as 
well as transport infrastructure. Or is it just a road that will go 
through areas with a lot of potential? 
KP: I think that the concept of this corridor can best be explained by 
looking at this map. Given that the ultimate objective is sustainable 
jobs, new investment and sustainability is going to rely on our ability 
to compete in international markets. Previously we have focused on 
import substitution. And the new economic strategy very clearly 
concentrates on the global context. Whit that borne in mine, from the 
Port of Maputo, there is a very rich catchment area that goes all the 
way to Gauteng of economic existing economic activity and new 
opportunity. The spatial definition of the corridor is in terms of 
economic opportunity. It is not defined in planning terms -- this is 
the boundary, you know. You have for example a sub-corridor which goes 
up into the Northern Province and the rationale for that is that you 
have agriculture and mining here and here and you need to ensure 
infrastructure and getting these goods to port is good, so there's a 
subcorridor. The infrastructure follows economic rationale and is not 
in and of itself, which is I think something that irritates the planners 
beyond belief. And you have a feeder from Secunda, which is a 
petrochemical cluster and you have Middleburg, which is a steel cluster. 
These tie in to the corridor. 
LPM: SASOL's new investment, is that clearly tied to the new 
infrastructure or is it random that they announced that? 
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KP: No, it's not random at all. I think there are two things that can be 
seen to have some bearing on that. The one is the clus t er strategy 
which is in addition to Spatial Development Initiatives ~nother led of 
the GEAR strategy. And clusters are really about how one gets the 
downstream industry around key regional going. And clearly there are 
enormous potentials around petrochemicals. And once you get downstream, 
particularly in medium size enterprises, and clearly those could be 
produced for export markets not only domestic ... 
LPM: And they're more labour intensive than the actual ... 
KP: Ja, the cluster strategy focuses clearly on this area and the 
petrochemical cluster but the viability of the downstream is very much 
tied in with global competitiveness. And so, location and proximity to 
the Port of Maputo become quite important. What you'll find is that 
many of the industries in the corridor are not exporting via Maputo at 
the moment. What we did, very early on in this project, is go and speak 
to all the private sector people in this area, particularly the bigger 
companies and to say to them, 'look if Maputo Port was able to handle 14 
million tons a year, and if it had good management, and everything was 
working, would you use the port?'. And the answer was unanimous, 'of 
course we would' . There are a lot of people who are trying to assess 
the viability of this concept. It's too soon, the infrastructure 
projects are not even in. 
LPM: One of the worst things I've ever heard about this was that many of 
the Eastern Transvaal fruit growers are actually exporting by Cape Town 
and it actually takes less time to get a carriage back from Cape Town 
than from Maputo 
KP: This is true. 
LPM: There's a lot of improvement to be made. 
KP: Absolutely. And one of the most significant difficulties there is 
the border post. There we are putting in a single facilities that both 
countries can share and the complex will be a one stop facility, similar 
to that which is between Canada and the United States. It'll have 
drive-through facilities and planning for that design is going on now. 
We're trying to get an agreement signed and in place ... 
LPM: That's a first in Africa. 
KP: Yes. So, I think that particularly in the agriculture sector there's 
enormous room for growth and in the agri-processing industry. Because 
most of the stuff going out of Cape Town is going in its low value form, 
there's no value added here. And we certainly want to encourage that. 
LPM: Now another thing that I'm very much interested in is the actual 
personalities involved and how they work together. I was wondering if 
you could identify the individuals who are either both the visionaries 
and the workhorses and how they interacted. 
KP: Well I think that the ... well a lot of people claim they gave birth 
to the corridor concept. In fact it may be true that people have been 
talking about this for a long time. What really got it going was from 
the Department of Transport, our Director General, Ketso, went to 
inspect roads or something in the Kruger Park. For some reason or 
another, he was in that area and getting to the border realised how 
close the sea was and how close Maputo was. He came back and said, 
'this is ridiculous, we've got to do something about this.' So 
discussions began between our ministry and the Ministry of Transport in 
Mozambique. So that's really how it started. There's been a great deal 
of interaction between ministers, there's been a great deal of 
interaction between people like Ketso and the Mozambican officials. And 
then Trade and Industry has been very much involved on the South African 
side. Because of the nature of very big private sector investments are 
planned within the corridor. And to try to make sure that the obstacles 
to those investments are removed. Institutionally, there is an 
interministerial committee which is composed of my minister and Minister 
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Muxanga in Mozambique. But other ministers are brought in for example 
Trade a nd Industry or Roads in Mozambique , depending on the issue 2nd 
the project. And below that you have a co- ordinating committee which is 
really Ketso and Paul Jourdan from Trade and Industry together with our 
Mozambican counterparts. My role in this has been really a workhorse 
role, not really a thinking role, in managing the project from the South 
African side. Then we also have on both sides a technical team, in 
Mozambique we had to really establish that capacity . They didn ' t have 
that sort of capacity. So we assisted them to establish that capacity 
using Mozambican people and training them and using consultants who are 
Mozambican, and so on. And on our side we basically used our 
development finance institutions, the DBSA, IDC, CSIR which is not a 
finance institution , but a lot of technical computer type stuff. So 
that ' s the sort of overall structure . So although the provinces are not 
technically part of that structure, the provinces are a really critical 
part, on the South African side particularly of this initiative. 
Because the investments that take place in South Africa don ' t take place 
in Pretoria they happen in local areas and that's been very important 
for us to consolidate a good working relationship and ensure that the 
capacity of the provinces is capable of handling the opportunity that is 
there, and taking it forward. So we have a programme in the Northern 
Province and Mpumalanga which is really focused around tourism , 
agriculture , and developing your small, micro and medium enterprises to 
be able to take advantage of some of the bigger investments that are 
going to take place . And that ' s quite an important part of the 
programme , it ' s often overlooked. 
LPM : Now, Mpumalanga recently established what they called a ' one stop 
investment shop ' . Is it part of the whole project . 
KP: Mpumalanga province is remarkable in that they have really taken 
the initiative and taken ownership of the initiative. They have 
established all sorts of mechanisms and things that enable investors to 
feel very comfortable and to have access to the information they need 
and so on. 
LPM : In your contact with the Mpumalanga officials, do you find that 
they are any more or any less capable than other provinces or are they 
particularly competent at what they do? Does that have anything to do 
with it? 
KP : I think that the one very significant difference, and I think that 
this applies not only to the provincial level but even at national 
level, is that if you have good ' A' political leadership and 'B' 
managerial people at the top of your structure , then the quality of what 
gets done lower down is much better. And Mpumalanga is certainly a case 
in point. You have very clear political leadership. You have very clear 
strategic sense in that province and even if you're dealing with 
somebody who may not necessarily be adequately skilled, dealing with 
their particular job, that over riding sense o f what needs to be done , 
what ' s ok . what ' s not ok., that ' s clearly entrenched in Mpumalanga. And 
I ' ve been dealing with a lot of the different offices on the SDI 
programme and one thing about Mpumalanga that stands out amongst the 
other provinces ... 
LPM : They s eem relatively successful in terms of delivery of other 
projects , housing and things like that. 
KP: Yeah, they are they are very much focused around delivery. There 
are, of course , people who like to plan endlessly everywhere , but I 
think that the overriding strategic d irection is certainly getting 
people into delivery sooner than anywhere else. Also , there isn ' t 
really any political contestation , which makes a big difference , a fair 
amount of hegemony there. 
LPM : There have been some minor rumblings about the distribution of 
benefits of the Maputo Corridor between different provinces. They're 
very minor and below the surface , and I'm thinking actually of KwaZulu 
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Natal and suddenly in June 1996 there was reporting of a ' super-
corridor ' that went right down to Richards Bay from Maputo. Did that 
have anything at all to do with that? 
KP : The one thing that is absolutely cast in stone in the SDI programme 
is that there are no political projects . All of the SDis are based on 
economic rationale; there's absolutely . .. People were saying 'oh, we ' re 
taking away traffic from Durban and Richards Ba y and Cape Town and 
that ' s bad and giving it to a nother count r y . And that ' s nonsense , 
because economically it makes a lot more sense for people to export 
through Maputo if it ' s closer. 
LPM : And is it also true that, barring new capacity coming on line , that 
Richards Bay and Durban are close to capacity? 
KP : Look , I think the debate between Durba n and Richards Bay, for us, is 
not a debate. It ' s the mentality that exists in ports. 'This is our 
port and we ' re the centre of the universe .' And we have basically, the 
approach that we have taken is that the port must develop to the 
capacity which suits it. What i s it going to handle? What is its 
economic hinterland, if you like. What is it best suited to do? Well, 
Richards Bay is a very deep port and there ' s an enormous amount of space 
and scope for growth , spatially , at Richards Bay. Durban is pretty much 
more or less at capacity . There are a few things that can be done to 
restructure the port , land uses and so on that will increase the 
capacity of the port. There ' s also a fair amount of opportunity on the 
existing airport s ite , once the airport moves . So there are prospects 
for Durban to expand as a port. And they are limited by the fact that 
it ' s not a deep port. If it wants to take in Panamax type vessels , it ' s 
going to have to build a new port entirely. And our projections are 
that it's not worth creating that sort of capacity in Durban, because 
it's almost at its limit . Richards Bay needs to be developed much 
faster than what's happening, because of the depth and the enormous 
scope for growth . It ' s also serviced by fairly good infrastructure 
already, so you don ' t need new roads and rail and all that stuff. So , 
there's an economic rationale to why things should be done . I think 
that people at local level generally tend to have very local 
perspectives of things . And it ' s a problem that we encounter on all 
SDis and it takes about six months to a year to get everybody looking 
outward and not looking inward . 
LPM : I remember that clearly from my experience. I worked in New York 
State and New York State is a very large area and the northern area goes 
all the way up to Canada and it ' s very rural and the Southern area 
includes America ' s largest city. You get an enormous amount of tension 
between downstaters and upstaters in the state assembly and senate in 
all the committees. In fact the elections often ride on that divide. 
So, the orientation of the connection between Maputo and KwaZulu-Natal, 
is that oriented towards tourism and things like that? 
KP: There is . . . let me get the document . 
LPM : I would also be interested in any spare documents you might have . .. 
KP: This is a little bit out of date and s ome of these maps have been 
altered. I think you ' re more interested in conceptual things . This 
shows the Lebombo , which is this one , and you get Richards Bay and 
Durban. If you look at this overall map here , you can see that the N2 , 
existing national road goes up to Richards Bay and goes up to Swaziland. 
There ' s an existing road in Swaziland that goes up to (unclear) and then 
it goes across to Maputo . All of this is existing road. That is really 
your commercial route , your link between these two ports , Swaziland and 
Maputo Port. This area has been completely neglected in terms of 
investment , but there are lots of people who live here, particularly on 
the South African side. And the potential here is really tourism. So 
the Lebombo initiative is about building a complete through road from 
Hluhluwe, all the way to Ponta Do Ouro and up to Maputo. And that will 
basically open up all of this area to tourism. There's also a fairly 
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rich agricultural area here. So we're also looking at agriculture in 
selected places, and this agriculture is really agriculture for export 
so we're not looking at sugar and that ... This road is not the commercial 
route and it's quite important to make that point or environmentalists 
get very upset if you don't. 
LPM: I was recently on holiday in the Transkei and I realised how poor 
the roads there really are. It's quite a shock. From the United States 
one of the first things you notice is that the roads are excellent. My 
car in America actually fell into a pothole in New York that destroyed 
the car and I wasn't able to get any money from the City of New York. 
But how does this corridor compare, what are the differences between 
this corridor and Beira? It's very different, it's from a different era, 
and was part of the old SADCC. 
KP: I think that an assessment of Beira. It's difficult to do an 
objective assessment of Beira, because the success of that corridor has 
been completely undermined by the war, so one doesn't have a sense of 
what might have been if there hadn't been a war in Mozambique. In the 
SADCC context, a corridor, even if it is only a transportation corridor, 
is absolutely vital to Zimbabwe and even to Malawi, although there are 
some difficulties of access, physically, to Beira. So, aside from 
anything else, the transportation linkage is absolutely critical. The 
economic success of the corridor is very difficult to assess. Because 
there are lots of industries that should locate in the corridor for 
export or import purposes, they haven't located there for obvious 
reasons. But there is a growing excitement in the private sector. JCI 
for example, are over the moon about this. The other important thing 
about Beira, and it's often misunderstood a lot. People think that 
Beira is in competition with Maputo, and Nacala and whatever else. The 
economic catchment areas of these corridors are completely separate. 
And in fact, developing Beira will enhance the development of the Maputo 
Corridor in the sense that it will open up an entire area of coastline 
in Mozambique between Beira and Maputo and that's really important. 
Those areas between the two ports are really completely without 
anything. So these two corridors, developing almost parallel to each 
other, enable enormous opportunities between them for tourism, 
agriculture, whatever; smaller towns developing into more substantial 
nodes. So, Beira is definitely viable, to assess Beira based on past 
performance is not appropriate. One of the things that we're doing on 
the Maputo Corridor which is now being applied in Beira, which didn't 
happen before. Beira was conceived and structured entirely as a private 
sector initiative. They set up a private company to run the corridor. 
There was no government buy-in. Government said 'that's a good idea, go 
ahead.' 
LPM: The port, was a problem ... 
KP: Of course it was all tied in to that. The difference is that for 
the Maputo Corridor, this is a government initiative. Government's role 
is to facilitate investment in this initiative. So it's a partnership. 
We didn't go out and say we are doing this whether the private sector 
likes it or not. We went out and said to the private sector, 'what do 
you think of this?' And I think that that's the big difference. You 
have to have high level and consistent political support for these 
initiatives otherwise they don't succeed. And in Beira's case, I think 
that's what ... if there is anything that can be picked up on, over and 
above the war, a factor why it hasn't sort of flourished, is that 
factor. What has now happened is that there is political buy-in and 
there is, both from Zimbabwe and Mozambique, government commitment to 
make sure that it works. And that is going to be the most significant 
difference. The economic rationale is there, there's no question about 
it. 
LPM: Now the Maputo Corridor, it appears to be basically a bilateral 
thing and any sort of involvement is an afterthought. 
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KP: Look, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe and Namibia complained bitterly. They 
said, 'this is something that impacts us in a major way and we' re not 
involved. And both Mozambique and ourselves took the position that we 
are focusing on something which has economic rationale. Swaziland is 
our neighbour. What would Swaziland bring? nothing. 
LPM: I guess they don't use the Goba route too much ... 
KP: For Swaziland Maputo port is an important alternate route to 
Richards Bay but economically there is no rationale for having a 
trilateral, or quadrilateral Maputo Corridor. So they have been brought 
in on the rail, port, and Corridor Company which we are about to set up 
and will facilitate investment and so on. So they will be brought in on 
specific structures. But we didn't need to get an agreement with 
Swaziland about the N4. We didn't need an agreement with Swaziland 
about the port ... 
LPM: One of the things we spoke about this morning was that it seems 
that the structure of decision making within this initiative is very 
organised in comparison with other initiatives, is this the case? 
KP: The way we structured this was that no matter what level of 
government you talk to about this, the same message is given. We 
established our co-ordinating structures with the provinces to ensure 
precisely that. So even if a person who wants to know about the road is 
in Nelspruit and decides to go and see Coleman Nyathi, he can tell them 
the very same story that I can tell and Nazir can tell. And we paid a 
lot of attention to ensuring that communication and information flowed 
properly, because that can just kill an initiative. When somebody wants 
to deal with somebody where the initiative is and nobody there knows 
anything about the initiative. So we paid a lot of attention to that. 
LPM: Your contact with the Mozambican government, in terms of the joint 
tendering process, what are your impressions of the government officials 
in Mozambique and their capacity? 
KP: I get asked this all the time and it's an unfair question to ask in 
the sense that you could make a general assessment and say that, 'Well, 
the capacity of the Mozambican government is zero because there are no 
skills or there's no this or that.' But if you look at this project, 
the toll road is a project worth more than a billion Rand. Structuring 
a joint implementing authority is not an easy situation where you have 
two completely different systems of government in operation. The way 
that Mozambique operates and the way that South Africa operates are two 
completely differe.nt systems. And yet, in just over a year the 
concession contract has been awarded and signed. So, you can have this 
general impression of Mozambique and there are serious inefficiencies, 
there are serious capacity problems, there's no question about that. 
But when you have commitment to an initiative, then those kinds of 
problems are much less of a problem. The difficulty for investors is 
that on one hand Mozambique is faced with this very serious problem of 
having to reconstruct their economy and that's infrastructure and a 
whole range of things. They're moving from one system of government to 
another system of government. That's a whole other set of legislative 
issues that they have to deal with. On the other hand they have a 
wealth of economic potential, and they have to respond to that 
appropriately. So, they are being pulled in five million different 
directions. And they have some very, very serious priorities which they 
absolutely have to address. Now, the investors are not interested in 
that. The investor is interested in saying, 'This is what I want to do, 
I want that piece of land, where's the infrastructure, etc.' and it's 
extremely frustrating for investors. Understandably so. If one is 
standing back and doing an assessment one has to take into account the 
kind of problems and priorities that the Mozambican government is 
facing. There is a very, very high level of commitment to this 
initiative. There's also a very high level of commitment to ensuring 
investment occurs. So, one really must asses in the broader scheme of 
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things rather than saying well , 'I met an investor who had to pay five 
bribes before an approval was at the end of the tunnel.' That happens, 
and it will continue to happen until s uch a time as the government has 
been able to establish the bare bones of what really needs to be 
established to build from there. And what I always say to investors is, 
'It ' s wrong , there shouldn ' t be corruption , but there is corruption, how 
do you deal with it?' You ' ve got to sustain the pressure. You've got 
to keep pressurising government to say we cannot do business like this. 
Because that 's the only way it ' s going to change. It ' s not going to 
change from within. It think that one needs to be quite realistic in 
assessing the capacity , because you can write it off and there would be 
sufficient evidence to do so , but I don ' t thing that ' s at all 
constructive and I don ' t think it ' s realistic either. 
LPM: So, you can work around that and improve it in the long term. 
KP : Absolutely 
LPM : What so far has been the greatest success and what so far is your 
greatest concern about the development? 
KP : Well look, obviously the delivery of the toll road contract is the 
greatest success that everybody can recognise and identify with. But 
from a government perspective the greatest success has been the ability 
of our two governments to pull together and pull it off. We have spent 
probably about four million Rand on this project from the government 
side, getting it together , getting the appraisals done, meeting, 
whatever . And the value of investment that is going to flow from this 
effort is worth several billion and to me that is the success of the 
project. I have no doubt that when the port is operational, and it will 
be by the end of the year the concession contract will be in place , when 
the roads are finished , and the border post is built . And they all will 
happen in the next 18 months -- there ' s no question about that. 
LPM : So the general date for everything to be up and running is 1998? 
KP : 1998. Absolutely , and there ' s no question about that. Once those 
things are in there is no question that people will invest. There are 
enormous opportunities just waiting. The fact that Alusaf is willing to 
invest so much in a smelter at this stage is really a clear sign of the 
kind of potential we are looking at . For me, the success of the manner 
in which government has dealt with it , and I think that that ' s 
different. If you look at other corridor attempts in Africa, that's the 
biggest difference. We have succeeded in creating an effective 
partnership with the private sector, not just on the road . 
LPM : Thank you. This has been very interesting ... 
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8.5 Interview with Francisca Soares -- 30May1997 
LPM: So, I've spoken to people in the central government, for example 
Karin Pearce. I've spoken to people involved in the TRAC Consortium, 
I've spoken to people from the TRAC Consortium and now, I'd like to get 
a perspective from this side. You're in an entirely different position 
from any of the people on the South African side. So, I'd just like 
start with some general questions on corridors and maybe we'll get down 
to some specifics. I was wondering how much time you have, half an hour 
perhaps? 
FS: Half and hour, an hour, forty five minutes .... 
LPM: Great, great, great. Now, for Mozambique, what are the goals of 
the corridor development? 
FS: We have designed the same perspective as South Africa; we are 
talking a development perspective, but of course you have to understand 
that there are many issues. Between South Africa and Mozambique there 
is a very old connection on the business point of view. When we are 
talking of Port of Maputo, when we are talking of trade, it is a very 
old connection even in colonial times. 
LPM: It goes back to 1894 ... 
FS : Out of the service of transport the migration was another issue or 
connection. So, there is a link, naturally. And we know that for the 
(unclear) for this region, the Maputo Corridor, the Port of Maputo is a 
natural port ... 
LPM: geographically logical. 
FS : geographical. Of course what we intend to do is give another level 
of service for the Port of Maputo. And accessibility is one of the key 
questions of the Port of Maputo. But we have defined the four key goals 
for this project. Probably you know already what goals we have defined. 
LPM : The official goals are ... certainly development and jobs and things 
like that ... 
FS : To maintain and create new jobs. To minimise the negative impacts 
on investment ... 
LPM : Is this related to or is it one part of your economic recovery 
programme? 
FS : No, in our official programme, we consider the corridors. It's not 
only the Maputo Corridor, but Maputo, Beira, and Nacala. It's part of 
the government's policy -- the programme for the five year ... and Maputo 
got the conditions for improving immediately, to start to develop. We 
defined the key projects. You probably know by the information what are 
the five key projects . It's the port, railways, toll road, the 
dredging, and telecommunications . 
LPM : The Maputo Corridor was particularly ripe to start right away 
because of South Africa ' s interest . How is the port changing? The port 
has a mixed reputation. There was a problem with USAID a while ago they 
stopped their relationship with the Port of Maputo for a period of time. 
There should be a tender going out later this week for private 
management. Is that going according to schedule? 
FS : There is a project for revitalisation ... of course this is an issue 
which (unclear). I think it's planned. I don't know if it's really 
this week, but it ' s planned to be in place. 
LPM: The port really is the cornerstone of the development. You can 
have a beautiful railway, wonderful telephones and nothing will happen 
unless things are working at the port. But there are changes taking 
place at the port and you can see it. 
FS : This is a process and you have to understand this is a process. We 
cannot change everything in a moment. It is a process which involves 
people also. And the war , it was yesterday. We have had a very short 
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time to move and to change completely everything and to give another 
image. 
LPM : I must say that I ' m surprised at how much has changed and how much 
has improved in Maputo . I expected it to be much worse than it is now. 
I ' ve been speaking with people in the city and it sounds as if things 
are changing quite r apidly. It seems that some things are going very 
well. How has it affected you, working in the government, the change 
from central planning to more interactive role with market and with 
capitalists investing? 
FS : I think it is a complete change which in fact is not easy because 
this is a change of the people also. and we are talking of the same 
people who have been working and living in colonial times. We have been 
living with central planning -- we are the same people! And now we are 
in an new situation and it ' s a very short time. It ' s not easy if you're 
a human being and you ' re talking of the changes. I think we are 
requiring a lot of the people . The level of co-operation ... international 
counterparts and all of these things which we needed to adequate ... all 
of the things we needed in order to operate also. 
LPM : I think one of the hardest things in government to do, is for an 
individual that had control over a particular situation, to step back 
and let other people take control of that situation. That's like the 
move from central planning to a more mixed economy . It ' s very difficult 
for people to give up that power. So, what is your relationship with 
international funders , like the World Bank? Are they happy with what's 
going on in the Maputo Corridor , are they satisfied? 
FS : I think this is not the best question for me. I can give only my 
feeling. The best answers you can get from the financiers. But, from 
our point of view , I think we are together . This is a new process. The 
Maputo Development Corridor, as such , is a kind of new project of co-
ordination. This involves different other projects and it ' s new. I 
think it ' s a process, but I don ' t foresee any problems. We are trying 
to find the best way to deal with each financier, according to their 
interest and our interest. But it is a process because we have to 
identify what we want and if they are also interested ... 
LPM : So, you weren't forced into this . It was not like South Africans 
and donors came along and said, ' Well we really want to do this' and 
Mozambicans were brought along? 
FS : Look, I was involved from the beginning with this project on a 
technical level . I don't think I was forced to do anything!! I couldn ' t 
do anything by force, I'm sure . Myself, I was not forced to do 
anything! 
LPM : There are always a lot of arguments that I have to work with that 
governments in Africa don ' t have options and don ' t choices and are 
forced into situations where they would r a ther not be . Now , you ' ve been 
working for a long time with the South Africans . What individuals in 
South Africa have you been working with and what is your impression of 
them? 
FS : My counterparts in the Department of Transport, Ketso Gordhan, Paul 
Jourdan , Karin Pearce, of course the co- ordinator was Mac Maharaj . It 
was interesting. I think it was a different experience from my side it 
was to work with South Africa. I think for them to work with Mozambique 
it was another experience. We ... the countries are quite different. The 
organisations, from the government side , a re also different. The means, 
and this is very important , the means are different also. The 
capabilities probably on a level where we are talking of qualified 
people and technicians also are different. Let me just explain. It's 
easy , for example, for them to contract a company to do a special job. 
In our case, we have to do that work ourselves. Of course the company 
that is specialised is different from the one group that has to do 
everything . So this is a completely different experience . So in this 
situation we can (unclear) different time, they can get another item of 
11 0 
work other than me . This is just an example, for you to understand . 
But for me it wa s very interesting to work with them and trying to 
follow in such a different context and such a different situation. 
There ' s a lot of difference between the countries and the counterparts 
to achieve an object ive , because we have launched the Maputo Corridor , 
we have investors conference , now we have got the first big project 
which is the toll roa d , this is in a ve r y s hort time. We talked for the 
first time in a ministerial meeting on the Maputo Corridor in August 
1995. 
LPM : So, August ' 95 was the first ministerial meeting. 
FS: Yes , regarding this . We are in 1997 and the fifth month we ' ve got 
the toll road -- all in a very short period . 
LPM: I hear that it ' s faster than similar projects in India , Malaysia , 
and other countries . It's amazing that given the constraint s that 
government has, both in Mozambique and in South Africa to get the job 
accomplished s o rapidly . 
FS: I think it was really people committed and involved, working day 
and night if you will , we found there ' s good co- operation between both 
countries . 
LPM : Have you had any contact at all with individuals from Mpumalanga? 
FS : We have been in the same meetings together. But we are at the 
central level, dealing with the central level dealing with central 
level. But t here is (unclear) involved with Mpumalanga, as well as our 
province, Maputo . We ' ve got some experience with them, but .. 
LPM : Now that the Maputo Corridor , it ' s large and growing in . terms of 
its ramifications. Not only is it going to Zimbabwe , South Africa, and 
Swaziland but there are plans for a new or improved road to KwaZulu-
Natal . How will that change the relationship between KwaZulu-Natal and 
Mozambique? 
FS : Sorry , I didn ' t get that . . . 
LPM: Sure, there ' s this road contemplated between Ponta do Ouro to 
KwaZulu - Natal along the coast. I was wondering how that would change 
Southern Mozambique and KwaZulu-Natal . 
FS: A part of the transport infrastructure , tourism is one of the 
sectors which we think that this project will be increasing . Probably 
also . . . if we get the infrastructure in place we expect there will be 
coming various other activities. Tourism is one , industry is probably 
one, agriculture and all the other activities related and which will be 
suitable when we have got the infrastructur e and transportation. 
LPM : One of South Africa ' s big concerns has been the border post and how 
that's changing. They are building a single integrated facility . How 
is that going to change the way in which customs is processed. Is it 
going to be computeri s ed, will there be new training - - how will that 
change? 
FS : That is a technical speciality, but what I can tell you is this, 
that the border post is a crucial project with which we are dealing 
right now . And all this is migration , customs , foreign affairs, public 
works are involved. There is a committee to work on it and we expect to 
achieve the objective, because one is to f a cilitate cargo and passengers 
and we expect s ome cha nges on it but they a re still working on the 
technical point of view , the agreements is . .. this is a one - stop 
facility. We have no experience , there a re few experiences in the world 
also . We are dealing with that issue . 
LPM: There is a s pecial committee of all the ministers involved. 
FS : Yes, with internal affairs also. 
LPM : One of the things that surprised me about the Maputo Development is 
that there is very little fighting over territory. A lot of ministers 
from different departments and a lot of different department heads and 
directors - general work together. In South Africa, Trade and Industry , 
and Transport for example work very closely together as opposed to 
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fighting over the project. So, your role in particular. Are you the 
manager from this side for the Maputo Corridor? 
FS : No, I am not the manager . In the beginning, when they were talking 
about 1995 , the government had to identify two co-ordinators for each 
side . And it was Paul Jourdan as well as Ketso Gordhan from the South 
African side and me and Antonio Pinto from international affairs. We 
had been nominated to be part of that with South Africans to discuss. 
So, we represent , from a technical point of view, the co-ordinators, 
but not the managers necessarily . You ' ve probably heard of the company 
that will be put in place. This does not mean that I will be the 
manager of this company. That is another story; I am involved as a co-
ordinator . 
LPM : From the technical side ... 
FS : Not jus t for transport this is a multisectoral project, it's not 
only transport . We ' ve got a committee which involves technicians from 
agriculture , industry , public works, planning and finance . So we co-
ordinate this committee. 
LPM : How has this development, one last thing , although maybe I should 
be asking someone else , how has this changed your relationship with 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe? Has it been as close of a working relationship 
or what has their role been? 
FS : It was started as a bilateral .. . project. However , it is regional 
also. The negotiations are starting between this initiative within both 
countries , Mozambique and South Africa . Of course, we have contact with 
the other countries in the region and we expect to get participation for 
the company from other countries in the region who are also interested 
in the project . The involvement of the private sector , not only from 
the region , but international also. 
LPM: So, the corridor company ' s participation will be very broad. 
FS : The company will be the participation of South Africa, Mozambique , 
governments of the region interested in the corridor, and the private 
sector. 
LPM : Now, how does this development .. . How is this different or similar 
to what's going on in Beira right now? Or what ' s been going on in the 
Beira Corridor for a while? 
FS : The Beira Corridor has another co-ordinator. I am not the co-
ordinator of the Beira Corridor, but I think they are also working on 
that . 
LPM : That actually pretty much answers my questions . .. thank you very 
much. 
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